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Poverty and Social Security HA-7-2-16

 

By Anthony J. Sanders

sanderstony@live.com

 

A. Regulation of benefit programs is best understood by the civil rights crime deprivation of relief benefits under 18USC§246. It is necessary to convict the SSA Actuary, Commissioner and Treasurer of a misdemeanor “no COLA” offense on January 1 and a felony if disability benefits are cut because the Commissioner was unable to do the math because SSA will have to be retroactively accounted for, as directed in this work, to pay back pay to compensate for the benefit loss and legislating a 3% COLA for all social security beneficiaries in 2016 under Sec. 204 and 225(i) of the Social Security Act 42USC§404(c) and §425. Although the Constitution bans retroactive laws, the insolvent Congress predictably failed to get the OASDI tax rate right in time, and it is because Congress did not pass the law, the OASDI tax rate must be retroactively accounted for from January 1 to pay the compensation (backpay) and free the year from the jail of simple civil rights offenders facing heightened penalties for discriminating against elders and the disabled. The political solution is to abolish the incompetent Actuary and hold the Commissioner responsible for accounting for this underpayment Sec. 204 of the Social Security Act 42USC§404(c) from January 1, 2016 as directed in this work. The federal government could have a budget surplus if only the $118,500 (2015) OASDI limit on taxable income were eliminated and revenues were shared with the federal government, as directed in the end of this work - the true accounting of the federal budget. SSA must however get the OASDI tax rate right for accounting competency purposes. The correct OASDI tax rate, that must be retroactively accounted for from January 1, 2016, to afford the back payments due faultless beneficiaries, are – 2.4% DI 10.0% OASI in 2016, 2.3% DI 10.1% OASI in 2017, and 2.2% DI and 10.2% OASI in 2018.

 

a. Social security is the largest, most important and most loved social program in modern governments. More than 50 million people receive the majority of their income from social security. More than 6 million people who receive disability insurance benefits face wrongful benefit cuts sometime this 2016 when the DI trust fund is predicted to be exhausted, because the Obama Administration didn't get the OASDI tax rate math right in time to prevent the causation of criminal damage. The United States must get the OASDI tax rate right to save the DI trust fund and free 2016 from jail. Furthermore, the United States must survey the racial theory that the Disability Insurance (DI) trust fund and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) discriminate against poor African-Americans, of both sexes, under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Blacks seem to be cruelly expected to survive until retirement, without equal access to disability insurance or SSI. Blacks are reported, by numerous black SSA employees, to enjoy limited access to survivor benefits, for the few who pass the ALJs murder test; Obama failed before he was even elected. Blacks in power must stop discriminating against disability and start suing for 'extremely poor African-American or half African-American' to be a 'qualifying disability' if, after surveying, it is corroborated, that there are a disproportionately small number of African-American disability and SSI beneficiaries under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

 

1. Since 2000 when the 1.8% rate was legislated the OASDI tax rate has not been changed and it is projected that the DI trust fund is going to be depleted this 2016 although OASI makes enough revenues to pay for DI without an OASI deficit until 2019 if optimally adjusted. In 2008, just before costs first exceeded revenues, it became apparent that the DI trust fund was going to be depleted much sooner than the OASI trust fund and the DI tax rate should have been increased. In 2000 the DI Trust Fund disbursed $60.2 billion, the balance was $55 billion. Since 2009 DI program costs have exceeded combined payroll tax and interest income by -$12.2 in 2009, -$23.6 in 2010 and -$25.8 in 2011. The trust fund ratio began its inexorable decline from a high of 199% in 2008 to 183% in 2009. DI costs continued to rise but revenues declined to a low of $105.5 billion in 2010. Growth was slow and by 2012 DI total revenues were $108.8 but program cost had risen to $138.5 billion and the trust fund had fallen to $132 billion 117% of annual benefit payments. (Tables VI. C5, VI.G2 Disability Benefit Disbursement under the OASDI Program 2013 Annual Report). By 2015 total revenues were projected to increase to $121.2 but the early retirement of the baby boomers had swollen payments to $151 billion and there was only $28.4 billion left, at the end of the year the trust fund ratio was 39% and in 2016 the trust fund is expected to be entirely depleted and would cease functioning, reduced benefits would continue to be paid with tax revenues. (Table IV.A2 Operations of the DI Trust Fund 2014 Annual Report). It is unfair that SSA is considering cutting benefits as low as 80% of current value when the trust fund is depleted sometime in 2016 when all they need to do is adjust the tax rate.

 

2. In 2016 total revenues are estimated to be $129.3 billion, payroll tax contributions are estimated to be $125..7 billion and total expenses $159.4 billion. To quickly estimate the minimum tax rate that the DI trust fund needs with the ratio 1.8 / 125.7 = x / 159.4 where x yields a DI tax rate of 2.3%. The DI trust fund has however been operating on a deficit since 2009 and is nearly depleted at year end 2015. It is therefore necessary to adjust the OASDI tax rate to an emergency rate of 2.4% to avoid depleting the trust fun. Using the same equation 1.8 / 125.7 = 2.4 / x the 2.4% rate would generate $167.6 billion in revenues, saving $8.2 billion for a trust fund balance of $44.2 billion, including about $1.5 billion in interest income at year end 2016. The United States must legislate the 2.4% DI and 10.0% OASI tax rate immediately. In 2017 the 2.3% tax rate is estimated to bring in $170.5 billion and expenses are estimated at $165.2 billion saving the DI trust fund $5.7 billion, bringing the trust fund balance to $51.6 billion, including about $1.7 billion interest income. In 2018 so many baby boomers are expected to have retired from disability that the actual DI tax rate should be adjusted to 2.2%, to prevent an early deficit in the OASI trust fund, making $185 billion and costing $171.2 billion, saving $13.8 billion. The DI tax rate of 2.2% and OASI tax rate of 10.2% is expected to be the intermediate rate from 2018 to at least 2022, that holds even when the OASI trust fund begins to show a deficit around 2020 to protect the smaller DI trust fund. The OASI trust fund is much larger and can better afford to lobby SSA to eliminate the maximum taxable limit on income and tax the richest to increase OASDI tax revenues by 130%, increase welfare spending and balance the federal budget, the year the new tax goes into effect. The 2.4% DI and 10.0% OASI OASDI tax rate estimates for 2016 must be legislated right away by unanimous roll-call vote:

 

Free Disability Insurance Reallocation Tax (DIRT) and 3% COLA Social Security Amendment of January 1, 2016

 

To amend the DI tax rate from 1.80% to 2.40% in 2016, 2.30% in 2017 and 2.20% in 2018; from 0.90% to 1.20% in 2016, 1.15% in 2017 and 1.10% in 2018 for employees and from 0.90% to 1.20% in 2016, 1.15% in 2017 and 1.10% in 2018 for employers under Sec. 201(b)(1)(S) of the Social Security Act 42USC(7)II§401.

 

To amend the OASI tax rate from 10.60% to 10.0% in 2016, 10.10% in 2017, and 10.20% in 2018; from 5.30% to 5.00% in 2016, to 5.05% in 2017, to 5.10% in 2018 for employees under 26USC(C)(21)(A)§3101 (a) and from 5.30% to 5.00% in 2016, 5.05% in 2017, and 5.10% in 2018 for employers under 26USC(C)(21)(A)§3111 (a) to avoid depletion of the Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund in 2016 without increasing the overall 12.4% OASDI or 15.3% OASDI and Hospital Insurance (HI) Federal Insurance Contribution Act tax-rate under 26USC(A)(2)§1401.

 

To legislate a 3% annual COLA at Sec. 225(i) 42USC425(i) retroactive to January 1, 2016 under Sec. 204(c) 42USC§404(c).

 

Be it enacted by the House and Senate Assembled

 

B. The United States is tired of being toyed with by the Actuary's real or feigned inability to perform the his OASDI tax rate calculation duties and refuses to fall prey again to fraudulent Harvard welfare advisors. Getting the OASDI tax rate right has been a priority every fiscal year since the baby boomers first incurred costs in excess of DI revenues in 2009, the tyranny was unable to account for, Harvard having opted to kill Osama bin Laden instead of being responsible for the supporting documents, whose math and laws, were ignored to lose the race for Commissioner Social Security Caucus of 2011s for case-lessness. The Actuary’s letter to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) titled, ‘Potential Reallocation of the Payroll Tax Rate Between the Disability Insurance (DI) Program and the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) Program’ dated February 5, 2015 was wrong to use the actuarial DI shortfall statistic of 2.7% proposed by the President as the result of a misleading intermediate estimate the fine print explains cannot be used to estimate the tax rate, after being informed of the correct 2.3% DI tax rate at the end of 2014 and then perpetuating the wrong answer. On September 30, 2015 Estimate of the Effects on the OASI and DI Trust Funds of enacting the temporary reallocation of the payroll tax rate proposed in S. 2090 and H.R. 3621, was published by the Actuary regarding legislation introduced on September 28, 2015 by Senator Ron Wyden and Representative Sandy Levin. The proposal would increase the total (employee plus employer) payroll tax rate for the DI Trust Fund by 0.85 percentage point, from 1.8 to 2.65 percent, for calendar years 2016 through 2020. The financial status of the combined OASI and DI Trust Funds is essentially the same as under present law. The combined asset reserves of the OASI and DI Trust Funds would become depleted in 2034. After reserve depletion in 2034, tax income would be sufficient to cover 79 percent of cost. This percent drops to 73 by 2089. The asset reserves of the OASI Trust Fund would become depleted in 2034. After reserve depletion in 2034, tax income would cover 77 percent of cost. This percent drops to 71 by 2088. The asset reserves of the DI Trust Fund would become depleted in 2034. After reserve depletion in 2034, non-interest income would cover 89 percent of cost. This percent drops to 81 by 2089. This bill is adequate but does not get the math exactly right and would accelerate the moment at which the OASI trust would begin to exhibit an unpleasant deficit. Every tenth of a percent of DI tax rate adjustment is billions of dollars from the OASI tax. In fact at a 2.65% rate, it can be calculated that the OASI trust fund would have a deficit of about $300 million at the end of 2016.

 

1. Having been informed of the 2.4% rate, the current Congressional DI tax rate estimate is basically correct, but perpetuating the Paperwork Reduction Act, that politely asks to be abolished, was estimated at $10 million, and the Actuary paid no mind to the $30 billion dollar social security amendment that requires proper legislative citation, as done above, and none of the propaganda for the hiring of civil rights criminals, nor infinite complexity of an insolvent balanced budget act that has plagiarized the answer to the Actuary's calculation from the disability beneficiary who actually balances their budget, and not their own unusually difficult task to find the citations needed to amend the OASDI tax rate in the United States Code. On October 27 2015 John Boehner received a memorandum from the Actuary titled Estimate of the Effects on the OASI and DI Trust Funds of enacting the temporary reallocation of a portion of the OASDI payroll tax rate proposed in H.R. 1314, the "Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015," introduced on September 27, 2015 Section 833. Reallocation of payroll tax revenue. For earnings in calendar years 2016 through 2018, increase from 1.80 percent to 2.37 percent the portion of the total 12.40 percent OASDI payroll tax that is directed to the DI Trust Fund. This reallocation of the payroll tax rates is projected to change the date for DI reserve depletion from the fourth quarter of 2016 to approximately the third quarter of 2022. The 2.37 percent rate estimated by Congress is not the 2.4% rate self-employed taxpayers might see on their paystubs. Nor does a flat 2.4% rate account for the retirement of the large class of baby boomers in 2018 that is expected to reduce the rate of disability to 2.2%. Nor does the Actuary estimate the $35.4 billion a 2.37% DI tax rate, rounded up to 2.4% of the taxable payroll, that would save his DI trust fund from certain depletion sometime in 2016.

 

C. Social Security is the primary social safety net for the poor, aged and disabled. 165 million working Americans, 93 percent of all workers, earn Social Security’s disability, survivor, and retirement protections for themselves and their families. In 2016 Social Security paid $834 billion in benefits to more than 58 million beneficiaries – nearly one in five Americans. 38 million retired workers, 9 million disabled workers. Of the nation’s 74 million children under age 18. Each month, 4.4 million dependent children – about 3.4 million under age 19 and 2 million adults disabled before age 22 – receive Social Security checks totaling about $2.5 billion. Operating on a such a large and growing deficit the DI trust fund is predicted to be totally depleted sometime in 2016, at which time the Social Security Trustees conspire to cut benefits to around 80% of current value. Under the current intermediate assumptions, the Social Security Trustees project that annual cost for the OASDI program will exceed non-interest income in 2014 and remain higher throughout the remainder of the long-range period. The projected theoretical combined OASI and DI Trust Fund asset reserves increase through 2019, begin to decline in 2020, and become depleted and unable to pay scheduled benefits in full on a timely basis in 2033. At the time of reserve depletion, continuing income to the combined trust funds would be sufficient to pay 77 percent of scheduled benefits. However, the DI Trust Fund reserves become depleted in 2016, at which time continuing income to the DI Trust Fund would be sufficient to pay 81 percent of DI benefits. Therefore, legislative action is needed as soon as possible to address the DI program’s financial imbalance. Lawmakers may consider responding to the impending DI Trust Fund reserve depletion as they did in 1994, solely by reallocating the payroll tax rate between OASI and DI. Such a response might serve to delay DI reforms and much needed corrections for OASDI as a whole. However, enactment of a more permanent solution could (must) include a tax reallocation in the short-run. Although the annual rate can be calculated fairly quickly, to navigate the extremely dynamic surge of retiring baby boomers, currently at the peak of their disability years, it is necessary to put different rates in a table to make an informed decision to have variable rates. This “pain in the OASDI” tax rate calculation takes a week of full time sedentary work certain to cause sciatica or heart disease.

 

Optimal OASDI Tax Rate Competition in Billions 2015-2022

 

OASDI Tax

Payroll Revenues

Total Revenues

Total Costs

Change in Fund

Fund

2015 OASDI 12.4% 10.6/1.8

808.4

938.0

909.7

28.3

2,812.1

OASI 10.6%

691.1

816.8

758.7

58.1

2,783.7

DI 1.8%

117.3

121.2

151.0

-29.8

28.4

2015 OASDI 12.4% 10.0/2.4

808.4

938.0

909.7

28.3

2,812.1

OASI 10.0%

651.7

777.4

758.7

18.7

2,744.2

DI 2.4%

156.7

161.6

151.0

10.6

68.8

2015 OASDI 12.4% 10.1/2.3

808.4

938.0

909.7

28.3

2,812.1

OASI 10.1%

658.5

784.2

758.7

25.5

2,751

DI 2.3%

149.9

153.8

151.0

2.8

61.0

2015 OASDI 12.4% 10.2/2.2

808.4

938.0

909.7

28.3

2,812.1

OASI 10.2%

665.0

789.5

758.7

30.8

2,811.6

DI 2.2%

143.4

148.5

151.0

-3.7

54.5

2016 OASDI 12.4% 10.6/1.8

853.0

985.3

963.3

22.0

2,834.1

OASI 10.6%

729.2

858.8

807.5

51.3

2,835.0

DI 1.8%

123.8

125.8

155.8

-30

-1.6

2016 OASDI 12.4% 10.0/2.4

853.0

985.3

963.3

22.0

2,834.1

OASI 10.0% 2015

687.9

817.5

807.5

10.0

2,793.7

OASI 10.0% 2016

687.9

817.5

807.5

10.0

2,754.2

DI 2.4% 2015

165.1

168.0

155.8

13.8

73.6

DI 2.4% 2016

165.1

167.1

155.8

12.9

9.3

2016 OASDI 12.4% 10.1/2.3

853.0

985.3

963.3

22.0

2,834.1

OASI 10.1% 2015

694.8

823.4

807.5

15.9

2,766.9

OASI 10.1% 2016

694.8

824.4

807.5

16.9

2,800.6

DI 2.3% 2015

158.2

161.2

155.8

5.4

67.4

DI 2.3% 2016

158.2

160.2

155.8

4.4

32.6

2017 OASDI 12.4% 10.6/1.8

904.9

1,042.7

1,022.3

20.4

2,854.4

OASI 10.6%

773.5

909.7

861.1

48.6

2,883.6

DI 1.8%

131.4

133.6

161.2

-17.6

-22.2

2017 OASDI 12.4% 10.0/2.4

904.9

1,042.7

1,022.3

20.4

2,854.4

OASI 10.0% 2015

729.7

863.9

861.1

2.8

2,796.5

OASI 10.0% 2016

729.7

865.9

861.1

4.8

2,759

DI 2.4% 2015

175.2

179.4

161.2

18.2

85.6

DI 2.4% 2016

175.2

177.4

161.2

16.2

48.8

2017 OASDI 12.4% 10.1/2.3

904.9

1,042.7

1,022.3

20.4

2,854.4

OASI 10.1% 2015

737.0

873.2

861.1

12.1

2,779

OASI 10.1% 2016

737.0

874.2

861.1

13.1

2,813.7

DI 2.3% 2015

171.4

175.9

161.2

14.7

81.1

DI 2.3% 2016

171.4

174.9

161.2

13.7

46.3

2018 OASDI 12.4% 10.6/1.8

960

1,105

1,087.6

17.4

2,871.8

OASI 10.6%

820.7

965.3

920.5

44.7

2,928.3

DI 1.8%

139.4

141.9

167.1

-25.2

-47.4

2018 OASDI 12.4% 10.0/2.4

960

1,105

1,087.6

17.4

2,871.8

OASI 10.0% 2015

774.3

917.2

920.5

-3.3

2,793.2

OASI 10.0% 2016

774.3

918.2

920.5

-2.3

2,756.7

DI 2.4% 2015

185.9

190.0

167.1

22.9

108.5

DI 2.4% 2016

185.9

188.6

167.1

21.5

67.8

2018 OASDI 12.4% 10.1/2.3

960

1,105

1,087.6

17.4

2,871.8

OASI 10.1% 2015

782

925.6

920.5

5.1

2,784.1

OASI 10.1% 2016

782

926.6

920.5

6.1

2,819.8

DI 2.3% 2015

178.1

182.6

167.1

15.5

96.6

DI 2.3% 2016

178.1

181.6

167.1

14.5

60.8

2018 OASDI 12.4% 10.2/2.2

960

1,105

1,087.6

17.4

2,871.8

OASI 10.2% 10.1 2015

789.7

934.3

920.5

13.8

2,792.8

OASI 10.2% 10.1 2016

789.7

933.3

920.5

12.8

2,832.6

DI 2.2% 2.3 2015

170.4

176.9

167.1

9.8

90.9

DI 2.2% 2.3 2016

170.4

175.9

167.1

8.8

55.1

2018 OASDI 12.4% 10.3/2.1

960

1,105

1,087.6

17.4

2,871.8

OASI 10.3% 10.1 2015

797.5

939.1

920.5

18.6

2,795.6

OASI 10.3% 10.1 2015

797.5

940.1

920.5

19.6

2,837.4

DI 2.1% 2.3 2015

162.6

168.1

167.1

1

82.1

DI 2.1% 2.3 2016

162.6

167.1

167.1

0

46.3

2019 OASDI 12.4% 10.6/1.8

1,012.9

1,165.1

1,158.7

6.4

2,878.3

OASI 10.6%

865.8

1,019

985.1

33.9

2,962.2

DI 1.8%

147.0

149.7

173.6

-23.9

-71.3

2019 OASDI 12.4% 10.2/2.2

1,012.9

1,165.1

1,158.7

6.4

2,878.3

OASI 10.2 10.1 2015

833.1

981.3

985.1

-3.8

2,789

OASI 10.2 10.1 2016

833.1

982.3

985.1

-2.8

2,829.8

DI 2.2% 2.3 2015

179.7

186.4

173.6

12.8

103.7

DI 2.2% 2.3 2015

179.7

185.4

173.6

11.8

56.9

2019 OASDI 12.4% 10.1/2.3

1,012.9

1,165.1

1,158.7

6.4

2,878.3

OASI 10.1% 2015

825.0

976

985.1

-9.1

2,754.6

OASI 10.1% 2016

825.0

977

985.1

-8.1

2,812.7

DI 2.3% 2015

187.8

193.5

173.6

19.9

128.4

DI 2.3% 2016

187.8

192.4

173.6

18.8

85.6

2020 OASDI 12.4% 10.6/1.8

1,065.5

1,224.5

1,235.2

-10.7

2,867.6

OASI 10.6%

910.9

1,072.0

1,054.6

17.4

2,979.5

DI 1.8%

154.7

157.6

180.6

-23

-94.3

2020 OASDI 12.4% 10.2/2.2

1,065.5

1,224.5

1,235.2

-10.7

2,867.6

OASI 10.2 10.1 2015

876.5

1,032.6

1,054.6

-22

2,767

OASI 10.2 10.1 2016

876.5

1,033.6

1,054.6

-21

2,808.8

DI 2.2% 2.3 2015

189.1

197

180.6

16.4

120.1

DI 2.2% 2.3 2016

189.1

196

180.6

15.4

72.3

2020 OASDI 12.4% 10.1/2.3

1,065.5

1,224.5

1,235.2

-10.7

2,867.6

OASI 10.1% 2015

867.9

1,025

1,054.6

-29.6

2,725

OASI 10.1% 2016

867.9

1,026

1,054.6

-28.6

2,784.1

DI 2.3% 2015

197.7

205.6

180.6

25.0

153.4

DI 2.3% 2016

197.7

204.6

180.6

24.0

109.6

2021 OASDI 12.4% 10.6/1.8

1,065.5

1,224.5

1,312.3

-29.1

2,838.4

OASI 10.6%

956.5

1,124.3

1,122.9

1.4

2,980.9

DI 1.8%

162.4

165.5

189.4

-23.9

-118.2

2021 OASDI 12.4% 10.2/2.2

1,065.5

1,224.5

1,312.3

-29.1

2,838.4

OASI 10.2% 10.3 2015

920.4

1,082.2

1,122.9

-34.7

2,732.3

OASI 10.2% 10.3 2016

920.4

1,083.2

1,122.9

-33.7

2,775.1

DI 2.2% 2.3 2015

198.5

207.6

189.4

18.2

138.3

DI 2.2% 2.3 2016

198.5

206.6

189.4

17.2

89.5

2021 OASDI 12.4% 10.1/2.3

1,065.5

1,224.5

1,312.3

-29.1

2,838.4

OASI 10.1

911.4

1,079.2

1,122.9

-43.7

2,681.3

DI 2.3

207.5

210.6

189.4

21.2

174.6

2022 OASDI 12.4% 10.6/1.8

1,172.0

1,341.4

1,395.8

-54.4

2,784.1

OASI 10.6%

1,001.8

1,176.3

1,197.3

-21

2,959.9

DI 1.8%

170.1

173.2

198.5

-25.3

-143.5

2022 OASDI 12.4% 10.2/2.2

1,172.0

1,341.4

1,395.8

-54.4

2,784.1

OASI 10.2% 10.3 2015

964

1,131.5

1,197.3

-65.8

2,666.5

OASI 10.2% 10.3 2016

964

1,132.5

1,197.3

-64.8

2,710.3

DI 2.2% 2.3 2015

207.9

218

198.5

19.5

157.8

DI 2.2% 2.3 2016

207.9

217

198.5

18.5

108

2022 OASDI 12.4% 10.1/2.3

1,172.0

1,341.4

1,395.8

-54.4

2,784.1

OASI 10.1

954.5

1,120

1,197.3

-77

2,604.3

DI 2.3

217.4

229.5

198.5

40.0

214.6

Source: Goss ’14 Tables IV.A1-3 Intermediate Projections, this differential equation comparing the effectiveness of different rates in dollar amounts takes a week the first time. It is possible that the Actuary could agree with the optimal rates of 2.3% DI and 10.1% OASI until 2018 when the optimal rate goes to 2.2% DI and 10.2% OASI.

 

1. Whereas the hard work has been done, it is now simply the matter of an hour to corroborate the adequacy of the current year, and a day for the SSA Commissioner to corroborate the right answer by methodically update Tables IV pertaining to the dollars figures of the OASI and DI trust funds, without making any actuarial errors. Two errors were detected in OASI Trust Fund Table IV.A.1, and at least one more is suspected before Table IV.A.3 OASDI in the 2015 Annual Report of the OASDI Trustees 2014. First a uniform rate of interest must be declared – 3.4% is standard. Second, the high expenditure figures are misplaced in the low-cost projection. To correct the 2014 Annual Report the Actuaries must first redo the DI Trust Fund Table A.2 using Arabic numeral 0 and negative numbers, in order to negotiate with the OASI trust fund. Second, the expenditure projections in the OASI Trust Fund Table A.1 must be properly arranged from high cost to low cost. Third, from a credible starting date, the Actuary must redo the OASI Trust Fund Table IV A.1 at an interest rate of their own declaration, the 3.4% rate is the norm. Fourth, the Actuary must recalculate the combined OASDI Trust Fund Table IV A.3. Fifth, the Actuaries redo the tables with the 2.4% DI 10.0% OASI rate of taxation in 2016, 2.3% DI 10.1% OASI in 2017 and 2.2% DI 10.2% OASI in 2018. Sixth, having an accurate baseline the Actuary must estimate the 130% increase in revenues that would result from the Without Income Limit Law (WILL). The WILL would prevent the OASI trust fund from developing a modest deficit in 2019 and possibly from needing to raise the overall OASDI tax rate in 2035 at the height of baby boomer costs. Taxing the rich would also make it possible to balance the true federal budget.

 

DI Trust Fund Depletion with Zero Interest and Negative Balance 2015-2022

 

Year

Total Revenue

Payroll Tax

Other Revenue

Net Interest

Total Spending

Net Increase Year End

Year End Balance

2015

121.2

117.3

1.9

2.0

151.0

-29.8

28.4

2016

125.8

123.8

2.0

0

155.8

-30.0

-1.6

2017

133.6

131.4

2.2

0

161.2

-27.6

-29.2

2018

141.9

139.4

2.5

0

167.1

-25.2

-54.4

2019

149.7

147.0

2.7

0

173.6

-23.9

-78.3

2020

157.6

154.7

2.9

0

180.6

-23

-101.3

2021

165.5

162.4

3.1

0

189.4

-23.9

-125.2

2022

173.5

170.1

3.4

0

198.5

-25

-150.2

Source: Goss '15 Table IV.A.2.

 

2. To begin calculating the OASDI tax reallocation DI Table IV.A.2 must be filled out. The Actuary left it to the reader to add other revenues, meaning the taxation of benefits, contributions from the General Fund and net interest, to come up with total revenue. Because there are no interest revenues, insignificant to nothing contributions from the General Fund are combined with the taxation of benefits to come up with Other Revenue. There is no interest after 2015 because the Trust fund will be depleted under current law. Net Interest is conservatively estimated at 3% for DIRT and WILL projections. Total spending is estimated using the Actuary’s intermediate projections for the current law. Administrative and Railroad Benefits are affordable and do not raise any questions. Net increase at year end is total revenues minus total spending. The total net increase is added to previous number, or subtracted if that number happens to be negative. At the end of 2015 the DI Trust Fund is estimated to have a balanced of $28.4 billion, however due to the ongoing deficit, the trust fund will be depleted sometime in 2016 and at the end of the year the balance will be -$1.6 billion, in 2017 it will -$29.2 billion and by 2020 it will reach -$101.3. The OASI Trust Fund could pay the deficit as a reduction in assets at the end of the year and there would be no DI trust fund, only a payroll tax and some taxation of benefits for revenues and benefit payments, administration and Railroad benefits for expenses. This is the easiest solution, it is sloppy accounting, but not criminally so, because no-one’s benefits would be unnecessarily cut, nor trust fund depleted. The right way to transfer revenues from one trust fund to the other is however to adjust the tax rate. SSA has previously always been able to perform the OASDI reallocation math. Now we are ready to begin calculating the optimal OASDI tax rate; 2.4% DI and 10.0% OASI in 20-16, 2.3% DI and 10.1% OASI in 2017 and 2.2% DI and 10.2% OASI in 2018, after which time the rate is expected to stabilize with the retirement of the baby boomers, giving the DI trust a slight advantage that would cause deficits to show first in the OASI trust fund, but the DI trust fund is small and disability rates can change disastrously, wherefore the adequacy of the tax rate must be regularly checked. The 2.4% DI tax rate of 2016 increases the trust fund balance by $5.3 billion over a 2.3% rate and $35.4 billion over the inadequate 1.8% rate.

 

DI Trust Fund: Current, Free DIRT and WILL 2015-2022

(billions)

 

Year

Total Rev.

Payroll Tax

Other Rev.

Net Interest

Gross

Cost

Gross Increase

USPS

Fed 2020

Year End Balance

2015

121.2

117.3

1.9

2.0

151.0

-29.8

0

28.4

2016

125.8

123.8

2.0

0

155.8

-30.0

0

-1.6

DIRT 2.4

167.1

165.1

2.0

1.0

155.8

11.3

0

34.8

WILL

216.7

214.7

2.0

1.0

161.0

55.7

21.4

62.7

2017

133.6

131.4

2.2

0

161.2

-27.6

0

-29.2

DIRT

171.3

167.9

2.2

1.2

161.2

10.1

0

44.9

WILL

222.4

218.3

2.2

1.9

167.3

55.1

21.9

88.9

2018

141.9

139.4

2.5

0

167.1

-25.2

0

-54.4

DIRT 2.2

174.4

170.3

2.5

1.5

167.1

7.3

0

52.2

WILL

226.9

221.4

2.5

3.0

173.9

53

22.3

119.6

2019

149.7

147.0

2.7

0

173.6

-23.9

0

-78.3

DIRT

184

179.6

2.7

1.7

173.6

10.4

0

62.6

WILL

240.2

233.5

2.7

4.0

180.9

59.3

22.8

156.1

2020

157.6

154.7

2.9

0

180.6

-23

0

-101.3

DIRT

194.1

189.1

2.9

2.1

180.6

13.5

0

76.1

WILL

254.0

245.8

2.9

5.3

188.2

65.8

32.9

189

2021

165.5

162.4

3.1

0

189.4

-23.9

0

-125.2

DIRT

204.2

198.5

3.1

2.6

189.4

14.8

0

90.9

WILL

267.6

258.1

3.1

6.4

197.2

70.4

35.2

224.2

2022

173.5

170.1

3.4

0

198.5

-25

0

-150.2

DIRT

214.4

207.9

3.4

3.1

198.5

15.9

0

106.8

WILL

281.3

270.3

3.4

7.6

206.3

75.0

37.5

261.7

Source: Goss '15 Table IV.A.2.

 

3. To calculate the free DIRT estimates for DI is necessary to multiply payroll tax revenues times 2.4/1.8 = 1.333 in 2016, 2.3/1.8 = 1.278 in 2017 and 2.2/1.8 = 1.222 in 2018 and add other revenues and net interest for the total revenues. Total spending uses the intermediate projection. The gross increase at end of year is total revenues minus total spending. The Year End Balance is the net increase at end of year, (less the postal service in WILL), plus the previous Year’s End Balance. The WILL is calculated by multiplying the free DIRT payroll tax revenues by 1.3. Medicare is estimated to have a taxbase 1.33 times the size of SSA’s because Medicare doesn’t have a maximum taxable limit and has some other minor sources of taxbase that are not readily available to SSA. Wherefore, the estimate of 1.3 times the free DIRT payroll tax is made and total revenues are recalculated. Not to lose all the people’s money to the federal deficit the high cost scenario is used in the WILL total spending projections to benefit the poor, while the intermediate revenue projections continue to be used as a baseline for revenues, to ensure a conservative estimate. Interest is estimated at 3.4% of the previous year’s Year-end balance. Revenues from the DI WILL are expected to be so high that the surplus revenues must be shared. Therefore, after paying the high cost projection and sharing with the US Postal Service $20 billion (2014) + 2% annual growth until 2020, if revenues allow, when the General Fund would share the surplus 50/50 and pay for USPS. In deciding on the optimal free DIRT tax rate one must adjust the rate in 2018 to prevent a deficit in the OASI account. In the WILL OASI shall become responsible for paying for SSI in 2017. SSI growth should be estimated highly, at around 5% annual growth from $70 billion in 2017. The cost of SSI is added to the high estimate that happens to be in the low-cost future in Table IV.A.1. Interest is estimated at 3.4% of previous Year-end Balance. OASI high cost projections and SSI costs are added in the WILL to create Gross Cost. Total revenues are subtracted by gross costs to give gross increase at end of year. There is a 90% federal share until 2020 when it will be renegotiated from this 75% share through 2022. The Year-end Balance is sum of gross increase year end, less the federal share plus the previous year’s Year-end Balance. The free DIRT Act reduces OASI revenues by multiplying current payroll taxes times 10.0/10.6= 0.944, 10.1/10.6 = 0.953 in 2017, 10.2/10.6 = 0.962 in 2018, and adding other revenues and net interest.

 

OASI Trust Fund; Current, Free Dirt and WILL 2015-2022

 

Year

Total Rev.

Pay-

roll Tax

Other Rev.

Net Int.

OASI Cost

SSI Cost

Gross Cost

Gross Increase

Federal Share

Year End Balance

2015

816.8

691.1

31

94.7

758.7

0

758.7

58.1

0

2,783.7

2016

858.8

729.2

33.9

95.7

807.5

0

807.5

51.3

0

2,835.0

DIRT

10.0

817.5

687.9

33.9

95.7

807.5

0

807.5

10

0

2,793.7

2017

907.4

773.5

37.5

96.4

861.1

0

861.1

46.3

0

2,881.3

DIRT

10.1

869.7

737.0

37.5

95.2

861.1

0

861.1

8.6

0

2,802.3

WILL

1,090.8

958.1

37.5

95.2

880.2

70

950.2

140.6

126.5

2,807.8

2018

959.6

820.7

40.9

98.0

920.5

0

920.5

39.1

0

2,920.4

DIRT 10.2

926.1

789.7

40.9

95.5

920.5

0

920.5

5.6

0

2,793.9

WILL

1,163.2

1,027

40.9

95.7

949.7

73.5

1,023

140.2

126.2

2,821.8

2019

1,009.8

865.8

44.7

99.3

985.1

0

985.1

24.7

0

2,945.1

DIRT

973.5

833.1

44.7

95.7

985.1

0

985.1

-11.6

0

2,796.3

WILL

1,223.9

1,083

44.7

96.2

1,024

77.2

1,101

122.9

110.6

2,834.1

2020

1,059.6

910.9

48.6

100.1

1,055

0

1,055

4.6

0

2,949.7

DIRT

1,020.4

876.5

48.6

95.3

1.055

0

1,055

-34.6

0

2,761.7

WILL

1,284.7

1,140

48.6

96.6

1,103

81.0

1,184

100.7

50.3

2,884.4

2021

1,109.4

956.5

52.6

100.3

1,123

0

1,123

-13.6

0

2,936.1

DIRT

1,067.1

920.4

52.6

94.1

1,123

0

1,123

-55.9

0

2,705.8

WILL

1,347.4

1,196.5

52.6

98.3

1,183

85.1

1,268

79.4

39.7

2,924.1

2022

1,158.5

1,001.8

56.9

99.8

1,197

0

1,197

-38.5

0

2,897.6

DIRT

1.113.1

964.0

56.9

92.2

1,197

0

1,197

-83.9

0

2,621.9

WILL

1,409.8

1,253.2

56.9

99.7

1,270

89.3

1,359

50.8

25.4

2,949.5

Source: Goss '15 Table IV.A.1. Correction: (1) Interest is recalculated at a uniform 3.4% rate. (2) High cost estimated for the WILL are found in the low-cost projections.

 

3. Two errors have been detected, in the 2014 OASI Trust Fund Table IV.A.1, and at least one more is suspected. First, the rate of interest had to be normalized at the arbitrary net interest rate of 3.4%, thus changing future total OASI revenues, gross increase and Year-end balance; so as not to be overly pessimistic about the Free DIRT Act, that seems to be more accurately projected than that of the 2014 Annual Report. Second, the high expenditure figures are misplaced in the low-cost projection. Because they are higher than the intermediate projections these low-cost projections are used to describe expanded SSA spending under the WILL Act. This is the first time that any hacking has been detected in the Annual Report of the OASDI Trustees. This is very trying on the mental health of the analyst swayed by high OASI and feudal DI estimates. Comprehension at the moment of the publication has so far been at absolute zero, a number that hasn’t even yet been invested by our non-Palestine Supreme Court compensating Actuary. SSA Actuaries must first redo the DI Trust Fund Table A.2 using Arabic numeral 0 and negative numbers. Second, from a credible starting date, the Actuary must redo the OASI Trust Fund Table IV A.1 at an interest rate of their own declaration. Third, they must recalculate the combined OASDI Trust Fund Table IV A.3. Fourth, the SSA Actuaries must come to agreement with the 2.3% DI 10.1% rate of taxation until 2018 when it changes to 2.2% DI and 10.1%, under penalty of having to calculate, for the sake of comparison, half a dozen “pain in the OASDI tax rates” that takes a week, so make sure to sit up straight on a soft cushion. Under the proposed OASI tax rate a deficit would not appear in the OASI account until 2019. Saving the DI trust fund, at no cost to taxpayers, by reallocating the FICA, moves the first expected deficit in the OASI account from 2022 to 2019. Although the 10.2 OASI 2.2 DI rate seems to be a better expression from 2018 there is no half a percent that can save both OASI and DI from a deficit in 2019. OASI is much better able to bear the costs of a deficit than the much smaller DI Trust Fund.

 

                                                              OASDI Trust Funds: Current, Free DIRT and WILL 2015-2022

 

OASI

DI

OASDI

Year

Total Rev.

Gross Cost

Gross Increase

Total Rev.

Gross

Cost

Gross Increase

Total Rev.

Gross Cost

Gross Increase

 

2015

816.8

758.7

58.1

121.2

151.0

-29.8

938.0

909.7

28.3

 

2016

858.8

807.5

51.3

125.8

155.8

-30.0

984.6

963.3

21.3

 

DIRT

824.5

807.5

17

161.2

155.8

5.4

985.7

963.3

22.4

 

WILL

824.5

807.5

17

208.7

161.0

47.7

1,033.2

968.5

64.7

 

2017

907.4

861.1

46.3

133.6

161.2

-27.6

1,041

1,022

18.7

 

DIRT

869.7

861.1

8.6

171.3

161.2

10.1

1,041

1,022

18.7

 

WILL

1,090.8

950.2

140.6

222.4

167.3

55.1

1,313.2

1,117.5

195.7

 

2018

959.6

920.5

39.1

141.9

167.1

-25.2

1,101.5

1,087.6

13.9

 

DIRT

926.1

920.5

5.6

174.4

167.1

7.3

1,100.5

1,087.6

12.9

 

WILL

1,163.2

1,023

140.2

226.9

173.9

53

1,390.1

1,196.9

193.2

 

2019

1,009.8

985.1

24.7

149.7

173.6

-23.9

1,159.5

1,158.7

0.8

 

DIRT

973.5

985.1

-11.6

184

173.6

10.4

1,157.5

1,158.7

-1.2

 

WILL

1,223.9

1,101

122.9

240.2

180.9

59.3

1,464.1

1,281.9

182.2

 

2020

1,059.6

1,055

4.6

157.6

180.6

-23

1,217.2

1,235.6

-18.4

 

DIRT

1,020.4

1,055

-34.6

194.1

180.6

13.5

1,214.5

1,235.6

-31.1

 

WILL

1,284.7

1,184

100.7

254.0

188.2

65.8

1,538.7

1,372.2

166.5

 

2021

1,109.4

1,123

-13.6

165.5

189.4

-23.9

1,274.9

1,312.4

-37.5

 

DIRT

1,067.1

1,123

-55.9

204.2

189.4

14.8

1,271.3

1,312.4

-41.1

 

WILL

1,347.4

1,268

79.4

267.6

197.2

70.4

1,615

1,465.2

149.8

 

2022

1,158.5

1,197

-38.5

173.5

198.5

-25

1,332

1,395.5

-63.5

 

DIRT

1.113.1

1,197

-83.9

214.4

198.5

15.9

1,327.5

1,395.5

-68

 

WILL

1,409.8

1,359

50.8

281.3

206.3

75.0

1,691.1

1,565.3

125.8

 

Source: 2014 Annual Report of the Trustees Table IV.A1 recalculated at 3.4% interest rate plus DI Table IV.A2 independent of the one year retardation of OASDI Table A3.

 

4. Even adjusting for a uniform 3.4% rate of interest, OASI high estimates defy logic. According to math derived from 2015 Annual Report data, keeping the DI trust fund solvent to sustain interest earnings causes OASDI a slight loss, although adjusting the OASDI tax rate is obviously a zero sum game. The free DIRT Act alone will cause an OASDI deficit in 2019 instead of 2020 by a margin of error less than $2 billion. The OASDI tax reallocation equation will need to be re-addressed in 2020, if Congress wishes to grant their own tax evasion immunity, despite the damage retroactive taxation might cause the rich, if the legislative insolvency continues to rob the poor. Although everyone today knows the need for a Without Income Limit Law (WILL). Because the OASI Trust Fund balance is so much larger than the DI Trust Fund balance, the tax rate must be biased to protect the DI Trust Fund against deficit. Ultimately, everyone agrees that by 2020 we are going to need to raise the rate of OASDI taxation. Why we haven’t already abolished the maximum taxable limit on OASDI contributions is that it is more than SSA needs to expand OASDI and SSI benefits to support ILO Holidays with Pay Convention 132 of 1970, Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention 156 of 1981 and Maternity Protection Convention 183 of 2000. Provided that certain accounting errors are corrected, the WILL would provide enough for the United States to produce a long-term budget surplus to honor legitimate debts and erase fraudulent ones. In summary Office of Management and Budget (OMB) (1) must abolish both Allowances and Other Defense Civil Programs rows from OMB Table 4.1; (2) must limit military spending to less than $500 billion since 2012 as reported by the FY 2015 defense budget, (3) Health and Human Services and ACA spending must be limited to less than $1 trillion since 2015, at least until 2020, but possibly forever. (4) Agency spending growth, in all other departments, must be stabilized at not more than 3% annually, aiming for 2% agency spending growth that provides 3% income growth.

 

D. Having legislated the OASDI tax rate to 2.4% DI and 10.0% OASI in 2016, 2.3% DI and 10.1% OASI I 2017 and 2.2% DI and 10.2% OASI in 2018; a new social security tax on the rich is the only logical legal way for the United States to earn a budget surplus. SSA must prove their independence, their ability to account, but the public is well aware that OASDI can pay all the bills - SSI and the federal budget - taxing the rich, if OMB would also allow the accounting errors of the Obama administration to be fixed. Why wait? The accuracy of Social security accounting has newly been breeched by the inability of the Actuary to adjust the OASDI tax rate in time to save the DI trust fund from certain depletion in 2016. Even people who don't take a week to do the OASDI tax rate math know, in terms of the Social Security fund, if it needs shoring up, currently there’s a cap. It’s around $118,500 (2015), above which no OASDI taxes are paid. By abolishing the OASDI Income Cap on Contributions the United States OASDI could save and the federal budget could be balanced with up to 90% of surplus revenues going to balance the federal budget until 2020 when 75% would. Solvency at any point in time requires that sufficient financial resources are available to pay all scheduled benefits at that time. Solvency is generally indicated by a positive trust fund ratio. “Sustainable solvency” for the financing of the program under a specified set of assumptions has been achieved when the projected trust fund ratio is positive throughout the 75-year projection period and is either stable or rising at the end of the period. For the combined OASI and DI Trust Funds to remain solvent throughout the 75-year projection period it is estimated: (1) revenues would have to increase by an amount equivalent to an immediate and permanent payroll tax rate increase of 2.83 percentage points (from its current level of 12.40 percent to 15.23 percent; a relative increase of 22.8 percent). With a WILL OASDI may or may not need to raise taxes in 2035 and is estimated to rise to only 13.58% of the expanded taxable payroll in 2090.

 

Without Income Limit Law (WILL) Act:

 

To abolish the maximum taxable limit on DI contributions on January 1, 2016 and OASI contributions January 1, 2017 and repeal Adjustment of the contribution and benefit base Section 230 of the Social Security Act 42USC(7)§430.To require the Social Security Administration to pay for SSI Costs beginning January 1, 2017.

 

To share profits in excess of social security program costs to the general fund of the U.S Treasury on a sliding scale beginning in 2017 DI 50/50 prioritizing the $22 billion + 2% annual growth cost of USPS, and OASI 10/90 to eliminate the federal budget deficit. In 2020 OASI would share at negotiated rates an estimated 25/75, in 2025 OASDI would share 50/50 and by 2030 75/25 and at 2035 OASDI would take all to pay for the peak in costs of Baby Boomer generation and might need to raise the overall OASDI tax rate. The rich must be taxed 33 percent of their income to benefit the poor without any new OASDI taxes for the middle and working classes, ever. Direct profit-sharing with the General Fund from an OASDI FICA tax without maximum taxable limit must only be allowed if it is scientifically proven, as it is in this document, that profit sharing with the General Fund would both completely balance the federal budget, producing a federal on-budget surplus and finance SSA, including SSI and administration, with at least 10% of surplus profit, so the OASDI trust funds and beneficiary population are guaranteed to grow off-budget. There is no need to delay taxing the rich 33 percent of their income. Instead of a maximum taxable limit there should be a maximum allowable on-budget federal deficit.

 

Without Income Limit Law OASDI 2016-2020

(in billions of dollars)

 

Payroll Tax Estimate

Without Income Limit Law

Total New Rev.

New SSI and Ad. costs

Net Rev.

Max.

Deficit

OMB Budget Deficit

2016

853.0

1,143.0

n/a

-531

2017

904.9

1,212.6

307.7

75.7

232

-208.8

-458

2018

960.0

1,286.4

326.4

78.7

247.7

-222.9

-413

2019

1,012.9

1,357.3

344.4

81.9

262.5

-236.3

-503

2020

1,065.5

1,427.8

362.3

85.2

277.1

-249.4

-550

Source: SSA ’14 Table IV.A3 Pg. 46 Intermediate Projection

 

2. The WILL would expand the taxbase by 130% without increasing the overall 12.4% rate of taxation simply by taxing the rich. The time to tax the rich is now. The federal government needs revenues to balance the budget. It is necessary that the rich have time to revise their budgets. Congress must not delay taxing people as rich as themselves the adjusted 2.4% DI tax on their entire income all calendar year 2016 beginning January 1, 2016. In FY2017 Congress could begin to tax the rich the full 12.4% OASDI tax on all of their income and SSA would pay for SSI and their own administrative costs. For Congressmembers whose base wage has been $174,000 without increase since Obama took office that comes to nearly $1,300 for the DI trust fund and $6,900 for OASDI.

 

E. SSA was corrupted by the $674 SSI payments without COLA from 2009-2011. Overpayment decisions of 2011 were ruled illegal by the Social Security Caucus. An underpayment must be made to return social security disability and state retirement beneficiaries the benefits that were wrongfully taken from them under color of law. In no circumstance should a person be threatened with $600-$699 a month for more than 42 months (Revelation 13:10) when their benefits automatically increase to $700 from whence the Cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) accrues. That Commissioner left SSA with a profound respect for the communist violence of lawyers in social office, without exercising the UN Charter right of all peoples, including social-workers, to self-determination, and losing every case to the conspiracy civil rights criminals disempowering both the Social Security Act and the Constitution with mathematically proven mental disability that would be severe, as in grounds for dismissal, if there were any justice in the Obama administration that killed Osama bin Laden to allow a Harvard criminal to keep office instead of be replaced by a black regional commissioner in the privately cased Social Security Caucus of 2011 when the optimal 2.4% rate of disability taxation was first calculated, before being forgotten by the Actuarial 2.7% propaganda, and remembered at a 2.3% rate in December 2014 before going up to 2.4% when Congress failed to pass the 2.3% Free DIRT Act.

 

1. SSA is familiar with retroactive accounting for overpayments and underpayments resulting from erroneous decisions under Sec. 204 of the Social Security Act 42USC(7)II§404. This law has become one of SSA's favorite methods of deprivation of rights under color of law against beneficiary underpayment complaints and attempts at unionization, whom they are threaten to kill or capture without any regard for the 42 month limit on such persecutions regarding the 'number of the beast' 666 (Revelation 13:10). Sec. 204(c) of the Social Security Act 42USC§404(c) logically provides the economic law that unlike the faultless beneficiaries they rob, officials who make wrongful overpayment decisions are not entitled to immunity like officials who find for underpayment. Not even the stare decisis of the Supreme Court is immune from the error they made attempting to legitimize the robbing of the one-time $200 emergency supplement in 2009 from beneficiaries to pay any outstanding student loans, without their permission, in classic Harvard overeducated treatment of backpay for litigious underpayment in Astrue, Commissioner of Social Security v. Ratliff No. 08-1322 (2010).  To better understand the legal meaning of Art. I Section 9 Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution that states, “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed” that bans retroactive laws, it may be necessary to understand both how grudgingly back taxes are collected from tax evaders and how free and easy it is for SSA to make underpayments to redress wrongful overpayment decisions under Sec. 204(c) of the Social Securty Act 42USC§404(c). Tax fraud is a general term which can trigger many different laws found in Title 26 (the Internal Revenue Code) and Title 18 of the United States Code (or “USC”). The core distinguishing feature of tax fraud is a taxpayer’s intent to defraud the government by not paying taxes the taxpayer knows are lawfully due. Tax fraud can be punishable by both civil (i.e. money) and criminal (i.e. jail time and money) penalties, with the civil violations primarily in Title 26 and the criminal violations principally in Title 18, respectively, of the USC. For example, a taxpayer can commit tax fraud and be punished with civil penalties under 26USC§6663, without being charged with criminal tax evasion. (a) Imposition of penalty; If any part of any underpayment of tax required to be shown on a return is due to fraud, there shall be added to the tax an amount equal to 75 percent of the portion of the underpayment which is attributable to fraud. Attempts to evade or defeat tax under 26USC§7201 occur when; Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $100,000 ($500,000 in the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution. Going to prison for tax evasion it obviously the cheapest way for US constitutional officials whose starting pay is pegged to the $174,000 Congressional salary that is so dishonorable they have insanely voted down a COLA for themselves every year since the federal budget was retroactively defrauded in 2009. It could be said that tax evasion became law on October 1, 2015 when SSA conspired with Congress to evade the Free DIRT Act 2.3% DI and the new tax rate that must be retroactively accounted for in calendar year 2016 is 2.4% DI and 10.0% OASI.

 

G. Having treated SSA's looming felony conviction regarding the depletion of the DI trust fund, it is necessary to treat upon the misdemeanor “no COLA” civil rights crime of deprivation of relief benefits to prevent any reenactment of Astrue's notorious Three Years Without COLA. Cost-of-Living Adjustment (COLA) peg to the CPI, or even the Elderly CPI, has too badly abused the General Fund with SSI $674 (2009-2011) for three years without COLA, that henceforth no one shall have to suffer the cruel and unusual punishment or treatment of $600-$699 for more than 42 months (Revelation 13:10) when benefits automatically increase to $700, and all beneficiaries and government workers would get a 3% annual COLA. Computation of Benefits to the Social Security Act at Section 215(i) as codified at 42USC(7)§415(i) has been so badly abused it must be amended. Deprivation of COLA constitutes deprivation of relief benefits against all beneficiaries. Section 215(i)(1)(F) of the Social Security Act becomes Section 215(i)(1)(A). The CPI linkage is not skillfully written and the meaningless labor statistic has not only been hacked to justify cruel and unusual punishment or treatment regarding the number of the beast but none of the “no COLA” decisions followed the letter of the law. The fall of 2015 no COLA decision failed to be justified because the combined OASDI trust fund has a trust fund ratio, somewhere between 295% and 300%, is considerably over 20%, and the wrongly sampled CPI did not take into consideration the much higher price of Apple computers people are saving for after so many of their senile Windows computers died from deleted restore points in their pursuit of sentencing the entire year of 2016 to their jail term. It is not an excuse that SSA can't do the OASI and DI trust fund tax rate calculus. The amended text, in its entirety to the end of Section 215(i) as codified at 42USC(7)§415(i) as it pertain to the Computation of Benefits, states;

 

(i) Cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) increases in benefits (1) for the purposes of this section (A) the term "OASDI fund ratio", with respect to any calendar year, means the ratio of - (i) the combined balance in the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund and the Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund as of the beginning of such year, including the taxes transferred under section 401(a) of this title on the first day of such year and reduced by the outstanding amount of any loan (including interest thereon) theretofore made to either such Fund from the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund under section 401(l) of this title, to (ii) the total amount which (as estimated by the Commissioner of Social Security) will be paid from the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund and the Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund during such calendar year for all purposes authorized by section 401 of this title (other than payments of interest on, or repayments of, loans from the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund under section 401(l) of this title), but excluding any transfer payments between such trust funds and reducing the amount of any transfers to the Railroad Retirement Account by the amount of any transfers into either such trust fund from that Account; in any calendar year for which the OASDI fund ratio is more than 20.0 percent.  (B) provided there is a combined trust fund ratio greater than 20.0 percent (i) If the Consumer Price Index for the Elderly exceeds for the previous year exceeds 3% retirees shall receive a percentage increase equal to the CPI for the Elderly, for the previous year, or (ii) if the Consumer Price Index for the previous year exceeds 3% the disabled shall receive a percentage increase equal to the CPI for the previous year.  (C) If the Commissioner of Social Security determines that a calendar year is also a cost-of-living computation year, the Commissioner shall publish a determination that a benefit increase is resultantly required and the percentage thereof. (D) In all normal years since the 1980s inflation has been around 3% and therefore the COLA shall be 3%.

 

Be it enacted in the House and Senate Assembled

 

2. The free DIRT Act will cause an OASDI deficit in 2019 instead of 2020 by a margin of error less than $2 billion. The OASDI tax reallocation equation will need to be re-addressed in 2020. There must be more scientific ways to calculate optimal rates other than dire necessity of the disability beneficiary. Because the OASI Trust Fund balance is so much larger than the DI Trust Fund balance, the tax rate must be biased to protect the DI Trust Fund against deficit. Ultimately, everyone agrees that by 2020 we are going to need to raise the rate of OASDI taxation. Why we haven’t already abolished the maximum taxable limit on OASDI contributions is probably that it is more than SSA demands. SSA could expand OASDI and SSI benefits in support of ILO Holidays with Pay Convention 132 of 1970, Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention 156 of 1981 and Maternity Protection Convention 183 of 2000.At this time the projected OASDI surplus from a WILL is not enough to satisfy official demands regarding the federal deficit. However, it is enough for a disability beneficiary to sustainably balance the federal budget, if only the Allowances and Other Defense Civil Programs rows were abolished from OMB Table 4.1; military spending was limited to less than $500 billion and Health and Human Services spending to less than $1 trillion, at least until 2020. Agency spending growth, in all other departments, is limited to no more than 3% annually, aiming for 2% agency growth that provides 3% income growth. Agencies that benefit the poor may grow more rapidly, or may slow down growth to 2% or even zero in dire emergency, but welfare benefits must never go down.

 

H. The trend in the United States is an increasing income gap between the rich and the poor both domestically and globally. In 2003 the top 1 percent of households owned 57.5 percent of corporate wealth, up from 53.4 percent the year before. The top group’s share of corporate wealth has grown by half since 1991, when it was 38.7 percent. In 2003, incomes in the top 1 percent of households ranged from $237,000 to several billion dollars. For every group below the top 1 percent, shares of corporate wealth have declined since 1991. These declines ranged from 12.7 percent for those on the 96th to 99th rungs on the income ladder to 57 percent for the poorest fifth of Americans, who made less than $16,300 and together owned 0.6 percent of corporate wealth in 2003, down from 1.4 percent in 1991. There appears to be a relationship between unusually high per capita income and high numbers of people living below the poverty line. For instance, the District of Columbia claims both the highest per capita income in the nation and the highest percentage of people living below the poverty line at 20.2 percent and highest rate of incarceration in the world at 1,500 per 100,000 in 2005. Long-term capital gains were taxed at 28 percent until 1997, and at 20 percent until 2003, when rates were cut to 15 percent. The top rate on dividends was cut to 15 percent from 35 percent that year. The rich must be taxed.

 

1. As America slipped into economic depression following the Crash of 1929, unemployment exceeded 25% and about 10,000 banks failed. The Gross National Product declined from $105 billion in 1929 to only $55 billion in 1932. In 1934 over half of the elderly in America lacked sufficient income to be self-supporting. The first social security identification cards were issued in 1936. Taxes were collected for the first time in January 1937 and the first one-time, lump-sum payments were made that same month. Regular ongoing monthly benefits started in January 1940. In the past 50 years, the US has been largely successful at reducing the poverty rate. In the late 1950s, the poverty rate for all Americans was 22.4 percent, or 39.5 million individuals. These numbers declined steadily throughout the 1960s, reaching a low of 11.1%, or 22.9 million individuals, in 1973. Over the next decade, the poverty rate fluctuated between 11.1 and 12.6%, but it began to rise steadily again in 1980. By 1983, the number of poor individuals had risen to 35.3 million individuals, or 15.2%. For the next ten years, the poverty rate remained above 12.8%, increasing to 15.1%, or 39.3 million individuals, by 1993. The rate declined for the remainder of the decade, to 11.3 percent by 2000. Since then, it has risen each year. In 2005 it was estimated that 35 million people live below the poverty line, 13.2% of the population. The U.S. Census Bureau assessed the impact of the Great Recession and found income inequality has skyrocketed. The full impact of the recession of 2008 on poverty is not yet known. The first year of the Great Recession dealt a sharp blow to middle-class families. In the 1970s the top 1% only made something like 8% of total income. In the 1980s it rose to 10 to 14%. In the late 1990s it was 15% to 19%. In 2005 it passed 21%. And in 2007 the top 1% received 23% of all the income earned in the country. 80% of all new income earned from 1980 to 2005 has gone to the top 1%. The top one percent owns more wealth than the bottom 90%. The wealthiest 400 Americans now earn an average of $345 million a year and pay an effective tax rate of 16.6%, on average. In 2003 the top 1 percent of households owned 57.5% of corporate wealth, up from 53.4% the year before, up 200% since 1991, when it was 38.7% in 1991. In 2003, incomes in the top 1 percent of households ranged from $237,000 to several billion dollars. During the eight years of President Bush, the wealthiest 400 American families saw their income more than double while their income tax rates dropped almost in half from 1995 to 2007. In 2005 one out of every four large corporations in the US paid no federal income tax on revenues of $1.1 trillion. From 1998 to 2005, two out of every three corporations paid no federal income taxes. Worse poverty seems to increasing.

 

2. National poverty is measured as the number of people who live below the poverty line, below which a person would be expected to suffer from hunger as the result of the market prices of room and board. Unemployment, the number of people actively looking for work, is also a significant indicator of national poverty, however the real employment figures which indicate the percentage of the population that is actually employed is less arbitrary. In 2005 it was estimated that 35-37 million people lived below the poverty line in the USA, 12.6-13.2% of the population, 4.7% were unemployed with a labor force participation rate of 66%. Census data shows that in 2010, 46.2 million Americans lived below the poverty line, and 63 million lived below 130% of the poverty line, SNAP’s gross income limit. Since the economic recession the number of people living below the poverty has increased 13.6%. In 2005 37 million, 13.2% of the population lived below the poverty line and in 2010 this number rose to 46.3 million, 15.1% of the population.

 

Poverty Thresholds, Weighted Average, Annual and Monthly 2004, 2011

 

Family Type

Family Type

Annual

Monthly

Family Type

Annual

Monthly

Single Individual

Under 65 years

 $ 9,827

$ 819

1 person

$11,170

$930

65 years & older

 $ 9,060

$ 756

2 people

$15,130

$1,260

Single Parent

One child

 $ 13,020

$ 1,085

3 people

$19,090

$1,590

Two children

 $ 15,219

$ 1,268

4 people

$23,050

$1,920

Two Adults

No children

 $ 12,649

$ 1,054

5 people

$27,010

$2,250

One child

 $ 15,205

$ 1,267

6 people

$30,970

$2,580

Two children

 $ 19,157

$ 1,596

7 people

$34,930

$2,910

Three children

 $ 22,543

$ 1,879

8 people

$38,890

$3,240

      1. Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2004, Report P60, n. 229, p. 45. U.S. Census Bureau; Preliminary Estimates of Weighted Average Poverty Thresholds for 2011

 

I. There is an emerging view that poverty constitutes a denial or non-fulfillment of human rights. The capability approach defines poverty as the absence or inadequate realization of certain basic freedoms, such as the freedoms to avoid hunger, disease, illiteracy, and so on. Wealth by itself does not promote democracy if the wealth is controlled by the state or small ruling elite. A resource-rich country can have a relatively high per capita gross domestic product, but if its natural wealth is centrally held and does not nurture an autonomous middle class that earns its wealth independently of the state, the prospects for political pluralism, civil liberties, and democracy are probably no better than in a poor country without resources. For wealth to cultivate the soil for democracy it must be produced, retained, and controlled by a broad base of society, and for wealth to be created in that manner, an economy must be relatively open and free. The reason why the conception of poverty is concerned with basic freedoms is that these are recognized as being fundamentally valuable for minimal human dignity. The concern for human dignity also motivates the human rights approach, which postulates that people have inalienable rights to these freedoms. Most societies want to enjoy a steadily rising standard of living while simultaneously protecting their members’ current social and economic status. Economic growth is the pre-requisite for the former, while social security programs are a prime mechanism for achieving the latter. In his 1941 State of the Union Speech, Franklin Delano Roosevelt articulated that “people everywhere in the world have a right to enjoy the Four Freedoms: Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Worship, Freedom from Want and Freedom from Fear”.

 

1. There is no denying that the United States needs to ratify the International Labor Organization (ILO) Holidays with Pay Convention (Convention 132) of 1970; Workers with Family Responsibilities (Convention 156) of 1981, and Maternity Protection (Convention 183) of 2000. The most important demographic difference between 1984 and 1999 was the change in marital status among the total U.S. population. In 1990 the number of marriages ending in divorce stood at 50%. The number of Temporary Assistance for NF beneficiaries has declined dramatically from a high of nearly 14.2 million in 1993 to little less than 5 million in 2003 after the Personal Responsibility and World Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996 coerced families with children to work. People are waiting longer before marriage, the number of people who never marry has increased, and marriages are more likely to end in divorce. Today the divorce rate remains stable at around 40 percent of marriages. In 2003 there were 12.9 million children living in poverty, or 17.6% of the under-18 population. That was an increase of about 800,000 from 2002, when 16.7% of all children were in poverty. Of 18-to-64-year olds 20.5 million, 11.1% were poor and of people 65 and older 3.6 million, 10.1% were poor. In 2011 an estimated 1 in 4 US children, 21%, were growing up in poverty, the highest rate in the industrialized world. In Finland, the number is about 2.8%; Norway, 3.4%; Sweden, maybe 4.2%, Switzerland, 6.8%, Netherlands in second place at 9.8 percent.

 

2. In 2004 in the U.S. an estimated 14 million parents had custody of 21.6 million children under 21 years of age while the other parent lived somewhere else. 28% of children live in single parent household as the result of the dramatic increase in divorce rate to 50% of all marriages in the 1990s. In 1999 there were 2.2 million marriages and 1.1 million divorces. Only 10% of children living with both parents were below the poverty line whereas 40% living with only one parent were below the poverty line. Children living only with their mothers were twice as likely to live in poverty as those living only with their fathers. In 2001, 6.9 million custodial parents were due an average of $5,000. An aggregate of $34.9 billion of payments were due and about $21.9 billion (62.6%) were received, averaging $3,200 per custodial-parent family, another $900 million were volunteered by parents without current awards or agreements. Average income for a family of four in the overall U.S. population, when adjusted for inflation and put into 1999 dollars, increased from about $50,000 in 1984 to $60,000 in 1999. Real median household income in the United States rose by 1.1 percent between 2004 and 2005, reaching $46,326. The overall U.S. home ownership rate increased slightly, from about 64 percent in 1984 to about 67 percent in 1999. There were 7.7 million families in poverty in 2005, statistically unchanged from 2004. The poverty rate for families declined from 10.2 percent in 2004 to 9.9 percent in 2005.

 

3. The poverty rate decreased for non-Hispanic whites (8.3 percent in 2005, down from 8.7 percent in 2004). The poverty rate for all blacks and Hispanics remained near 30% during the 1980s and mid-1990s. Thereafter it began to fall. In 2000, the rate for blacks dropped to 22.1-24.9% and for Hispanics to 21.2 percent- the lowest rate for both groups since the United States began measuring poverty. At the same time the poverty rate increased for Asians (11.1 percent in 2005, up from 9.8 percent in 2004). For White families in America, the average median net worth is $87,000. For Hispanic families, it is $8,000. For African-American families, it is $5,000. That is including home equity, or home ownership. Without home ownership, the net worth for African-American families falls to $1,000. In 1979, the average central city poverty rate was 15.7%, at its highest point, in 1993, it was 21.5%, by 2001 it was 16.5%, but was still over twice the rate for the suburbs, 8.2%.  Poverty in rural areas is not negligible either; in 2001, 14.2% of people living outside metropolitan areas were poor. Among the states, New Mexico had the largest percentage of individuals in poverty; from 1998 to 2000 it was 19.3%. Connecticut, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, and New Hampshire had the lowest poverty rates among states—below 8% from 1998 to 2000.

 

State Poverty and Unemployment Rates 2004 & 2010

 

State Law

Population

Per capita

Number of poor

% Poor

Unem- ployed

Federal

2004

295,882,240

$21,587

33,899,812

12.4%

5.5%

2010

308,745,538

$39,937

46,215,956

15.3%

9.6%

Alabama 2004

4,500,752

$18,189

698,097

16.1%

5.6%

2010

4,779,736

$33,504

883,078

18.9

9.3%

Alaska

2004

648,818

$22,660

57,602

9.4%

7.5%

2010

710,231

$44,233

76,850

11.0%

7.9%

Arizona

2004

5,580,811

$20,275

698,669

13.9%

5.0%

2010

6,392,017

$34,539

1,105,075

17.6%

10.0%

Arkansas

2004

2,725,714

$16,904

411,777

15.8%

5.7%

2010

2,915,918

$32,805

529,710

18.7%

7.8%

California

2004

35,484,453

$22,711

4,706,130

14.2%

6.2%

2010

37,253,956

$42,514

5,785,036

15.8%

12.4%

Colorado

2004

4,550,688

$24,049

388,952

9.3%

5.5%

2010

5,029,196

$42,295

651,744

13.2%

8.8%

Connecticut

2004

3,483,372

$28,766

259,514

7.9%

4.9%

2010

3,574,097

$54,239

348,881

10.1%

9.1%

Delaware

2004

817,491

$23,305

69,901

9.2%

4.1%

2010

897,934

$40,097

104,456

11.9

8.3%

District of Columbia

2004

563,384

$28,659

109,500

20.2%

2010

601,723

$70,710

107,279

18.8%

9.8%

Florida

2004

17,019,068

$21,557

1,952,629

12.5%

4.8%

2010

18,801,310

$38,210

3,048,621

16.5%

11.4%

Georgia

2004

8,684,715

$21,154

1,033,793

13%

4.6%

2010

9,687,653

$34,747

1,698,004

18.0%

10.0%

Hawaii

2004

1,257,608

$21,525

126,154

10.7%

3.3%

2010

1,360,301

$41,550

146,923

11.1%

6.6%

Idaho

2004

1,366,332

$17,841

148,732

11.8%

4.7%

2010

1,567,582

$31,897

244,009

15.8%

9.3%

Illinois

2004

12,653,544

$23,104

1,291,958

10.7%

6.2%

2010

12,830,632

$42,040

1,732,129

13.8%

10.3%

Indiana

2004

6,195,643

$20,397

559,484

9.5%

5.2%

2010

6,483,802

$33,981

960,402

15.3%

10.3%

Iowa

2004

2,944,062

$19,674

258,008

9.1%

4.8%

2010

3,046,355

$38,039

368,965

12.5%

6.1%

Kansas

2004

2,723,507

$20,506

257,829

9.9%

5.5%

2010

2,853,118

$38,977

374,677

13.5%

7.0%

Kentucky

2004

4,117,827

$18,093

621,096

15.8%

5.3%

2010

4,339,367

$32,316

796,208

18.9%

10.3%

Louisiana

2004

4,496,334

$16,912

851,113

19.6%

5.7%

2010

4,533,372

$37,039

831,512

18.8%

7.5%

Maine

2004

1,305,728

$19,533

135,501

10.9%

4.6%

2010

1,328,361

$36,763

169,076

13.1%

7.9%

Maryland

2004

5,508,909

$25,614

438,676

8.5%

4.2%

2010

5,773,552

$49,023

559,937

9.9%

7.4%

Massachusetts

2004

6,433,422

$25,952

573,421

9.3%

5.1%

2010

6,547,629

$51,304

724,845

11.4%

8.4%

Michigan

2004

10,079,985

$22,168

1,021,605

10.5%

7.1%

2010

9,883,640

$34,714

1,614,110

16.7%

12.6%

Minnesota

2004

5,059,375

$23,198

380,476

7.9%

4.7%

2010

5,303,925

$42,798

595,485

11.5%

7.3%

Mississippi

2004

2,881,281

$15,853

548,079

19.9%

6.2%

2010

2,967,297

$31,071

644,156

22.4%

10.3%

Missouri 2004

5,704,484

$19,936

637,891

11.7%

5.7%

2010

5,988,927

$36,799

888,471

15.3%

9.5%

Montana

2004

917,621

$17,151

128,355

14.6%

4.4%

2010

989,415

$35,053

146,257

15.2%

7.2%

Nebraska

2004

1,739,291

$19,613

161,269

9.7%

3.8%

2010

1,826,341

$39,534

224,530

12.6%

4.6%

Nevada

2004

2,241,154

$21,989

205,685

10.5%

4.3%

2010

2,700,551

$36,938

393,605

14.8%

14.9%

New Hampshire 2004

1,287,687

$23,844

78,530

6.5%

3.8%

2010

1,316,470

$43,698

110,096

8.6%

6.0%

New Jersey 2004

8,638,396

$27,006

699,668

8.5%

4.8%

2010

8,791,894

$51,139

883,643

10.2%

9.5%

New Mexico 2004

1,874,614

$17,261

328,933

18.4%

5.7%

2010

2,059,179

$33,342

400,779

19.8%

8.4%

New York 2004

19,190,115

$23,389

2,692,202

14.6%

5.8%

2010

19,378,102

$48,596

2,840,564

15.0%

8.6%

North Carolina 2004

8,407,248

$20,307

958,667

12.3%

5.5%

2010

9,535,483

$35,007

1,618,597

17.4%

10.5%

North Dakota 2004

633,837

$17,769

73,457

11.9%

3.4%

2010

672,591

$42,890

81,176

12.5%

3.9%

Ohio 2004

11,435,798

$21,003

1,170,698

10.6%

6.1%

2010

11,536,504

$36,162

1,771,404

15.8%

10.1%

Oklahoma 2004

3,511,532

$17,646

491,235

14.7%

4.8%

2010

3,751,351

$35,389

613,067

16.8%

7.0%

Oregon 2004

3,559,596

$20,940

388,740

11.6%

7.4%

2010

3,831,074

$36,317

596,649

15.8%

10.8%

Pennsylvania 2004

12,365,455

$20,880

1,304,117

11%

5.5%

2010

12,702,379

$40,604

1,645,097

13.4%

8.7%

Rhode Island 2004

1,076,164

$21,688

120,548

11.9%

5.2%

2010

1,052,567

$41,995

143,132

14.1%

11.6%

South Carolina 2004

4,147,152

$18,795

547,869

14.1%

6.8%

2010

4,625,364

$32,462

813,939

18.1%

11.0%

South Dakota 2004

764,309

$17,562

95,900

13.2%

3.5%

2010

814,180

$39,519

114,798

14.6%

4.7%

Tennessee 2004

5,841,748

$19,393

746,789

13.5%

5.4%

2010

6,346,105

$34,921

1,102,643

17.8%

9.6%

Texas 2004

22,118,509

$19,617

3,117,609

15.4%

6.1%

2010

25,145,561

$37,747

4,411,273

17.9%

8.1%

Utah 2004

2,351,467

$18,185

206,328

9.4%

5.2%

2010

2,763,885

$32,517

362,689

13.3%

7.7%

Vermont 2004

619,107

$20,625

55,506

9.4%

3.7%

2010

625,741

$40,134

74,720

12.4%

6.2%

Virginia 2004

7,386,330

$23,975

656,641

9.6%

3.7%

2010

8,001,024

$44,267

865,746

11.1%

6.9%

Washington 2004

6,131,445

$22,973

612,370

10.6%

6.2%

2010

6,724,540

$42,589

890,251

13.5%

9.5%

West Virginia 2004

1,810,354

$16,477

315,794

17.9%

5.3%

2010

1,852,994

$32,042

327,459

18.2%

8.9%

Wisconsin 2004

5,472,299

$21,271

451,538

8.7%

4.9%

2010

5,686,986

$38,225

731,564

13.2%

8.3%

Wyoming 2004

501,242

$19,134

54,777

11.4%

3.9%

2010

563,626

$44,961

62,636

11.4%

7.0%

Source: , U.S. Census; Table 1 Population Change for the United States 2000-2010. Bureau of Economic Analyses Per Capita 2008-2010, U.S. Census Bureau Personal Income All Ages in Poverty 2010, National Conference of State Legislatures State Unemployment 2010