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American Popular Election: The United States has not achieved a Quorum for Democracy since 1900 HA-29-10-10

 

By Anthony J. Sanders

 sanderstony@live.com

 

                                           Contribute to Health and Democracy

 

                                              Blog About It

 

Part One: 66% Voting Age Population Turnout Quorum

 

Part Two: Restrictions on Voter Eligibility

 

Part Three: Incumbent Democratic-Republican Two Party System

 

Stage One: Hamiltonian Federalists defeated by the Jeffersonian Democratic-Republicans 1788-1820

 

Stage Two: Jacksonian Democrats and the Whigs 1820-1856

 

Stage Three: Progressive Republican Era 1860-1896

 

Stage Four: Republican Populism 1900-1928

 

Stage Five: New Deal Democrats 1932-1968

 

Stage Six: Split Ticket Voting 1972-present

 

Part Four: Evolution of the Federal Corrupt Practices Campaign Act

 

Part Five: Vote for Me: An Aspiring Young Multi-party Democracy at 222

 

Part One: 66% Voter Age Population Turnout Quorum

 

On Tuesday, 2 November 2010, voters in the United States will elect members of the 112th United States Congress, including all members of the United States House of Representatives and almost one-third of the United States Senate (IFES ’10). The Democratic and Republican (DR) bipartisan system holds all public offices at all levels of government in a nearly totalitarian grip.  In 2005 ninety-nine of the one hundred U.S. senators were either republicans or Democrats, 434 of the 435 representatives in the House of Representatives are affiliated with one of the two major parties, all fifty of the state governors and more than 7,350 of the approximately 7,400 state legislators elected in partisan elections ran under major party labels (Maisel & Buckley ’05:267).  Fifty-eight percent of Americans believe a third major political party is needed because the Republican and Democratic Parties do a poor job of representing the American people. Independents, express a greater degree of support (74%) for a third party, but 47% of Republicans and 45% of Democrats also expressed a desire for the creation of a third party.  Sixty-two percent of those who describe themselves as Tea Party supporters would like a third major party formed, but so do 59% of those who are neutral toward the Tea Party movement.  (Jones ’10).  Congressional approval, averaging 35%, dipped to 16% in March 2010, Presidents usually enjoy a higher job approval rating, averaging around 50%, between 20-90% (Newport ’09).   Overall Gallup's annual Governance poll finds a continued deterioration in public confidence in U.S. government institutions. Just 26% of Americans say they are satisfied with the way the nation is being governed, the lowest in the eight-year history of the Governance poll and tying a 1973 Gallup reading, as the lowest in the poll’s 34 year history (Jones ’08).

 

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The legitimacy of a democracy depends upon voter participation.  In a democracy the people are sovereign.  As a rule of thumb, endorsed by the now defunct Election World website, a minimum of 2/3 voter participation is needed to qualify as a popular democracy (Huntley ’98).  Therefore, according to the US Census Bureau Bicentennial Edition statistics, the United States has not technically qualified as a popular democracy since 1900 when voter participation was 73.2 percent.  The 2008 president election, typically at least 10 percentage points more popular than midterm elections such as the 2010 congressional election, garnered only 56.8 percent turnout - the highest turnout rate since 1968 when it was 60.6 percent.  For a while though, in the Civil War and Reconstruction era between 1840 and 1900 US voter participation was between 69.6 percent in 1952 and 81.8 percent in 1876 including the newly eligible black voters under the XV Amendment of 1870, 1900 was the last election to enjoy 66% turnout.  Equal suffrage for women under the XIX Amendment of 1920 was more problematic and the presidential elections of 1920 with 49.2 percent turnout and 1924 with 48.9 percent turnout were the lowest presidential election, since the first popular presidential election 1824, with the exception of 1996 (49.1%), that reinstated Clinton with a mandate to balance the budget.  The XVI Amendment of 1971 to allow all people 18 or older to vote similarly had a negative impact on voter turnout pushing voting age turnout in the presidential elections forever below the 60 percent enjoyed throughout the 1950s and ‘60s (Morton & Barabba ’70).  Turnout in the once awed European democracies is over 75 percent in Great Britain and France, over 80 percent in west Germany, the Low Countries and Scandinavia, over 90 percent in Italy.  Currently the United States ranks twentieth among twenty-one democracies in turnout as a percentage of the voting-age population (only Switzerland is worse).  If people are too intimidated or apathetic to come to the polls this indicates the government is either too abusive or too negligent to elect a representative government, which means the government should not be expansive but self-determinant.  Fifty million additional American would have had to vote in 1984 to bring turnout back to nineteenth-century levels (Schlesinger 99: 256)

 

Turnout of Voting Age Population in Presidential Election Years 1824-2008

 

2012

2008

2004

2000

1996

1992

?

56.8%

55.3%

51.3%

49.1%

55.1%

1988

1984

1980

1976

1972

1968

50.1%

53.1%

52.6%

53.6%

55.2%

60.6%

1964

1960

1956

1952

1948

1944

61.7%

64.0%

60.6%

63.3%

53.0%

55.9%

1940

1936

1932

1928

1924

1920

62.5%

61.0%

56.9%

56.9%

48.9%

49.2%

1916

1912

1908

1904

1900

1896

61.6%

58.8%

65.4%

65.2%

73.2%

79.3%

1892

1888

1884

1880

1876

1872

74.7%

79.3%

77.5%

79.4%

81.8%

71.3%

1868

1864

1860

1856

1852

1848

78.1%

73.8%

81.2%

78.9%

69.6%

72.7%

1844

1840

1836

1832

1828

1824

78.9%

80.2%

57.8%

55.4%

57.6%

26.9%

 

Source: Series Y 27-78 Morton, Rogers C.B. Secretary of Commerce; Barabba, Vincent P. Director of the Bureau of the Census. Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970. Bicentennial Edition pg. 1071-1072

 

Voter participation is actually a function of three factors- eligibility, registration and turnout.  The first is who is eligible to register to vote?  The second factor involves how many eligible people bother to register.  The third factor is the decision of those eligible and registered to turn out to cast their ballot on Election Day.  Turnout is often expressed as a percentage of registered voters who actually turn out and vote.  Voter age population (VAP) rates are however the standard by which elections are judged, VAP rate is the percentage of voting age population (VAP) who votes.  States vary tremendously in their turnout rates.  In the 2000 election, eleven states had turnout rates greater than 60 percent of the voting age population, led by Minnesota, at 68.8 percent, and Maine, at 67.3 percent, at the other extreme sixteen states had turnout rates less than 50 percent of the voting age population, with Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Nevada and Texas all below 45 percent.  The debate over ease of registration has been heated.  Turnout during congressional election years is typically under 40 percent (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 80 & 89).  A factor that can overturn elections is a percentage of invalid votes exceeding 0.7% in the Parliament and 2% in the presidential election.  Out of the past 20 biannual elections between 1968 and 2008 only two of the ten presidential elections resulted in turnout of registered voters less than 66% but in the ten mid-term elections has not achieved 66% turnout since 1970.  The turnout of registered voters is not typically used as the gauge of voter participation, however the voter turnout of registered in the United States between 1968 and 2008 does indicate a democratic belief in the President exclusively amongst registered party members or independents.  As a percentage of voter age population (VAP) turnout during the 36 biannual elections between 1946 and 2008 not once has the USA achieved the requisite 66% participation of the VAP.  Not since the election of 1900 has US voter participation achieved 66% of the VAP (Morton & Barraba ’70: 1071-1072). 

 

Parliamentary Election Turnout United States of America 1946- 2006

 

Year

The year the election took place or a law was passed, etc

Total vote

The total number of votes cast in the relevant election. Total vote includes valid and invalid votes, as well as blank votes in cases where these are separated from invalid votes.

Voter Turn-
out

The voter turnout as defined as the percentage of registered voters who actually voted

Registration

The number of registered voters. The figure represents the number of names on the voters' register at the time that the registration process closes (cut-off date), as reported by the electoral management body.

 

 

 

Registration as a percent of voting age population (VAP)

Voting age population

The voting age population (VAP) includes all citizens above the legal voting age

VAP Turn-
out

The voter turnout as defined as the percentage of the voting age population that actually voted

Population

The total population

2008

131,313,820

89.75%

146,311,000

65%

225,080,141

58.34%

303,824,640

2006

82,121,411

47.52%

172,805,006

78.5%

220,043,054

37.32%

298,444,215

2004

121,862,329

68.75%

177,265,030

82.5%

215,080,198

56.66%

293,027,571

2002

73,844,526

45.31%

162,993,315

77.4%

210,464,504

35.09%

278,058,881

2000

99,738,383

63.76%

156,421,311

73.1%

213,954,023

46.62%

284,970,789

1998

73,117,022

51.55%

141,850,558

67.4%

210,446,120

34.74%

280,298,524

1996

96,456,345

65.97%

146,211,960

74.4%

196,511,000

49.08%

265,679,000

1994

75,105,860

57.64%

130,292,822

67.3%

193,650,000

38.78%

262,090,745

1992

104,405,155

78.02%

133,821,178

70.6%

189,529,000

55.09%

255,407,000

1990

67,859,189

56.03%

121,105,630

65.2%

185,812,000

36.52%

248,709,873

1988

91,594,693

72.48%

126,379,628

69.1%

182,778,000

50.11%

245,057,000

1986

64,991,128

54.89%

118,399,984

66.3%

178,566,000

36.40%

239,529,693

1984

92,652,680

74.63%

124,150,614

71.2%

174,466,000

53.11%

236,681,000

1982

67,615,576

61.10%

110,671,225

65.2%

169,938,000

39.79%

233,697,676

1980

86,515,221

76.53%

113,043,734

68.7%

164,597,000

52.56%

227,738,000

1978

58,917,938

57.04%

103,291,265

65.2%

158,373,000

37.20%

221,537,514

1976

81,555,789

77.64%

105,037,989

68.9%

152,309,190

53.55%

218,035,000

1974

55,943,834

58.15%

96,199,020

65.8%

146,336,000

38.23%

214,305,134

1972

77,718,554

79.85%

97,328,541

69.1%

140,776,000

55.21%

208,840,000

1970

58,014,338

70.32%

82,496,747

66.3%

124,498,000

46.60%

203,211,926

1968

73,211,875

89.66%

81,658,180

67.9%

120,328,186

60.84%

200,710,000

1966

56,188,046

 

116,132,000

48.38%

197,730,744

1964

70,644,592

 

114,090,000

61.92%

192,119,000

1962

53,141,227

 

112,423,000

47.27%

186,512,143

1960

68,838,204

 

109,159,000

63.06%

180,684,000

1958

45,966,070

 

103,221,000

44.53%

175,038,232

1956

58,434,811

 

106,408,890

54.92%

168,903,000

1954

42,509,905

 

98,527,000

43.15%

162,725,667

1952

57,582,333

 

96,466,000

59.69%

157,022,000

1950

40,253,267

 

94,403,000

42.64%

151,325,798

1948

45,839,622

 

95,310,150

48.10%

146,631,000

1946

34,279,158

 

88,388,000

38.78%

142,049,065

Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. County View: United States 2009

 

Overall in 2008 225 million people were of voting age, 74% of the total population of 303.8 million.  65% these 225 million adults, 146.3 million registered to vote, 48.1% of the total.  Of those registered 131.3 million actually voted, a turnout of 89.75%, the highest since the International Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) began tracking this measure of voter turnout as a percentage of registered voters in 1968.  It is also remarkable that voter registration declined significantly from 172.8 million to 146.3 million, 15.6% between the midterm election of 2006 and the presidential election of 2008.  There is not normally much difference in voter registration between presidential and midterm elections, voter registration has progressively increased in all but 8 of the past 20 biannual elections since 1968, with the exception of the midterm elections of 1974, 1978, 1982, 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998 and 2008.  The 2008 presidential election was the first election to ever register a decline in voter registration from the previous presidential election and the first to register a decline from the previous midterm election.  Numerically voter registration in the 2008 election regressed a decade to 1998-2000 levels.   The 2008 presidential election had the lowest rate of registration of voter age population (VAP), at 65% since records began being collected in by IDEA in 1968, only in 1982 did it drop so low as 65.2%, so soon after the high of 82.5% in the 2004 presidential election when the HAVA of 2002 was enforced.  Otherwise voter age population (VAP) turnout rate, denied the vote of convicted felons by many states, was 58.34%.  The 2008 election is remarkable, for electing a black man to the White House by a landslide, for his record campaign finance contribution, low voter registration and high turnout of registered voters.  

 

General Election VAP Turnout Rates, State by State 2000-2008

 

State

VAP
2008

VAP

2006

VAP

2004

VAP

2002

VAP

2000

 

VAP

2008

VAP

2006

VAP

2004

VAP

2002

VAP 2000

United States

56.9%

37.1%

55.4%

36.3%

50.0%

Missouri

64.5%

48.1%

62.9%

43.9%

56.2%

Alabama

59.0%

35.9%

55.2%

40.4%

50.1%

Montana

65.6%

55.6%

63.4%

47.7%

60.6%

Alaska

64.0%

47.8%

65.2%

51.0%

65.0%

Nebraska

59.9%

45.1%

59.8%

37.3%

55.0%

Arizona

47.7%

33.3%

47.0%

30.7%

40.2%

Nevada

49.7%

31.1%

47.3%

31.1%

40.2%

Arkansas

50.1%

36.5%

51.0%

39.7%

46.0%

New Hampshire

69.0%

39.9%

68.4%

46.0%

60.7%

California

49.7%

32.2%

47.1%

29.0%

44.1%

New Jersey

58.4%

34.1%

55.2%

32.6%

50.1%

Colorado

64.1%

43.1%

61.2%

42.0%

53.7%

New Mexico

55.8%

38.6%

53.9%

35.7%

45.4%

Connecticut

61.1%

42.5%

59.7%

38.9%

56.6%

New York

50.8%

30.3%

50.2%

31.4%

47.5%

Delaware

61.3%

39.0%

59.4%

37.9%

54.9%

North Carolina

61.3%

28.7%

53.9%

37.2%

47.5%

District of Columbia

55.4%

25.5%

48.9%

27.1%

43.9%

North Dakota

63.3%

44.1%

63.8%

47.6%

59.7%

Florida

58.3%

34.3%

56.1%

39.5%

47.9%

Ohio

64.7%

46.3%

65.1%

37.6%

55.4%

Georgia

54.7%

30.7%

50.0%

32.2%

42.4%

Oklahoma

53.2%

34.3%

55.3%

39.6%

48.0%

Hawaii

45.4%

34.6%

44.1%

40.2%

39.9%

Oregon

62.5%

48.4%

66.8%

47.2%

59.1%

Idaho

58.7%

42.0%

58.7%

42.0%

53.5%

Pennsylvania

61.4%

42.6%

60.6%

37.3%

52.3%

Illinois

57.0%

36.3%

55.7%

37.7%

51.4%

Rhode Island

57.2%

46.7%

52.9%

40.1%

50.7%

Indiana

57.2%

35.2%

53.0%

33.3%

48.3%

South Carolina

55.8%

33.1%

50.7%

35.6%

45.7%

Iowa

67.2%

46.3%

67.4%

45.7%

59.6%

South Dakota

62.8%

56.4%

66.9%

59.7%

56.9%

Kansas

58.8%

41.1%

58.3%

41.4%

54.0%

Tennessee

54.5%

39.5%

54.1%

37.3%

48.1%

Kentucky

55.7%

39.0%

56.9%

36.4%

50.4%

Texas

45.8%

25.8%

45.4%

28.8%

42.4%

Louisiana

58.6%

28.3%

58.5%

37.8%

54.2%

Utah

50.4%

31.8%

54.7%

35.0%

50.3%

Maine

70.0%

53.3%

72.6%

50.1%

66.4%

Vermont

65.9%

53.8%

65.0%

48.1%

63.1%

Maryland

61.0%

42.2%

57.2%

41.6%

51.0%

Virginia

62.2%

40.6%

56.2%

26.9%

50.9%

Massachusetts

60.1%

44.4%

58.7%

44.4%

55.4%

Washington

60.3%

42.7%

60.8%

37.9%

56.2%

Michigan

65.7%

49.9%

63.9%

42.3%

57.3%

West Virginia

49.9%

32.3%

53.4%

30.8%

46.1%

Minnesota

73.1%

56.4%

73.9%

59.7%

66.4%

Wisconsin

69.0%

50.8%

71.6%

43.2%

64.5%

Mississippi

59.3%

28.5%

54.2%

29.2%

47.8%

Wyoming

62.6%

49.4%

63.7%

49.2%

58.2%

Source: United States Election Project. General Elections 2000-2008. October 2010

 

State-by-state in the five biannual elections between 2000 and 2008, turnout is much higher during presidential elections than midterm elections.  Not a single state achieved a 66% quorum during midterm elections, however during the Presidential elections a few states qualify every year.  Average national VAP turnout in midterm elections of 2006 was 37.1% with a high of 56.4% in Minnesota and low of 25.5% in the District of Columbia, and in 2002, 36.3%, with a high of 59.7% in Minnesota and low of 26.9% in Virginia.  In the 2008 presidential election average participation was 56.9% however five states, Minnesota with 73.1%, Maine with 70.0%, Wisconsin and New Hampshire with 69.0% and Iowa with 67.2% achieved the 66% supermajority VAP turnout needed for a quorum.  In 2004 average national participation was 55.4% nonetheless seven states achieved the quorum, the same states as 2008, plus Oregon with 66.8% and South Dakota with 66.9%.  In the 2000 presidential election voting age turnout was 50.0%, only two states, Maine and Minnesota with 66.4% VAP turnout were popular.  Hawaii consistently had the lowest VAP turnout in presidential elections with 45.4% in 2008, 44.1% in 2004 and 39.9% in 2000.  Americans have become more involved in the electoral process since a low of in 1996 and 2000.  Americans however do not participate at the desired rates. 

 

Voting Age Population Turnout in Recent Parliamentary Election in 21 Most Populous Aspiring Democracies

 

  Country

VAP Turn­out - Parliamentary

The voter turnout as defined as the percentage of the voting age population that actually voted in the parliamentary elections

VAP Turn­out - Presidential

The voter turnout as defined as the percentage of the voting age population that actually voted in the presidential elections

  Country

VAP Turn­out - Parliamentary

The voter turnout as defined as the percentage of the voting age population that actually voted in the parliamentary elections.

VAP Turn­out - Presidential

The voter turnout as defined as the percentage of the voting age population that actually voted in the presidential elections

Indonesia

87.60%

(2004)

74.77%

(2004)

Russian Federation

61.91%

(2007)

62.22%

(2004)

Brazil

83.54%

(2006)

83.57%

(2006)

India

60.57%

(2004)

 

Italy

79.13%

(2008)

 

United Kingdom

58.32%

(2005)

 

Thailand

76.23%

(2007)

 

Philippines

54.87%

(2007)

 

Turkey

73.99%

(2007)

 

France

54.52%

(2007)

76.75%

(2007)

Germany

71.99%

(2005)

 

Iran, Islamic Republic of

54.08%

(2008)

67.62%

(2005)

Japan

66.62%

(2005)

 

Nigeria

46.63%

(2003)

65.33%

(2003)

Ethiopia

66.19%

(2005)

 

Korea, Republic of

46.59%

(2008)

64.17%

(2007)

Bangladesh

64.57%

(1996)

53.10%

(1986)

Pakistan

38.77%

(2008)

 

Mexico

63.62%

(2006)

63.26%

(2006)

United States

37.32%

(2006)

58.23%

(2008)

 

 

 

Egypt

19.75%

(2005)

16.41%

(2005)

Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Voter Turnout

 

With 37.32% voter age population (VAP) turnout during the United States parliamentary elections of 2006 ranked 169th out of 188 nations using recent election data recorded by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA).  41%, 77 nations of the 188 had VAP turnout greater than the arbitrary 66% in their most recent parliamentary election.  Vietnam reported VAP turnout of 100.79%, either their children are voting or they are having technical difficulties.  Rwanda had 93.6% VAP turnout, Indonesia 87.6%, Belgium 86%, Peru 84.1%, Denmark 83.2% while Japan hangs on with 66.62%.  While it might be difficult to achieve 66% voter turnout, 41% of nations do, and 59% do not.  China, North Korea, Saudi Arabia and the United Nations are conspicuously absent from the electoral statistics.  India, often called the world’s largest democracy, ranked 100th with 60.57% VAP turnout.  Technically, the world’s largest popular democracy is Indonesia with 87.6% of adults.  Of the 21 most populous aspiring democracies only 8 actually qualified with more than 66% of the vote.  Out of 106 nations the U.S. Presidential election of 2008 VAP turnout, usually much higher than in the mid-terms, was 70th place, with 58.2% VAP turnout, Afghanistan placed 71st at 57.9%, only 47, 44.3% of participating nations, garnered the 66% supermajority of VAP turnout needed to qualify as popular democracies.  The US Parliamentary elections ranked 20th out of the 21 most populous aspiring democratic nations, only Egypt, a major recipient of US foreign military assistance had lower turnout in their parliamentary elections.  The United States scored much higher in the presidential election of 2008 with 58.23% VAP turnout, 17th out of 21, while Brazil took first place with 83.57% while fewer Indonesians 74.77% voted for their President than Parliament 87.60%.  While the presidential election increases voter turnout in some countries, France and Iran are the only nations whose presidential elections helped the nation to achieve a passing VAP turnout, in Mexico, Egypt and Indonesia turnout was lower during the Presidential than Parliamentary election (IDEA ’09).          

 

There is a saying that “people get the government they vote for.” The implication of the maxim is that if undesirable or unwise legislation is enacted, if executive branch officials are inept or ineffective, or if the government is beset with widespread corruption, then such unfortunate results are the consequence of the electorate’s decision regarding whom to trust with the powers and prestige of public office.  No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live (Kant 1795 §2.1).  However, when governments and political parties have monopolized and manipulated all the options, voting becomes counterproductive to the voter. It is argued that voting is a civic duty and that the state can expect patriotic citizens to invest a certain amount of effort toward that duty.  By not voting however, a citizen is expressing that they do not support the political system and either fear or dislike it so much they do not want to be exposed it.  If sufficient number of voters turnout to support the government, then the legitimacy of the democracy to embark on expansionist policies, is not typically questioned.  However, if less than 66% of the VAP turnout, the electorate has clearly expressed that they want the government to be less intrusive.  Secretaries of State aim to ensure that the voting process is accessible to voters and also work to secure the integrity of the ballot box against fraud, waste and abuse.  Elections must be conducted in an orderly fashion to guarantee a free and fair election that validly reflects the choice of the electorate (Blackwell ’09: 107-123).  Democracy is only a form of despotism, where the executive power is established by the election of a tyranny of the majority, therefore a republican constitution must establish principles to ensure firstly, the freedom of the members of a society, secondly, dependence of all upon a single common legislation, as subjects, and, thirdly, by the law of their equality, as citizens. A republican constitution gives a favorable prospect for the desired consequence, i.e., perpetual peace (Kant 1795 §2.1).  

 

Democratic peace theory is that democracies do not make more upon each other, nor do they commit genocide against their own citizens.  If the United States wishes to improve their low VAP turnout the USA must not make war or abuse their citizens and come to identify their nation not as a democracy but as an aspiring democracy (MD §34). The National Voter Registration Act of 1993, and the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), have facilitated voter registration and the ability to cast ballots with little success. The Acts had four official purposes: (1) to establish procedures that will increase the number of eligible citizens who register to vote in elections for Federal office; (2) to make it possible for Federal, State, and local governments to implement this Act in a manner that enhances the participation of eligible citizens as voters in elections for Federal office; (3) to protect the integrity of the electoral process; and (4) to ensure that accurate and current voter registration rolls are maintained (Blackwell & Klukowski ’09:114).  The NVRA of 1993 actually led to the lowest percentage turnout of voting age population since 1924 in the presidential election of 1996.  HAVA of 2002, on the other hand, may have brought some people to the polls.  In crafting a strategy to improve voter participation the federal government must be sure that it not only reminds citizens of their right to vote but protects the integrity of the ballot box and voter registries against intimidation and injustice.  People don’t want to the come to the polls for two reasons.  One, because they fear having their identity stolen by abusive officials.  And two, with the nearly absolute Democratic and Republican monopoly of political parties at nearly every level of government voting would do no good because all votes just perpetuate the bipartisan system.  The reason for the decline in participation since 1900 is the taxman became more oppressive with the epidemiologic surveillance of the U.S. Census Bureau of 1900, income tax of 1916 and prohibition of 1919.    

 

Part Two: Restrictions on Voter Eligibility

 

The federal constitution forbids age or gender restrictions on voting rights for any citizen of at least 18 years, though some states restrict specific groups including those convicted of felonies. Registration is self-initiated and not compulsory. Most states require citizens to register by some deadline well in advance of an election, though a few permit same day or Election Day registration, and one does not conduct registration at all.  State-level officials (Board of Elections or Secretary of State) design registration forms and determine requirements, but most election boards use continuous voter registries maintained by local governments.  Two populations, people under 18 and convicted felons are the two remaining populations to be legally disenfranchised from the polling booth.  No state in the world allows children to vote.  Four states (Maine, Massachusetts, Utah, Vermont) do not disenfranchise convicted felons. In forty-six states and the District of Columbia, criminal disenfranchisement laws deny the vote to all convicted adults in prison. Thirty-two states also disenfranchise felons on parole; twenty-nine disenfranchise those on probation. And, due to laws that may be unique in the world, and in violation of the “no previous condition of servitude” clause of the XV Amendment, in fourteen states even ex-offenders who have fully served their sentences remain barred for life from voting, although their crime had nothing to do with electoral fraud.  These restrictions cut into the third party vote and overall VAP turnout.  An estimated 3.9 million Americans, or one in fifty adults, have currently or permanently lost the ability to vote because of a felony conviction, an estimated 1.7% of the voting age population, 3% of voter turnout (JD §264: 882-887).  The U.S. foreign-born population is 36.5 million, with 14.4 million naturalized citizens. Research documents that naturalized citizens are less likely to register and vote than native citizens (Crissey ’08).   

 

Impact of Felon Disenfranchisement on Voter Age and Voting Eligible Populations under State Voting Law 2008

 

State

Total Turnout

Voting Age Population

VAP Turnout Rate

Voting Eligible Population

VEP Turnout Rate

Non- Citizen

Prison

Probation

Parole

Total Ineligible Felons

Overseas Eligible

Alabama

2,105,622

3,558,576

59.0%

3,418,204

61.6%

2.2%

30,508

53,252

8,042

61,155

74,079

Alaska

327,341

510,020

64.0%

481,716

68.0%

3.7%

5,014

6,708

1,732

9,234

60,686

Arizona

2,320,851

4,809,400

47.7%

4,165,988

55.7%

11.6%

39,589

82,232

7,534

84,472

90,036

Arkansas

1,095,958

2,167,235

50.1%

2,064,173

53.1%

2.9%

14,716

31,169

19,908

40,255

43,963

California

13,743,177

27,279,556

49.7%

22,153,555

62.0%

17.9%

173,670

0

120,753

234,047

486,207

Colorado

2,422,236

3,748,718

64.1%

3,419,539

70.8%

8.0%

23,274

0

11,654

29,101

71,854

Connecticut

 

2,695,793

61.1%

2,443,533

 

8.5%

20,661

0

2,328

21,825

45,799

Delaware

413,562

672,304

61.3%

620,448

66.7%

5.3%

7,075

17,216

551

15,959

12,658

District of Columbia

266,871

479,880

55.4%

430,690

62.0%

10.3%

0

0

0

0

6,916

Florida

8,453,743

14,395,399

58.3%

12,542,585

67.4%

11.2%

102,388

279,760

4,528

244,532

451,907

Georgia

3,940,705

7,169,980

54.7%

6,380,404

61.8%

7.3%

52,719

397,081

23,448

262,984

141,001

Hawaii

456,064

1,000,026

45.4%

897,488

50.8%

9.7%

5,955

0

0

5,955

20,090

Idaho

667,506

1,116,659

58.7%

1,028,291

64.9%

4.9%

7,290

49,513

3,361

33,727

26,779

Illinois

5,578,195

9,684,345

57.0%

8,743,436

63.8%

9.2%

45,474

0

0

45,474

200,530

Indiana

2,805,986

4,808,900

57.2%

4,636,209

60.5%

3.0%

28,322

0

0

28,322

89,605

Iowa

1,543,662

2,285,881

67.2%

2,203,793

70.0%

2.6%

8,766

22,958

3,159

21,825

43,108

Kansas

1,264,208

2,102,464

58.8%

1,994,038

63.4%

4.2%

8,539

16,263

4,958

19,150

42,495

Kentucky

1,858,578

3,281,251

55.7%

3,156,184

58.9%

2.2%

21,706

51,035

12,277

53,362

58,518

Louisiana

1,979,852

3,343,411

58.6%

3,206,903

61.7%

2.0%

38,381

40,025

24,636

70,712

68,285

Maine

744,456

1,045,008

70.0%

1,031,496

72.2%

1.3%

0

0

0

0

21,362

Maryland

2,651,428

4,317,486

61.0%

3,901,736

68.0%

7.8%

23,324

96,360

13,220

78,114

77,074

Massachusetts

3,102,995

5,123,478

60.1%

4,672,376

66.4%

8.6%

11,408

0

0

11,408

77,830

Michigan

5,039,080

7,613,003

65.7%

7,311,245

68.9%

3.3%

48,738

0

0

48,738

163,673

Minnesota

2,921,147

3,980,782

73.1%

3,744,757

78.0%

4.0%

9,910

127,627

5,081

76,264

70,063

Mississippi

 

2,176,453

59.3%

2,099,663

 

1.9%

22,754

22,267

2,922

35,349

45,082

Missouri

2,992,023

4,533,017

64.5%

4,352,278

68.7%

2.5%

30,186

57,360

20,683

69,208

96,710

Montana

497,599

750,159

65.6%

736,697

67.5%

1.3%

3,545

0

0

3,545

22,898

Nebraska

811,923

1,337,385

59.9%

1,264,519

64.2%

4.3%

4,520

19,606

846

14,746

27,311

Nevada

970,019

1,946,641

49.7%

1,650,759

58.8%

14.1%

12,743

13,337

3,908

21,366

45,656

New Hampshire

719,643

1,030,415

69.0%

1,000,628

71.9%

2.6%

2,702

0

0

2,702

25,558

New Jersey

3,910,220

6,627,332

58.4%

5,755,371

67.9%

11.7%

25,953

128,737

15,849

98,246

110,559

New Mexico

833,365

1,486,830

55.8%

1,345,199

62.0%

8.3%

6,402

20,883

3,724

18,706

31,444

New York

7,721,718

15,048,837

50.8%

13,099,560

58.9%

12.4%

60,347

0

52,225

86,460

263,787

North Carolina

4,354,571

7,029,536

61.3%

6,521,263

66.8%

5.9%

39,482

109,678

3,409

96,026

133,483

North Dakota

321,133

499,894

63.3%

492,052

65.3%

1.3%

1,452

0

0

1,452

11,179

Ohio

5,773,387

8,802,396

64.7%

8,557,033

67.5%

2.2%

51,686

0

0

51,686

174,703

Oklahoma

1,474,694

2,747,092

53.2%

2,596,910

56.8%

4.0%

25,864

27,940

3,073

41,371

57,046

Oregon

1,845,251

2,925,885

62.5%

2,709,299

68.1%

6.9%

14,167

0

0

14,167

63,480

Pennsylvania

 

9,790,263

61.4%

9,435,272

 

3.1%

49,215

0

0

49,215

203,791

Rhode Island

475,428

824,604

57.2%

762,509

62.4%

7.0%

4,045

0

0

4,045

13,827

South Carolina

1,927,153

3,445,524

55.8%

3,284,019

58.7%

3.4%

24,326

41,254

1,947

45,927

72,241

South Dakota

387,449

608,222

62.8%

596,337

65.0%

1.2%

3,342

0

2,720

4,702

20,144

Tennessee

2,618,238

4,767,143

54.5%

4,558,557

57.4%

3.1%

27,228

58,109

10,578

61,572

127,930

Texas

 

17,654,414

45.8%

14,841,794

 

13.5%

172,506

427,080

102,921

437,507

549,216

Utah

971,185

1,889,690

50.4%

1,746,298

55.6%

7.2%

6,552

0

0

6,552

31,783

Vermont

326,822

493,436

65.9%

483,487

67.6%

2.0%

0

0

0

0

10,546

Virginia

3,753,059

5,982,805

62.2%

5,518,704

68.0%

6.6%

38,276

53,614

4,471

67,319

124,689

Washington

3,071,587

5,036,901

60.3%

4,564,797

67.3%

7.8%

17,926

113,134

11,768

80,377

138,296

West Virginia

731,691

1,429,429

49.9%

1,407,009

52.0%

0.8%

6,059

8,283

2,005

11,203

33,788

Wisconsin

2,997,086

4,322,269

69.0%

4,135,627

72.5%

3.0%

23,379

50,418

18,105

57,641

78,721

Wyoming

256,035

406,742

62.6%

394,627

64.9%

1.7%

2,084

5,438

727

5,167

13,832

U.S. Total

132,645,504

230,782,870

56.9%

213,231,835

62.2%

8.4%

1,605,448

2,451,085

627,680

3,144,831

4,972,217

 

Source: United States Election Project. General Elections 2008. October 2010

 

The impact of various factors, such a felony disenfranchisement laws, non-citizenship and overseas eligibility need to be analyzed.  In the 2008 election of the 230.8 million people of voting age and 132.6 million showed up to vote between 56.9%-57.5% allowed by the 8.4% margin of non-citizens.  Only 213.2 million of the 230.8 million voter age population, in 2008 were eligible to vote, 17.6 million votes were disqualified either because they were one of the 20 million non-citizens, not all of them permanent residents, or they were among the 3.1 million convicted felons disenfranchised by state law, or the ballot was unreadable.  There are nearly 5 million overseas votes (US Election Project ’08).  The disenfranchisement of felons weighs particularly heavily upon the 1.4 million African American men, or 13 percent of the black adult male population, are disenfranchised, reflecting a rate of disenfranchisement that is seven times the national average. More than one-third (36 percent) of the total disenfranchised population are black men. Ten states disenfranchise more than one in five adult black men; in seven of these states, one in four black men are permanently disenfranchised. Given current rates of incarceration, three in ten of the next generation of black men will be disenfranchised at some point in their lifetime. In states with the most restrictive voting laws, 40 percent of African American men are likely to be permanently disenfranchised (Human Rights Watch ’98; JD §264: 882-887).  The United States really needs to review the previous condition of servitude clause of the XV Amendment reinstate the right to vote to people who have served their sentence, and consider reinstating it to all 3.1 million people have been denied the right to vote on the grounds that were sentenced to prison, probation and parole.  This reform would be more likely to improve than detract from voter turnout because felon disenfranchisement is more of a continuation of the black slavery issue than the overprotection of women and children

 

In colonial times only those white males who owned land were empowered to vote.  The first step in expanding the franchise involved eliminating the property requirement that only taxpayers could vote.  This reform happened on a state-by-state basis, starting before the ratification of the Constitution, when Vermont granted universal male suffrage in 1777 and when South Carolina substituted a taxpayer requirement for a property-holding requirement. In 1789 only white males who owned property were generally eligible to vote, only around one in thirty Americans.  At independence, the newly formed states rejected some of the civil disabilities inherited from Europe; criminal disenfranchisement was among those retained. In the mid-nineteenth century, nineteen of the thirty-four existing states excluded serious offenders from the franchise.  Convicted felons were not the only people excluded from the vote. Suffrage was extremely limited in the new country: women, African Americans, illiterates, and people without property were also among those unable to vote.  Before the Civil War the United States Constitution did not provide specific protections for voting. Qualifications for voting were matters which neither the Constitution nor federal laws governed. At that time, although a few northern states permitted a small number of free black men to register and vote, slavery and restrictive state laws and practices led the franchise to be exercised almost exclusively by white males.  The history of equal suffrage has four phases, first, an increase in white male eligibility, enfranchisement of black citizens, enfranchisement of women, and enfranchisement of those between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one.  The property qualification finally disappeared when Virginia eliminated it in 1850 (Morton & Barabbas ’70: 1071-1072).  It is possible a compromise between the North and South could have been reached allowing the Republican Party to enroll southern blacks as members of their party pursuant to voting and Union rights.  A great many people participated in the political process during this time known as the Gilded Age of political parties, the only era to consistently achieve the 66% quorum, hoping to influence the system and be rewarded by philanthropic parties.

 

Shortly after the end of the Civil War Congress enacted the Military Reconstruction Act of 1867, which allowed former Confederate States to be readmitted to the Union if they adopted new state constitutions that permitted universal male suffrage, and militarily occupied the Southern States. The 14th Amendment, which conferred citizenship to all persons born or naturalized in the United States, was ratified in 1868.  The Fifteenth Amendment to the constitution, ratified in 1870, provided specifically that the “right to vote shall not be denied or abridged on the basis of race, color or previous condition of servitude”.  This superseded state laws that had directly prohibited black voting. Congress then enacted the Enforcement Act of 1870, which contained criminal penalties for interference with the right to vote, and the Force Act of 1871, which provided for federal election oversight.  As a result, in the former Confederate States, where new black citizens in some cases comprised outright or near majorities of the eligible voting population, hundreds of thousands -- perhaps one million -- recently-freed slaves registered to vote. Black candidates began for the first time to be elected to state, local and federal offices and to play a meaningful role in their governments (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 70). By 1877 about 2,000 black men had won local, state, and federal offices in the former Confederate states. As many as a million blacks registered to vote and voter age participation remained above 66% from 1860-1896 (Morton & Barabbas ’70: 1071-1072).

Electoral success changed when Reconstruction ended in 1877 and federal troops withdrew from the old Confederacy. The extension of the franchise to black citizens was strongly resisted and the prisons never reviewed. With federal troops no longer present to protect the rights of black citizens, white supremacy quickly returned to the old Confederate states.  Among others, the Ku Klux Klan, the Knights of the White Camellia, and other terrorist organizations attempted to prevent the 15th Amendment from being enforced by violence and intimidation. Two decisions in 1876 by the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of enforcement under the Enforcement Act and the Force Act, and, together with the end of Reconstruction marked by the removal of federal troops after the Hayes-Tilden Compromise of 1877, resulted in a climate in which violence could be used to depress black voter turnout and fraud could be used to undo the effect of lawfully cast votes.  Once whites regained control of the state legislatures using these tactics, a process known as "Redemption," they used gerrymandering of election districts to further reduce black voting strength and minimize the number of black elected officials. In the 1890s, these states began to amend their constitutions and to enact a series of laws intended to re-establish and entrench white political supremacy.  Such disfranchising laws included poll taxes, literacy tests, vouchers of "good character," and disqualification for "crimes of moral turpitude." These laws were "color-blind" on their face, but were designed to exclude black citizens disproportionately by allowing white election officials to apply the procedures selectively. Other laws and practices, such as the "white primary," attempted to evade the 15th Amendment by allowing "private" political parties to conduct elections and establish qualifications for their members (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 70).  

 

The Southern states experimented with numerous additional restrictions to limit black participation in politics, many of which were struck down by federal courts over the next decades.  As a result of these efforts, in the former Confederate states nearly all black citizens were disenfranchised by 1910. The problem of racial discrimination in voting, by white Southern legislators legally limiting blacks from voting with Jim Crow laws, including literacy tests, tests on interpreting the Constitution, whites only primaries, poll taxes and residency requirements.  By 1960 fewer than 10 percent of the African American citizens in Mississippi were registered to vote.  The process of restoring the rights taken stolen by these tactics would take many decades.  In Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915), the Supreme Court held that voter registration requirements containing "grandfather clauses," which made voter registration in part dependent upon whether the applicant was descended from men enfranchised before enactment of the 15th Amendment violated that amendment.  In Smith v. Allright 321 U.S. 649 (1944) the Supreme Court ruled that primaries that the Texas whites only primary was unconstitutional. By the 1960s all but five states had eliminated even nominal poll taxes (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 73-74).  In Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), the Supreme Court established the one-person, one-vote principle (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 71).  In Richardson v. Ramirez 418 U.S. 24, 41-55 (1974) the Court rejected the argument that the disenfranchisement of felons violates the Equal Protection Clause, ruling felon disenfranchisement is a matter of state policy (Blackwell ’09:113).

 

Black Voter Registration in Southern States 1960-2000

 

State

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

Alabama

13.7

66.0

55.8

71.8

72.0

Arkansas

38.0

82.3

57.2

62.4

60.0

Florida

39.4

55.3

58.3

54.7

52.7

Georgia

29.3

57.2

48.6

53.9

66.3

Louisiana

31.1

57.4

60.7

82.3

73.5

Mississippi

5.2

71.0

62.3

78.5

73.7

North Carolina

39.1

51.3

51.3

64.0

62.9

South Carolina

13.7

56.1

53.7

62.0

68.6

Tennessee

59.1

71.6

64.0

77.4

64.9

Texas

35.5

72.6

56.0

63.5

69.5

Virginia

23.1

57.0

53.2

64.5

58.0

Average

29.7

63.4

56.5

66.8

65.66

Source: Table 3.1 pg. 76 Maisel & Buckley ‘05

 

The Constitution requires a national census to be conducted once per decade, and this mandate serves as the basis for apportioning seats in the U.S. House of Representatives. For each state, the number of people in each constituent congressional district must be precisely equal (Blackwell & Klukowski ’09).  Congress passed legislation in 1957, 1960, and 1964 that contained voting-related provisions. The 1957 Act created the Civil Rights Division within the Department of Justice and the Commission on Civil Rights; the Attorney General was given authority to intervene in and institute lawsuits seeking injunctive relief against violations of the 15th Amendment. The 1960 Act permitted federal courts to appoint voting referees to conduct voter registration following a judicial finding of voting discrimination.  In the early 1960s, the Supreme Court also overcame its reluctance to apply the Constitution to unfair redistricting practices. In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Supreme Court recognized that grossly mal-apportioned state legislative districts could seriously undervalue -- or dilute -- the voting strength of the residents of overpopulated districts while overvaluing the voting strength of residents of under-populated districts. The 1964 Act also contained several relatively minor voting-related provisions. In 1971, 13 individuals created the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC).  Between 1970 and 1992, the number of African Americans serving in state legislatures increased 274 percent (from 168 to 463). According to 2003 figures from the National Conference of State Legislators, 595 African Americans held seats in the upper or lower house in state legislatures, accounting for 8.1 percent of all.  in 1970 there were only 15 black women state legislators—accounting for less than 10 percent of all African-American state legislators. By 1992, the number of black women state legislators had increased to 131, or roughly 28 percent of all black state legislators. As with other women in Congress, legislative experience at the state level provided a vehicle for election to the U.S. Congress. In 1971, there was only one African-American woman in Congress—Shirley Chisholm of New York—among a total of 14 blacks in Congress. By late 2007, African-American women accounted for nearly one-third of all the sitting black Members of Congress.

 

Apportionment of Representatives among the States 1790-1970

 

Year

Congress

Population Base (1,000)

Number of States

Number of Repre-sentatives

Date of Act

Apportionment Population per Representative

1970

93rd

203,053

50

435

 

469,088

1960

88th -92nd

178,559

50

435

 

410,5481

1950

83rd -87th 

149,895

48

435

 

334,587

1940

78th – 82nd

131,006

48

435

November 15, 1941

301,164

1930

73rd – 77th

122,093

48

435

June 18, 1929

280,675

1920

No re-app.

 

48

435

 

 

1910

63rd – 72nd

91,604

48

435

August 8, 1911

210,583

1900

58th  – 62nd 

74,568

45

386

January 16, 1901

193,167

1890

53rd – 57th

61,909

44

356

February 7, 1891

173,901

1880

48th – 52nd  

49,371

38

325

February 25, 1882

151,912

1870

43rd – 47th

38,116

37

292

February 2, 1872

130,538

1860

38th – 42nd

29,550

34

241

March 4, 1862

122,614

1850

33rd – 37th

21,767

31

234

July 30, 1852

93,020

1840

28th -32nd

15,908

25

223

June 25, 1842

71,338

1830

23rd – 27th

11,981

24

240

May 22, 1832

49,712

1820

18th -22nd

8,972

24

213

March 7, 1822

42,124

1810

13th – 17th

6,584

17

181

December 21, 1811

36,377

1800

8th -12th

4,880

16

141

January 14, 1802

34,609

1790

3rd – 7th

1st – 2nd

3,616

----

15

13

105

65

April 14, 1792

Constitution 1789

34,436

30,000

Source: Series Y 215-219 Morton, Rogers C.B. Secretary of Commerce; Barabba, Vincent P. Director of the Bureau of the Census. Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970. Bicentennial Edition pg. 1084

 

Women first came together in the famous conference at Seneca Falls, New York in 1848 to asset their own rights.  From that point until the successful adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920, women suffragists waged a valiant, prolonged, often brilliant and frequently frustrating battle to win the right to vote.  Women were first given the right to vote on school issues in the frontier states in the 1890s.  Wyoming had granted women the right to vote on all matters in 1869 and in applying for admission to the Union, Wyoming included women’s suffrage in its constitution, Congress however did not admit Wyoming until 1890 as the first state with universal female suffrage.  Other Western states followed Wyoming’s lead, in at least partial recognition of the important and equal role women played in the settlement of the frontier, but the progress was slow and often frustrating.  By 1916 women’s suffrage was included in both party platforms, though the suffragists still wanted state action.  In 1917 women turned to more militant actions, picketing the White House and delivering petitions to the president.  Some were jailed, others replaced them.  When female prisoners were force fed, the press had a field day.  More women came to Washington and the jails became more crowded.  The women’s suffrage amendment passed the House in the second session of the Sixty-fifth Congress, but it failed to achieve the two-thirds vote necessary in the Senate.  More women came to Washington, more picketed, more were jailed, and more hunger strikes ensued.  Finally President Wilson was won over to the cause.  Then the Republican controlled House passed the measure in 1919, Wilson pressured his fellow Democrats in the Senate to enact women’s suffrage.  At long last, in August 1920, the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified by three-quarters of the states, and women won the right to vote in all elections.  No further legal barrier could be used to prevent women from voting (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 78-79). 

 

Voter Turnout in Presidential Elections, by Gender, 1964-2008

 

 

Source: Center for American Women and Politics. Gender Differences in Voter Turnout. Eagleton Institute of Politics. Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey. November 2009

 

The women and children of the 20th century were not as well received as the freed blacks of the Gilded Age.  Voter turnout for women remained low in the years immediately after enfranchisement.  Voter participation in 1920 and 1924 was the lowest voter participation in history at 49.2% and 48.9% respectively, probably as the result of the restrictions on freedom imposed by the XVIII Amendment prohibition of alcohol one year from 1919.  Despite the adversity, the number of female voters steadily increased, exceeding the male number by 1964, and leveled off in 1972, at a turnout level only slightly below that of men.  Since 1980 turnout rates of women voters have exceeded the rates for men in every national election. Today, women still constitute only 19 per cent of the members of parliaments around the world.  In the United States House of Representatives 73 of 435 seats, only 16.8% were filled by women.  In the Senate only 15 seats, 15% were occupied by women.  This is below international mean.  No woman has ever been elected President or Vice President although many unsuccessful challengers have nominated women as their Vice-Presidential candidate.  Female candidates suffer no electoral or fund-raising disadvantage compared to male candidates. A gender related fund-raising disadvantage may have existed in Congressional elections prior to the mid-eighties, but this seems to have disappeared or even reversed in recent years.  Since 1984, female candidates for the House have been slightly more successful than males at raising funds and at least as successful in raising PAC contributions, large contributions and even early contributions.  At the state level, female candidates also raise more money than their male counterparts.  Consequently, the current dearth of female office holders is thought to be primarily the result of prior barriers to women entering politics, the effects of which are still realized today because of the generic incumbency advantage.  Older and more male-dominated cohorts are being replaced by younger and less male-dominated cohorts (Milyo & Schosberg ’00: 2).

 

2004 Voter Turnout by Age

 

Age Group

Turnout

18 – 24

47%

25 - 34

56%

35 - 44

64%

45 - 54

69%

55 - 64

73%

65 and older

71%

Source: Old Enough to Fight but Not Old Enough to Vote: The 26th Amendment. The Free Library. Scholastic Inc. 2008

 

During World War II, when eighteen year olds were conscripted into military service, many people believed that the voting age should be lowered to eighteen.  In 1943 Georgia lowered its voting age to eighteen, but no other state followed suit.  President Eisenhower expressed support for eighteen-year-old voters during his first term (1953-1957), but only Kentucky amended its constitution to effect that change.  When Alaska and Hawaii were admitted to the Union in the late 1950s, their constitutions called for voting ages of nineteen and twenty, respectively.  No further changes ensued until the United States became embroiled in the Vietnam War.  The cries were heard, “old enough to die but not old enough to vote.”  In response Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1970, one provision of which made eighteen year olds eligible to vote in all national, state, and local elections.  In Oregon v. Mitchell 400 U.S. 112 (1970) the Supreme Court struck down this provision, asserting that Congress could not constitutionally take such actions for state and local elections.  In response Congress passed and the requisite 37 states ratified, the Twenty-sixth Amendment, making eighteen the minimum voting age for all elections (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 85).  In 1974 the US abolished the draft and became a volunteer military. 11 million 18 – 20 year olds gained the right to vote and between 1970 and 1972 the voter age population increased by 16.3 million from 124.5 million to 140.8 million, 13.1% growth.  Between 1972 and 1974 growth in VAP was 3.9% and between 1968 and 1970 3.5% close to the birth rate.  The 26th Amendment set voter age participation back ten percentage points from the 60-70% in the 1960s presidential elections and 40-50% in midterm elections to the 50-60% in all subsequent presidential elections and the 30-40% in congressional elections (IDEA ’09).  Young voters are easy to register but least likely to show up to the polls, of any age group.

 

The easing of voting restrictions has a checkered history.  Property requirement were eased and during Reconstruction former Confederate states were obligated to enfranchise black voters in their constitutions, the XV amendments guaranteed blacks the right to vote and participated in politics.  Voter participation was never higher between 1860 and 1900 voter participation did not fall below 71.3%.  However when Union occupying forces left southern states legislated a Redemption and by 1890 few blacks were registered to vote.   Segregation cast a pall over the elections and since 1900 no national election has achieved a 66% turnout.  By 1900 the voting franchise had been tainted by apartheid and to assure a fear for one’s health the U.S. Census Bureau began keeping accurate epidemiologic statistics.  Women’s suffrage, the XIX amendment of 1920, was falsely associated with the cruel prohibition of alcohol of the XVIII amendment of 1919-20, and 1920 and 1924 had the lowest voter participation rates of the 20th century.  The U.S. Census Bureau uniquely did not even bother to re-apportion the districts in 1920.  The admission of an estimated 33.9 million women doubled the size of the voting age population from 27 million males in 1910 to 60.9 million men and women in 1920 a 226% increase (U.S. Census ’48 : 1).  It took a while for voter turnout to pick back up as a percentage but by 1964 there were numerically more women registered to vote than men, by the 1972 women had equal turnout rates and since 1980 more women have turned out to vote than men.  The XVI amendment of 1971 allowed 11 million people ages 18-20 to vote at the polls, but these youths have the lowest participation rates of any age group, and subsequently voter participation has dropped 10 percentage points.  The enfranchisement of convicted felons offers to expand the electorate by 3.1 million votes.  Extending the right to vote to people under 18 would increase the voting age population by 74.6 million, 32%.  These captive populations would be particularly easy to motivate to go to the polls.  The penal system would stay out of the electoral process.  Third parties could appeal for prison votes.  Probation officers could give out election material.  Parents could vote for their infants so long as they had identification and were registered to vote.  Only genuine third party option would be as likely to foster voter turnout. 

 

Part Three: Incumbent Democratic-Republican Two Party Electoral System

 

We elect one president of the United States, fifty governors, one hundred senators, 435 members of Congress, 1,984 state senators, 5,440 state representatives, thousands of mayors, city council members, county commissioners, judges of probate, clerks of court, water district commissioners and other public officeholders.   In 2005 ninety-nine of the one hundred U.S. senators are either republicans or Democrats, 434 of the 435 representatives in the House of Representatives are affiliated with one of the two major parties, all fifty of the state governors and more than 7,350 of the approximately 7,400 state legislators elected in partisan elections ran under major party labels (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 267).  Although federal officials get most of the attention, state and local officials often make decisions that have more direct impact on our daily lives.  State and local officials holding some elective office are also qualified candidates for higher office (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 200-201).  The States have the constitutional responsibility for delivering the vast array of governmental programs and services that characterize life in the United States.  There are about 85,000 local governments in the United States.  One of the usual responsibilities of nearly every county government is the conducting of elections.  Sometimes, local governments supplement their finances with federal aid (Dover ’03: 67).  The distribution of power within the American federal system places extensive responsibilities at the local level, yet the structure of public finance leaves those local governments with only limited funding to carry out their numerous responsibilities.  The federal government dominates the most lucrative types of taxation, while the states rely upon the ones that follow in their ability to produce revenue.  Local governments, such as counties, are often left with the least-productive types of taxation to finance their myriad activities (Dover ’03: 68).

 

Nearly two-thirds of U.S. cities with a population of over five thousand hold nonpartisan elections to determine who will hold local offices.  The movement toward nonpartisan government was part of Progressive era reforms, advocates of nonpartisan local government feel that running a local government should be more like administering a business than playing partisan politics.  Frequently they cited the corruption and the inefficiency of partisan politics as, “There is no Democratic or Republican way to clean a street”.  Critics contend that nonpartisan elections tend to draw fewer voters because citizens do not care who wins these elections and because elections without the cue of party often confuse voters (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 473). States have also delegated considerable power to the people in regards to initiatives and referendums.  The California recall process begins with an official “Notice of Intention to Recall”, signed by at least sixty-five voters, filed with the California secretary of state’s office, whereby the lieutenant governors will set the date of the recall election within sixty to eighty days (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 262).  In Maine organized parties rarely have enough strength to help state legislative candidates significantly, however, in states such as Minnesota, party organizations practically run the campaign for candidates.  In Massachusetts in 1998 eighteen of the forty seats in the state senate were won without any major party opposition, 45 percent, 68 out of 160 house members won reelection with no opponent, 42.5 percent.  In Florida in the 1998 elections for representative to the state house of representatives, Democratic candidates ran unopposed by Republican opponents in 37 of 120 races.  Republican candidates faced no major party opposition in twenty races (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 25). 

 

The modern two party system evolved in six distinct party systems in American political history, Jeffersonian Democratic-Republican, Jachsonian Democrats, Progressive Republican Era, Republican Populist, New Deal Democrats and the modern age of split ticket voting whereupon informed voters divide their vote so that the President’s party does not also hold a majority in Congress  (Maisel & Buckley ’05: Xxiii).  The Founder envisioned directly elected Representatives connected to their populace and two Senators selected by the state parties.   The other elected officials of the federal government were chosen through a filtering process.  The elaborate mechanism for choosing the president has given the office a great deal of independence from the ruling party (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 10-11).  The Electoral College was created in 1787 as part of the original writing of the national constitution.  Some convention delegates wanted the president chosen by a direct popular vote of the people, while others preferred a more indirect method, choice by Congress, the electoral college was a compromise.  The House of Representatives would choose the president if the Electoral College failed in its designated task.  One unusual feature of the Electoral College was the method designated for choosing the vice president, now deferring to the Presidential candidate’s counsel.  Originally the vice president would be the second highest vote getter in the Electoral College and would have the responsibility of presiding over the Senate.  Electors were each given two votes for someone not of their state (Dover ’03: 23-25). The Electoral College helped to produce a clear winner in three elections.  In the elections of 1860, 1912 and 1992, Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson and Bill Clinton, respectively, finished first in the popular vote in campaigns in which there were more than two major candidates.  Lincoln attained 39.8 percent of the popular vote, Wilson 41.8 percent and Clinton 43.4 percent.  None of these are convincing victories.  The distributions of electoral votes in these elections provided more convincing evidence for claims of victory.  Lincoln attained 180 votes of the 303 that were cast in 1860; Wilson garnered 435 out of 531 while Clinton won 370 votes from the grand total of 538 that comprised the electoral college of 1992.  The size of these electoral vote triumphs allowed these presidents to claim popular mandates when their actual votes may have suggested otherwise (Dover ’03: 33). 

 

The ability of the president to lead his own party in Congress, to win support in the other party, or to coalesce opposition measured by presidential support scores and presidential opposition scores changes.  Poor showing in public opinion polls certainly works against the president’s credibility as a leader to his fellow partisans in Congress.  But increased popularity does not necessarily equate legislative success.  American is not a parliamentary democracy.  Congress is a separate branch of government, representatives and senators have separate electoral bases from the president.  Therefore, the ability of the president to lead his party in Congress will depend on two criteria, first, institutional constraints, where his agenda falls relative to the preferences of his party’s majority, second external factors from scandal to war to the economy, all of which affect the ability of a president to persuade even members of his own party to follow his lead (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 465).  Vice presidential running mates for major-party candidates are officially nominated by the two parties’ conventions.  But the choices are made by the presidential candidate.  The vice presidential nominee can help or hurt the ticket.  Certainly the nominee is evaluated in party on this choice, the first important decision he has to make after confirmation as his party’s standard bearer. The process for choosing vice presidential candidates is not a formal one, but it has been a careful and organized one (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 325 & 326).  The party leadership roles of majority leader and minority leader and majority whip and minority whip developed out of the intense partisan conflict at the turn of the 20th century.  Although Speakers are officially elected by the entire House, the vote to elect them is essentially party line.  Each party’s caucus, a meeting of all party members, nominates a candidate for Speaker.  The Speaker’s right hand is the majority leader.  Elected by members of his or her own party to handle the day-to-day leadership of the party, the majority leader schedules legislation, coordinates committee work, and negotiates with the president, the House minority leader, and the Senate leadership.  The goal of a majority leader is to build and maintain voting coalitions and essentially to keep peace in the family.  Next in line in the party hierarchy are the whips, their job is to link the rank and file to the party leadership.  They are the information disseminators, in house pollsters, and vote counters.  They make the party position known to all members of the caucus, assess who is for, against, or on the fence on any given piece of legislation and try to persuade reluctant members to follow the party line and report back to the Speaker and the majority and minority leaders with the expected vote tallies (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 438). Nancy Pelosi is a generous fund raiser, she gave $1 million in 2002 to her colleagues for their reelection bids, more than any other House Democrat (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 447).

 

The incumbent has a distinct advantage.  In only six elections since World War II have fewer than 90 percent of those seeking reelection been reelected.  Over 90 percent of House incumbents seeking to return are successful in election after election.  The average reelection rate for incumbents seeking reelection in the last three elections was over 97 percent.  Senators too are rarely defeated (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 471). 

State legislators seeking reelection also win virtually all of the time (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 258).  Incumbent presidents do not have to prove that they are capable of handling the office or that they have the requisite background and experience, they have held the job for four years.  What is better experience for being president than having been president?  Incumbent presidents have a political organization in place (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 369).  Incumbents are winning because challengers are poor campaigners.  When challengers run good campaigns, incumbents can lost.  But good challengers appear too infrequently for too many important offices.  The lack of good challengers and good campaigns insulate incumbents in congressional races, the same factors insulate those incumbents seeking reelection to less visible and less attractive offices as well (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 260). Early in the twentieth century, Presidents Taft, Hoover and Bush I lost bids for reelection, but these defeats are easily explained.  Taft lost because former president Theodore Roosevelt ran as a third-party candidate, as the candidate of his famous Bull Moose Party splitting the Republican vote, allowing Woodrow Wilson to win with less than a majority.  Hoover lost because the voting public blamed him for the Great Depression.  Bush lost votes on the economy to Perot.  Each loss took place before the electronic media multiplied the advantages of incumbency (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 369).  Nearly 90 percent of respondents report having had some contact with their congressional leaders, almost a quarter had personally met their representatives, and almost three quarters had received mail from their representative in Washington.  Challengers are not known at all, voters do not choose between two candidates on equal footing but between one who is well known and positively viewed and another who has to fight to be viewed at all (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 80 & 89).

 

The most prevalent rules call for candidates to run in their party’s primary if they meet certain fairly simple criteria.  First, the prospective candidate must be a registered member of the political party whose nomination he or she seeks.  Second, candidates must meet some sort of test to gain access to the ballot.  Often this test involves gathering a certain number of signatures on a petition.  The number of signatures necessary and who is eligible to sign are important factors.  In Tennessee, only 25 signatures are required for most offices.  In Maine a percentage of those voting in the last election are needed, only registered party members may sign petitions, and they must sign a petition that contains only the names of party members from their home town (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 208).  Despite the lip service given to the basic principle of majority rule, majority rule is an exception in American politics.  Most elections in America, and certainly most primaries are determined by plurality rule.  That is, the person with the most votes, not necessarily 50 percent plus at least one, in the primary wins the nomination (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 217).  Politicians generally like to avoid hotly contested primaries.  However, under certain circumstances, such as when a candidate is not well known and/or a candidates organization has not tested, a little primary can be a good thing (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 230). Credential disputes are the most easily understood.  In party rules and in the call to the convention, each party establishes the procedures through which delegates are to be chose.  In most cases no one challenges the delegates presenting themselves as representing a certain state.  Each party appoints a Credentials Committee that hears challenges to proposed delegations and rules on the disputes.  The report of the Credentials Committee is the first order of official business before the nominating convention.  Credentials, and rules disputes which can determine who wins and who loses, are seen as critical matters. The whips inform the delegates and the delegates fall into line (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 321 &324).

 

After the national conventions, party members sometimes even reject the top candidate of their party and cross over to split their ballots at election time.  Only party regulars can more or less be counted on to vote the straight ticket. Many people find choosing between the parties a hard decision, or may reject both.  Many don’t bother to register, or frustrated, they leave a blank or register Independent.  Unwillingness to join one side disregards the fact that the membership of a major party includes a surprising diversity of conservatives, moderates, liberals, pro and anti-government, pro-regulation and deregulation, internationalist and isolationist and other attributes that divide people.  Both the rise of blind allegiance to Party and rejection of Party have gotten out of hand.  Asked about their orientation in 2002, Americans replied that they were Moderate (40%), Conservative (36%) and Liberal (19%).  Liberal is the meaning of recent years, not the 19th century one which was rooted in freedom from government authority.  Being Independent takes one out of the party arena and may seem to reduce stress and strain, but it excludes one from party primaries in many, but not all states.  It facilitates tuning out of the kinds of meaningful disputes over issues that perennially occupy those who affiliate with a Party.  It also diminishes the percentage of the electorate who participate in our primary elections.  While Independents tend to revel in their freedom form the controls of Party, they actually prevent themselves from having much to do with the orientation of the American System of Government, whose power is rooted in political parties and those who work effectively within the party machinery. After all, a political party is at its core an organization that consists of individuals, leaders and followers alike, at national, state, and local levels (Bornet ’04: 10-11).

 

A party system is a pattern of interaction in which two or more political parties compete for office or power in government and for the support of the electorate, and must therefore take one another into account in their behavior in government and in election contests.  The American national party system is generally classified as a competitive two party-system.  The Democratic and Republican parties compete with each other for national offices; each has a chance of winning.  Minor parties may be on the ballot from time to time, but they neither persist nor have they had much of a chance of winning.  In the 1992 presidential election, and to a lesser extent in the 1996 campaign, Ross Perot’s third party threatened the hegemony of the Democratic and Republican (DR) parties.  But in the final analysis his effort to undermine the two-party system fell short.  Thus our national system remains the competitive two party-system.  It is decentralized in the sense that local and state politics are not generally disciplined (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 15 & 17).  Theoretically the Democrat and Republican parties are organized in each of the roughly 190,000 precincts in the United States.  Oftentimes, only one party has a precinct.  In the 1980s and 1990s the Christian right motivated their members to show up for local precinct committee meetings in their areas and to attend the nominating caucuses to promote conservative candidates.  This grassroots strategy eventually led to conservative control of local Republican party organizations in states such as Texas and Minnesota and has continued to provide a critical base of electoral support for GOP candidates (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 59). Today, state party central committees operate for both parties in each of the fifty states, and the means of choosing committee members is set by state law.  Those who favor strong party organization believe that the state should interfere as little as possible with the internal working of political parties.  Effective state party chairs not only lead the state committee, they define its tasks and setting its goals, they also act as the linchpin between grassroots party and the national party.  The average budget for state parties rose nearly five times, to nearly $300,000 annually, between 1961 and 1979.  By 1984 the average had risen to nearly $350,000 with the largest state budgets reaching $2.5 million and with only a quarter of the party committees operating with budgets of less than $100,000.  State parties recruit and de-cruit candidates for local and state offices.  State parties are continually at work to increase turnout in both primary and general elections.  At the national level there are the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and the Republican National Committee (RNC) (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 61-63).

 

In Federalist 10 (1787) Madison warns of the mischief of faction, reasoning that many groups must be allowed to flourish so that no one group becomes too powerful.  Such was the concept of party at the time the Constitution was drafted to the tune of “taxation without representation is tyranny!”  The major American political parties exist, as do other political organizations, to organize large numbers of individuals behind attempts to influence the selection of public officials and the decisions these officials subsequently make in office.  The differences between parties and other political organizations are often slender.   We may define “political party” generally as the articulate organization of society’s active political agents, those who are concerned with the control of governmental power and who compete for popular support with another group or groups holding divergent views (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 14). The Democratic Party traces its origins back to Thomas Jefferson’s Democratic-Republican Party that murdered the Federalist Party.  President Andrew Jackson split with the party retaining only the name Democrat.  By the 1830s hundreds of delegates from state party affiliates would convene to nominate the candidates (Dover ’03: 27).  The Republican Party emerged as the foe of the expansion of slavery into the territories and won the Presidency in 1860 with Abraham Lincoln, who served as president and commander in chief during the four years of the Civil War.  It was the Republicans who pushed for the adoption of the 13th, 14th and 15th Amendments during Reconstruction but they took their Union pensions and ran from the racial discrimination that swept the nation until the middle of the 20th century.  Modern political parties were in their infancy at the dawn of the nineteenth century.  The Republican Party, reliant upon the military occupation of the former Confederate states, was dominating the American political landscape at the dawn of the twentieth century (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 468).  In the beginning of the 20th century Republicans vacillated between Progressivism, trust busting, government regulation of business and Conservatism, pro-business and protective tariffs.  Republicans held office for the entire post-Civil War era with the exception of Grover Cleveland’s non-consecutive terms, and Woodrow Wilson’s two terms.  The New Deal Democrats elected FDR by a landslide for four consecutive terms, and usually held the presidency and majority until the 70s  (Bornet ’04: 1 & 4).

 

FDRs party identifies with the New Deal’s public works programs and federal help for the unemployed of the Great Depression and with the Social Security act of 1935, civil rights and trade union legislation, and Medicare.  The Democrats are at one with use of the national government regulate the private sector of the economy and increasing the federal power.  Republicans advocate the well-being of business and entrepreneurship, and minimum taxes and governmental regulations espoused by Reagan.  The Democratic Party remains the party of Franklin D. Roosevelt.  In contrast the Republican Party has become the party of Reagan. Scratch an orthodox Republican and you will quickly find someone who professes distrust of Government.  Yet at the same time that individual will happily use Government to crate and operate the Nation’s military establishment, and FBI.  Scratch and orthodox Democrat, and you will uncover an expressed belief in a form of government that uses its power to regulate and to collect income taxes from the affluent, with the money supposed to be spent on improving the circumstances of mankind at home and abroad.  Tax policies commonly divide the parties, with some Republican conservatives eager to cut taxes in upper brackets to help the economy, not of course themselves.  Democratic liberals, meanwhile, seem sometimes to desire using taxes not just to balance the budget or pay for programs, but to level the playing field of income distribution and property ownership.  Democrats say they are champions of individual security and of protection of free speech.  Republicans, meanwhile, tend to observe that they try to keep the good of the whole Nation in the forefront of their thinking.  They assert that they believe fervently in the right to earn a living free of most government intervention, and that the right to own property certainly ought to include most aspects of the right to its use as the owner sees fit (Bornet ‘4: 5, 7, 8 & 13). In basic political matter we are more alike than we may think. Fundamentally, paraphrasing Jefferson’s first Inaugural Address, “we are all Republicans, we are all Democrats”.  We are democrats in that we insist on one person, one vote, and majority decision-making.  We are republican in relying on representative government, a necessity where large populations, widely scattered, are involved.  We are Democratic-Republican in our belief System, which is solidly federalist yet also nationalist, solidly rooted in democratic principles yet clearly republican in electoral activities (Bornet ’04: 6). 

 

This is an enormous country, with sections and regions.  There are variations in economic conditions and recourse, and differing landscapes.  Some blame for the rejection of party affiliation by young people should be placed on those who routinely besmirch party heroes.  College professors as a whole are sharply divided in politics.  In the social sciences and humanities they are overwhelmingly Democratic liberals.  Some remember the old Socialist Party, still hoping for government ownership and regulation of the means of production and distribution.  The science and physical education departments are by no means Democrats, while the business division faculty is probably Republican up and down the corridors.  Judges vary in party affiliation.  When they are appointed to the highest court, justices often change their ideology appreciably during their years of service, emerging in old age with beliefs foreign to their early careers (Bornet ’04: 9-10). Terrorism is defined as the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to attain goals that are political, religious or ideological in nature, through intimidation, coercion or instilling fear (Chomsky ’04: 79).  Presidents from the Democratic Party led the Nation’s military establishment as commander in chief in World War I and II, Korea, Vietnam, Haiti, Somalia and Bosnia.  Presidents from the Republican Party accepted the burden of leading the Union in the Civil War, the Spanish-American War and inherited the Vietnam War, they sought wars in Grenada and Panama and led the Nation during both the Gulf War and the Iraq War.  Criticism of the United Nations is normally Republican, for it was President Wilson, a Democrat, who pioneers international organization with his ungratified League of Nations, while Roosevelt and Truman helped create the United Nations.  Presidents from both parties have relied on NATO.  They were both aggressive during the Cold War in confronting the Soviet Union (Bornet ’04: 7).  

 

A representative democracy rests no just on the consent of the governed but on the informed consent of the governed.  One conception of democratic society is one in which the public has the means to participate in some meaningful way in the management of their affairs and the means of information are open and free.  If you look up democracy in the dictionary you’ll get a definition something like that.  An alternative conception of democracy is that the elections bar the public from managing their own affairs and the means of information must be kept rigidly and narrowly controlled, the democratic official is a popularly elected despot, not necessarily an aristocrat, but despot nonetheless (Chomsky ’02).  The question of how responsible men get into the positions where they have the authority to make decisions is by serving people with real power.  The people with real power are the ones who own the society, and have instilled in them the beliefs and doctrines that will serve the interests of private power.  Unless they can master that skill, they’re not part of the political class. So we have one kind of educational system directed to the responsible men, the political class.  They have to be deeply indoctrinated in the values and interests of private power and the state-corporate nexus that represents it.  As society becomes more free and democratic, propaganda is needed to control the masses.  The business community controls the media and has massive resources.  The political system trains the political class to work in the service of the masters the people who own the society.  The rest of the population ought to be deprived of any form of organization, they ought to be working. If they can achieve that, then they can be part of the political class, who create and perpetuate the “necessary illusions” and emotionally potent “oversimplifications” to keep the naďve simpletons more or less on course (Chomsky ’02: 19-20).  Parties have essentially become one of a class of participants in modern elections.  Parties have become little more than super PACs. Candidates view parties as a source of money (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 479). The most interesting debate about the role of political parties in the twenty-first century is how the two parties define themselves (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 480).  When parties are weak, the linkage role of the electoral process is not played well.  When parties are strong, a possibility exists that representation and accountability will follow.  Other institutions, the media, interest groups, have tried to pick up the slack, but they have done so without notable success.  And thus we are drawn back to the conclusion that if political parties did not exist, someone would have to invent them.  Since ours already exist, we should get on with the work of making them function more productively (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 486).  A progressive theory of liberal democratic thought argues that a revolution in the art of democracy could be used to manufacture consent and bring about agreement on the part of the public for the election of third party candidates (Chomsky ’02: 9-17). 

 

Stage One: Hamiltonian Federalists and Jeffersonian Democratic-Republicans

 

George Washington won the election in 1788 and reelection in the nation’s second presidential election of 1792.  Under the original rules electors were selected in November, they voted in December and Congress counted the votes in January.  He deigned to run for a third term.  In 1788 all 69 electors voted for Washington but with their second vote 34 voted for John Adams and the remaining 35 were split with John Jay receiving 9 votes.  In the election of 1792 each of the 135 electors from fifteen states voted for Washington and with their second vote indicated Adams as their pick for vice president over New York Governor George Clinton (Dover ’03: 28)  The first American party was the Federalist party, it was shaped largely by Alexander Hamilton, George Washington’s treasury secretary.  James Madison, author of famous Federalist Paper Number 10 regarding the need for faction, pressured a reluctant Thomas Jefferson to join him in organizing an opposition party to Hamilton’s Federalists.  Jefferson’s Democratic-Republicans formed as a reaction to the rising tide of Federalist policies gaining support in Congress, favoring New England merchants and manufacturers at the expense of southern and western farmers and tradesmen (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 33).  The classical Greek philosophy of the Democratic-Republican (DR) was superb.  By Washington’s retirement the nation had developed two active political parties, the Federalists and the Democratic-Republicans.  Jefferson stood against Hamilton’s statist ideas for good administration and an expansive executive, for an empowered federal government, with a capacity for managing finance, taking control of debt and banking, and encouraging manufacture.  Hamilton had wanted to unite the interest and credit of rich individuals with those of the state in order to foster economic growth.  The Jeffersonians, in heated contrast, proposed to limit the intrusiveness of the federal government in the market.  In 1804 Treasury Secretary Hamilton was killed in a duel by Burr, the Anti-Federalist candidate, who returned to finish his term as Vice President before being acquitted for murder. Instinctively the Jeffersonians aligned themselves with the likes of the Whiskey Rebellion and thus with popular rule over federal authority.  Jefferson set out his party’s core principle as “equal rights for all, special privileges for none” (Greenberg ’04: 9). 

 

Electoral College Count in Presidential Elections 1789-1820

 

Year

# States

Candidates

Party Affiliation

Votes

1820

24

James Monroe

Republican

231

 

 

John Q. Adams,

Independent-Republican

1

 

 

Not Voted

 

3

1816

19

James Monroe

Republican

183

 

 

Rufus King

Federalist

34

 

 

Not Voted

 

4

1812

18

James Madison

Democratic-Republican

128

 

 

De Witt Clinton

Fusion

89

 

 

Not Voted

 

1

1808

17

James Madison

Democratic-Republican

122

 

 

C.C. Pinckney

Federalist

47

 

 

George Clinton

Independent-Republican

6

 

 

Not Voted

 

1

1804

17

Thomas Jefferson

Democratic-Republican

162

 

 

C.C. Pinckney

Federalist

14

1800

16

Thomas Jefferson

Democratic-Republican

73

 

 

Aaron Burr

Democratic-Republican

73

 

 

John Adams

Federalist

65

 

 

C.C. Pinckney

Federalist

64

 

 

John Jay

Federalist

1

1796

16

John Adams

Federalist

71

 

 

Thomas Jefferson

Democratic-Republican

68

 

 

Thomas Pinckney

Federalist

69

 

 

Aaron Burr

Anti-Federalist

80

 

 

Samuel Adams

Democratic-Republican

15

 

 

Oliver Ellsworth

Federalist

11

 

 

George Clinton

Democratic-Republican

7

 

 

John Jay

Independent Federalist

5

 

 

James Iredell

Federalist

3

 

 

George Washington

Federalist

2

 

 

John Henry

Independent

2

 

 

S. Johnston

Independent Federalist

2

 

 

C.C. Pinckney

Independent Federalist

1

1792

15

George Washington

Federalist

132

 

 

John Adams

Federalist

77

 

 

George Clinton

Democratic-Republican

50

 

 

Thomas Jefferson

 

4

 

 

Aaron Burr

 

1

1789

13

George Washington

 

69

 

 

John Adams

 

34

 

 

John Jay

 

9

 

 

R.H. Harrison

 

6

 

 

John Rutledge

 

6

 

 

John Hancock

 

4

 

 

George Clinton

 

3

 

 

Samuel Huntington

 

2

 

 

John Milton

 

2

 

 

James Armstrong

 

1

 

 

Benjamin Lincoln

 

1

 

 

Edward Telfair

 

1

 

 

Not Voted

 

12

Source: Series Y 79 – 83. Morton, Rogers C.B. Secretary of Commerce; Barabba, Vincent P. Director of the Bureau of the Census. Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970. Bicentennial Edition pg. 1073-1074

 

This first party-system allowed for the orderly succession after Washington stepped down when John Adams (F) defeated Thomas Jefferson (D-R) in 1796 and Jefferson defeated Adams in 1800.  In the election of 1796 Adams, a Federalist, won with 71 votes and nine states, while Jefferson, Democratic-Republican, won 68 votes and seven states.  For Vice President Pinckney had been slated by the Federalists and Aaron Burr by the Anti-Federalists.  Jefferson however had won the second largest number of electoral votes and took the post of Vice President. Because of partisan rivalry, was never assigned any executive responsibilities.   In 1800 the problems with the electoral-college became worse.  Both Adams and Jefferson ran again, with Jefferson winning this election by a close margin of 73 to 65 electoral votes.  There was more party unity this time because Burr also received 73 votes.   Burr had marched with the traitor Benedict Arnold during the war.  The House of Representatives chose Jefferson over Burr, who was elected Vice President (Dover ’03: 28).  On July 11, 1804, at the Heights of Weehawken in New Jersey, Alexander Hamilton was mortally wounded in a duel with Aaron Burr, who was later acquitted of murder charges and returned to finish his term as Vice President before leaving politics.  Thus ended the rise of two-party competition in a limited electorate, limited by low suffrage and the dissemination of information.  Given that presidents and senators were not popularly elected, the Federalists and Democratic-Republicans had to extend their efforts to the states to woo potential presidential electors and to recruit state legislators who were supportive of their respective parties national candidates (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 33). In his inaugural address in 1800 Jefferson reflected, “Every difference of opinion is not a difference of principle.  We have called by different names brethren of the same principle.  We are all Republicans, we are all Federalists.”  During Jefferson’s administration, few legislators identified themselves according to party.  The Democratic-Republicans dominated the political scene for twenty-four years, without serious opposition during the administrations of Jefferson, Madison and Monroe (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 35).

 

The Federalist Party declined significantly after John Adams lost the election of 1800.  After the election of 1800 the Federalist party soon became a New England sectional party, promoting policies too conservative to appeal to the greater electorate.  More specifically, the Federalists denouncement of Congress’s declaration of war against Britain in 1812 further diminished the party credibility.  It competed in national elections for nearly two decades after that but never won, nor did it appear likely to do so.  It ceased its efforts entirely after 1816.  The last Federalist presidential nominee was defeated by Monroe in 1816.  With the virtual collapse of the Federalist party, the first American party system essentially collapsed.  The adoption of the Twelfth Amendment in 1804 had two effects.  First it eliminated the problem that had developed from the initial language of the Constitution by repealing the provision that electors must cast two undesignated votes for President.  Second, it informally recognized political parties as the nominating institutions in presidential elections by providing separate ballots for president and vice president (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 35 & 36).  By 1824 the Federalist Party had ceased to exist (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 35 & 36). James Monroe was unopposed for a second term in 1820 but the lack of a rival damaged the ruling Democratic-Republicans in the battle for a successor to Monroe in 1824.  With little opposition Monroe was reelected in 1820, his two terms were so lacking in party conflict that the pundits deemed it the “era of good feelings.”  But, the lack of another party to compete with in the electoral arena did not mean a lack of conflict within the dominant party (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 35 & 36).

 

A great distinction must be made between parties.  Some countries are so large that the different populations who are in perpetual state of opposition.  If a civil war breaks out the struggle is carried on by rival states.  But when the citizens entertain different opinions upon subjects which affect the whole country alike, such, for instance, as the principles upon which the government is to be conducted, then distinctions arise that may correctly be styled parties.  When the War of Independence was terminated and the foundations of the new government were to be laid down, the nation was divided between two opinions, as old as the world, one tending to limit, the other to extend indefinitely the power of the people. The Party that desired to limit the power of the people were Federalists.  The other party was exclusively attached to the cause of liberty, the Democratic-Republican (DR).  America is the land of democracy and the Federalists were always in the minority, but they relied upon the moral power of the great men from the War of Independence.  In 1801 the DR got hold possession of the government, Thomas Jefferson was elected President and he increased the influence of their party.  The means by which the Federalists had maintained their position were artificial, and their resources temporary, and the Federalists found themselves in so small a minority they perceived they were vanquished and fell into two divisions, one joined the victorious DR and the other laid down their banners and changed their name.   Society is convulsed by great parties, it is only agitated by minor ones.  When the Democratic-Republican party got the upper hand, it took exclusive possession of the conduct of affairs, and from that time on the laws and the customs of society have been adapted to its caprices.  The two chief weapons that parties use in order to obtain success are the newspapers and public associations (DeToquevile 1835:174- 180) 

 

Stage 2: Jacksonian Democrats 1824 - 1856

 

1824 was the first year the electoral-college vote for President was decided by popular election, and it was so flawed as to need to be decided by the House.  Turnout for the Presidential election jumped from 26.9% in 1824, the first year, to 57.6% in 1828 to an all-time high of 80.2% in 1840 (Greenberg ‘04:10).  By 1824 there were four candidates all claiming membership to the Democratic-Republican Party, as a result no candidate won either a majority of the electoral or popular vote and the election was decided in the House of Representatives.  John C. Calhoun, Monroe’s secretary of war declared himself a candidate in 1821.  Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, Secretary of the Treasury William H. Crawford, Speaker of the House Henry Clay and the hero of the battle of New Orleans, General Andrew Jackson, had all been put forward by their supporters.  Crawford might have been the front-runner, but he suffered a paralyzing stroke in the fall of 1823 and had to stop campaigning.  Calhoun withdrew when he was promised the vice presidential nomination by both Adams and Jackson.  Andrew Jackson led in the popular vote with 41.3 percent of the popular vote and 99 electoral votes and eleven states, followed by John Quincy Adams with 84 electoral votes, 30.9 percent of the popular vote and seven states.  William Crawford and Henry Clay each won three states.  Crawford finished third in electoral votes, with 41 votes, but fourth in popular vote, with 11.2 percent, while Clay finished third in the popular vote with 13 percent, but fourth in electoral votes with only 37 votes.  Since no candidate had a majority of the electoral vote, the House of Representatives decided the election.  Clay was Speaker of the House.  He actively supported Adams, and his backing proved crucial.  Adams was elected because thirteen state delegations voted for him on the one and only ballot.  Jackson won the support of seven states, and Crawford of four.  Adams named Clay his Secretary of State.   The House election of Adams and his deal with Clay convinced the people of the undesirability of allowing the House of Representatives to choose the president (Dover ‘03: 30).  The election of 1924 created a violent split in the Jeffersonian Democratic-Republican party, between the backers of Adams, the National Republicans, and those of Jackson, the Democrats (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 37).

 

Popular and Electoral Votes in Presidential Election 1824- 1856

 

Year

# States

Candidate

Party Affiliation

Electoral College Votes

Popular Votes

Vote Eligible Population Turnout

1856

31

James Buchanan

Democratic

174

1,832,955

78.9%

 

 

John C. Fremont

Republican

114

1,339,932

 

 

 

Millard Fillmore

American

8

871,731

 

1852

31

Franklin Pierce

Democratic

254

1,601,117

69.6%

 

 

Winfield Scott

Whig

42

1,385,458

 

 

 

John P. Hale

Free Soil

 

155,825

 

1848

30

Zachary Taylor

Whig

163

1,360,967

72.7%

 

 

Lewis Cass

Democratic

127

1,222,342

 

 

 

Martin Van Buren

Free Soil

 

291,268

 

1844

26

James K. Polk

Democratic

170

1,338,464

78.9%

 

 

Henry Clay

Whig

105

1,300,097

 

 

 

James G. Birney

Liberty

 

62,300

 

1840

26

William H. Harrison

Whig

234

1,274,624

80.2%

 

 

Martin Van Buren

Democratic

60

1,127,781

 

1836

26

Martin Van Buren

Democratic

170

765,483

57.8%

 

 

William H. Harrison

Whig

73

 

 

 

 

Hugh L. White

Whig

26

739,795

 

 

 

Daniel Webster

Whig

14

 

 

 

 

W.P. Mangum

Anti-Jackson

11

 

 

1832

24

Andrew Jackson

Democratic

219

687,502

55.4%

 

 

Henry Clay

National Republican

49

530,189

 

 

 

William Wirt

Anti-Masonic

7

 

 

 

 

John Floyd

Nullifiers

11

 

 

 

 

Not Voted

 

2

 

 

1828

24

Andrew Jackson

Democratic

178

647,286

57.6%

 

 

John Q. Adams

National Republican

88

508,064

 

1824

24

John Q. Adams

No Majority

84

108,740

26.9%

 

 

Andrew Jackson

Decided in House

99

153,544

 

 

 

Henry Clay

No Parties Designations

37

47,136

 

 

 

W.H. Crawford

 

41

46,618

 

 

Source: Series Y 79 – 83. Morton, Rogers C.B. Secretary of Commerce; Barabba, Vincent P. Director of the Bureau of the Census. Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970. Bicentennial Edition pg. 1073-1074

 

By 1828 the party system had been redesigned.  Jackson’s supporters created the Democratic Party, while Adams and Clay started the National Republican Party.  The latter entity did not last long and was succeeded by the Whig Party in 1834.  The Whigs were, in turn, replaced by the current Republican Party in the election of 1856.  Since that time, the two major parties have performed the role of nominating the two final candidates for president, with the Electoral College serving as the electing institution (Dover ‘03: 30).   By 1928 all but two of the 24 states selected their electors by popular vote.  The popular vote in 1828 more than tripled that of 1824.  Jackson’s victory in 1828 put a premium on party organization to mobilize voters.  The successful grassroots organization by Jackson supporters was due much in part to the leadership of Martin van Buren.  Often referred to as the “father of parties” Van Buren was the chief architect of the first American mass party and the chief defender of the patronage system that supported it.  Nominating conventions have been integral components of Presidential elections since the 1830s (Dover ‘03: 2).  Supported by a loyal following Jackson readily won reelection in 1832, having been re-nominated by his party at the first national party convention, with Van Buren on the ticket as vice president.  As Jacksonian Democrats continued to build support, using the spoils system that rewarded legions of friends, a new opposition party led by Henry Clay and Daniel Webster, the Whigs, was formed to oppose Jackson (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 38).  By the election of 1836, competition between the Democrats, as the Jeffersonian or Democratic Republicans came to be called and the Whigs became intense.  Strong party organization on both sides of the presidential campaign of 1840 between Van Buren and Henry Harrison yielded a record number of voters at the polls.  78 percent of adult white males voted in the 1840 presidential election, up from the record set previously by Jackson, the 56 percent turnout in 1828 was more than double the 1824 percentage.  In 1848 Martin van Buren broke with the Democrats to head the Free-Soil party (Greenberg ’04:11).

 

Politics had emerged as the true national pastime and the spoils system retained its place as a powerful tool in the arsenal of nineteenth-century party warfare.  Once in office, even the Whigs, who criticized the Democratic use of patronage as corrupt, proved to be as adept as their counterparts in utilizing the spoils of success to their maximum electoral advantage (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 39).  Political parties cling to principles, in them private interest is more studiously veiled under the pretext of the public good.  The Jacksonian Democrats emerged with a philosophy of government and citizens consistent in content and style with those of the Jeffersonians.  They gained clarity in opposition to Henry Clay’s “American system”, where the government expanded credit, protected industry and financed internal improvement, for the purpose of promoting America’s modernization.  But while the Whig opponents proffered a government should exert a beneficial paternal fostering influence upon the Industry and Prosperity of the People, the Democrats wanted to stop government from overreaching, the Democrats as they put it preferred the “voluntary system”.  They opposed high tariffs, arguing it was a system for plundering the laboring classes, The Democrats assumed special guardianship over the principles of the Constitution, to block those who would expand government with a doctrine of expediency and general welfare.”  The Democrats sought to center the American in the common man, but not slaves or Native Americans who were cruelly mistreated in this era. Democrats built support in all regions of the country by 1838 that would keep them in power for decades.  Every Democratic ticket from 1836 to 1860 was by design regionally balanced, one Southerner and one non-Southerner.  The Democrats’ rules required then, and up until 1936, that the nominee win two-third of the votes at the convention (Greenberg ’04:10).  The election of Zachary Taylor, a Whig, in 1848 was the only election in this cycle of nine presidential elections who was not a Democrat. 

 

In 1845 Congress designated the first Tuesday after the first Monday in even numbered years as the day in which states had to conduct elections to select members of Congress.  In response to this law, state governments tended to schedule elections for their own and local officials on these same days (Dover ’03: 70).  By the 1850s, it was clear the leaders of the two major parties could no longer sidestep the slavery issue.  The slavery question had been a latent source of political conflict since the Missouri Compromise of 1820 that decreed all territories above latitude 36ş 30’ north, slavery would be forever prohibited, solidifying sectional division between the northern and southern wings of the two parties.  The Compromise of 1850 secured the admission of California as a free state and abolished the use of the District of Columbia as a depot in the interstate slave trade, and also opened New Mexico and Utah to popular sovereignty on the slavery issue.  Third parties rose to take a stand, or fall, on the slavery issue, the Liberty party, then the Free Soil party.  A coalition of antislavery parties united in opposition to the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 gave birth to the Republican party.  John C. Fremont got nearly 40 percent of the vote in 1856, a majority in the North, but he was not even on the ballot in most of the Southern states.  In the election of 1860 Abraham Lincoln, the second Republican presidential candidate, defeated Democrat Stephen A. Douglas as well as Southern Democrat candidate John C. Breckinridge and the Constitutional Union party’s John Bell, ushering in the third party system. By 1850 the basic features of the American political system were not unlike those in place today (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 40-42).

 

Stage Three: Progressive Republican Era 1860-1896

 

In the election of 1860 Abraham Lincoln, the second Republican presidential candidate, defeated Democrat Stephen A. Douglas as well as Southern Democrat candidate John C. Breckinridge and the Constitutional Union party’s John Bell, ushering in the third party system. The third party system roughly coincided with the “Gilded Age” or the “Progressive Era” following the Civil War to the mid-1890s, when political parties achieved unprecedented levels of power and organization.  This period had the highest turnout of any in American history, from 1868 to 1892, almost 80 percent of all eligible voters showed up at the polls for presidential elections, including black males of voting age.  The most significant political innovation of this period was the urban political machine.  Each machine was organized as a structured hierarchy, a dominant leader, the political boss, ward leaders beholden to the boss, precinct captains beholden to the ward leader, and those who worked the streets beholden to those organizing the precinct.  The glue that held these machines together was material incentives, tangible rewards for work well done, and the withdrawal of those rewards if work was not done.  Patronage jobs were the reward for electoral success.  Aid, to the newly arrived immigrant, the unemployed, or the underemployed, ensured loyalty to the machine (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 43-44).  Perhaps the classic example of an urban political machine during this era was Tammany Hall, the Democratic New York City machine and its notorious ringleaders, Boss William Marcy Tweed.  George Washington Plunkitt, ward boss of the Fifteenth Assembly District in New York said, the importance of patronage, material good and constituent services in securing party loyalty to the machine is clear, “You can’t keep an organization together without patronage.  Men ain’t in politics for nothin’”.  The machine boss flourished in a time when a complex industrial society outstripped the instruments of governance.   Not only did the gilded Age parties control patronage jobs, but they were the gate-keepers to elected offices as well.  However while bosses dominated politics industrialists dominated society (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 46).

 

Popular and Electoral Votes in Presidential Election 1860-1896

 

Year

# States

Candidate

Party Affiliation

Electoral College Votes

Popular Votes

Vote Eligible Population Turnout

1896

45

William McKinley

Republican

271

7,102,246

79.3%

 

 

William J. Bryan

Democratic

176

6,492,559

 

 

 

John M. Palmer

National Democratic

 

133,148

 

 

 

Joshua Levering

Prohibition

 

132,007

 

 

 

Charles H. Matchett

Socialist Labor

 

36,274

 

 

 

Charles E. Bentley

Nationalist

 

13,969

 

1892

44

Grover Cleveland

Democratic

277

5,555,426

74.7%

 

 

Benjamin Harrison

Republican

145

5,182,690

 

 

 

James B. Weaver

People’s

22

1,029,846

 

 

 

John Bidwell

Prohibition

 

264,133

 

 

 

Simon Wing

Socialist Labor

 

21,164

 

1888

38

Benjamin Harrison

Republican

233

5,447,129

79.3%

 

 

Grover Cleveland

Democratic

168

5,537,857

 

 

 

Clinton B. Fisk

Prohibition

 

249,506

 

 

 

Anson J. Streeter

Union Labor

 

146,985

 

1884

38

Grover Cleveland

Democratic

219

4,879,507

77.5%

 

 

James G. Blaine

Republican

182

4,860,293

 

 

 

Benjamin F. Butler

Greenback-Labor

 

175,370

 

 

 

John P. St. John

Prohibition

 

150,369

 

1880

38

James A. Garfield

Republican

214

4,453,295

 

 

 

Winfield S. Hancock

Democratic

155

4,414,082

79.4%

 

 

James B. Weaver

Greenback-Labor

 

308,578

 

 

 

Neal Dow

Prohibition

 

10,305

 

1876

38

Rutherford B. Hayes

Republican

185

4,036,572

81.8%

 

 

Samuel J. Tilden

Democratic

184

4,284,020

 

 

 

Peter Cooper

Greenback

 

81,737

 

1872

37

Ulysses S. Grant

Republican

286

3,596,745

71.3%

 

 

Horace Greenley

Democratic

3 (died)

2,843,446

 

 

 

Charles O’connor

Straight Democratic

 

29,489

 

 

 

Thomas A. Hendricks

Independent Democratic

42

 

 

 

 

B. Gratz Brown

Democratic

18

 

 

 

 

Charles J. Jenkins

Democratic

2

 

 

 

 

David Davis

Democratic

2

 

 

 

 

Not Voted

 

17

 

 

1868

37

Ulysses S. Grant

Republican

214

3,013,421

78.1%

 

 

Horatio Seymour

Democratic

80

2,706,829

 

 

 

Not Voted

 

23

 

 

1864

36

Abraham Lincoln

Republican

212

2,206,988

73.8%

 

 

George B. McClellan

Democratic

21

1,808,787

 

 

 

Not Voted

 

81

 

 

1860

33

Abraham Lincoln

Republican

180

1,865,598

81.2%

 

 

J.C. Breckinridge

Democratic (S)

72

848,356

 

 

 

Stephen A. Douglas

Democratic

12

1,382,718

 

 

 

John Bell

Constitutional Union

39

592,906

 

 

Source: Series Y 79 – 83. Morton, Rogers C.B. Secretary of Commerce; Barabba, Vincent P. Director of the Bureau of the Census. Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970. Bicentennial Edition pg. 1073-1074

 

The new Republican Party won in 1860, based exclusively in the North and militarily occupied the South for the entire Progressive era.  The Republican Party would win the great majority of elections between 1860 and 1928 although they faced close elections in 1876, 1880 and 1888.  However, Democrat Grover Cleveland won the White House in nonconsecutive terms in 1884 and 1892 when Jim Crow laws were most ascendant.  The essential voting patterns were established as early as 1856 and confirmed in 1880 when the South was reintegrated into the Union.  Lincoln established the Republicans as the party that held the nation together, and by abolishing slavery and breaking the power of the South landed classes they had set the country irrevocably down a modernizing and industrial path.  Republican leaders from Lincoln to Teddy Roosevelt to Coolidge described their party as the American Party, ready to defend America.  The Civil War was a reference point where Republicans could continually remind voters that they defended America’s virtues with force of arms.  The great majority of the party’s presidential nominees were military figures, especially in this period after the Civil War.  The states of the Old South at the outset of the 1890s began enacting statutes to disenfranchise the black voter and to end the prospect of competitive general elections in the Southern states.  The Republicans, for their part, constructed a system of Civil War pensions available only to veterans of the Union Army, one in ten voters concentrated in the Northeast and Midwest, not much.  The payment exploded from 1880 to 1910, when the Republicans were retrenching their position to fend off the Populists.  The Grand Army of the Republic, 400,000 strong, backing the Republicans through all the election battles (Greenberg ;04:12).  The Republicans won the Civil War.

 

Two elections in the post-Civil War period were defined by electoral-college difficulties.  In 1876, voters appeared to have chosen the Democratic nominee Samuel Tilden for president over Republican Rutherford Hayes by a margin of over 250,000 popular votes and an electoral vote count of 203 to 166; 51 percent of the popular vote to 48 percent.  There were serious discrepancies in the vote count in three former confederate states, South Carolina, Louisiana and Florida.  In each of these states, competing governmental institutions submitted final vote tallies that showed the party of the leaders of those institutions winning the state, with Tilden leading in all three.  Congress had to choose between the party slates and appointed a commission comprised of five House members, five senators and five justices to investigate the claims and decide which slates to accept. The commission voted eight to seven, strictly on party lines, to seat the Republican electors.  The Senate accepted this decision, but the House indicated it would disapprove.  In a move of historic significance, a number of Southern congressmen agreed to vote for the Republican slates in exchange for an end to Reconstruction and the appointment of several Southerners as executives in the new Republican administration. This deal made, the disputed electors went to Hayes, who won the presidency through an electoral vote count of 185 to 184 despite the fact that he had lost the popular vote.  Without the existence of the electoral college, Tilden would have become president.  The Congress responded to this controversy by enacting a law, which is still in effect today, that says Congress must accept the slate of electors that is certified as official by a state’s governor unless it can be proven that such a slate was chosen in a fraudulent manner (Dover ’03: 31).

      

The second difficult election occurred in 1888.  The Democrats nominated Grover Cleveland for a second term as president, while the Republicans chose Benjamin Harrison.  The election was close, as were most of the elections, during this time, with Cleveland garnering 48.6 percent of the popular vote compared to Harrison’s 47.8 percent.  While this margin may not seem large, only 0.8 percent of 1 percent, it was large when compared to its two predecessors.  The popular vote difference in the election of 1880 was only 0.02 percent, and Cleveland had won the popular vote when seeking his first term in 1884 by only 0.25 percent.  There was an important difference between the elections of 1884 and 1888, Cleveland had won the electoral votes of twenty of the nation’s thirty-eight states in 1884, by 1888 he carried only eighteen.  Two of the states he had carried in 1884, New York and Indiana, went for Harrison.  As a result, Harrison won the electoral vote by an overwhelming margin of 233 to 168.  Cleveland won the popular vote by scoring massive victories in the former confederate states, where nearly all voters supported the Democrats.  Harrison won most of the other states by far closer margins.  Cleveland had more votes, but Harrison had a broader and more national base of support.  The election of 1888 was the last time when the winner of the popular vote did not also win the electoral vote, until 2000 (Dover ’03: 31).  Progressive reforms in the electoral arena had more immediate impacts.  The first was the Australian ballot, a state-printed ballot cast in secret and listing all candidates for a particular position, no one party’ candidates for all position.  The new ballot, adopted in all but two states from 1889 and 1891, enabled split-ticket voting and reduced voter intimidation at the polls (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 48 & 49). 

 

The Populist platform began, “corruption dominates the ballot box, the legislatures, the Congress and touches even the ermine of the bench.  The people are demoralized.  Most of the states have been compelled to isolate the voters at the polling places to prevent universal intimidation or bribery”.  Popular momentum for anti-machine reforms was provided by Charles J. Guitenau, the deranged disappointed office seeker who shot President Garfield.  His crime and Garfield’s death focused popular criticism on the spoils system and indirectly create the civil service system.  The Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act of 1883 was the first step in the decline of the urban machines, depriving them of their very lifeblood, patronage (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 48 & 49). The immediate post-Civil War years were, the golden age of American parties.  Flush with industrial contributions party regularity was higher, party loyalty deeper and party stability greater than at any other time in American history.  In 1876 the Greenback Labor Party nominated a candidate for president, Peter Cooper of New York, paradoxically one of the richest men in the country, a “limousine liberal”, and in 1878 the party attracted 1,060,000 votes in congressional elections, enough to elect fourteen congressmen (Gordon 04: 268).  Third parties such as the Greenback party in 1880, the Anti-Monopoly party in 1884, the Labor party in 1888 and the Populist party in 1892 flourished (Schlesinger 99: 265).  In the nineteenth century visiting Europeans were awed by the popular obsession with politics.  Tocqueville in the 1830s thought politics “the only pleasure an American knows.”  Bryce half a century later found parties “organized far more elaborately in the United States than anywhere else in the world.”  Voting statistics justified transatlantic awe.  In no presidential election between the Civil War and the end of the century did the American turnout, the proportion of eligible voters actually voting, fall below 70 percent.  In 1876 it reached nearly 82 percent.  But in no presidential election since 1968 has the American turnout exceeded 55 percent.   In 1984, only 52.9 percent voted (Schlesinger 99: 260). 

 

The Republican Party was defined by its modernizing, unifying and nationalist vision that became more ideologically developed as the parties battled through the industrial revolution.  Between 1880 and 1910 national wealth increased 275 percent and the urban population grew from 28 to 46 percent, while massive immigration brought downward pressure on wages.  This was a time for the rise of corporations, holding companies, trusts and monopolies, but also a time for deep downturns, including most of the 1890s, after the panic of 1893.  The election of 1896 was hot.  The Democrats, breaking with their tradition of running fiscally austere, antigovernment nominees, chose William Jennings Bryan, the populist, evangelical candidate who would change the identity of the Democratic Party.  His politics were rooted in the civic virtue and common man themes that carried the Democrats through the nineteenth century, but it included the premise that the country should be enriched from the bottom up, “if you legislate to make the masses prosperous, their prosperity will find its way up through every class which rests upon them”.  Republicans thought the government should promote the country’s growth and advancement with mercantilist policies, by creating markets, protecting American manufacturing behind high tariffs, and create a favorable climate for surging big corporations.  McKinley said, “We are not a nation of classes, but of sturdy, free, independent and honorable people \aspiring to achieve the highest development and greatest prosperity, out of come the greatest gains to the people, the greatest comforts to the masses, the widest encouragement for many aspirations.  There is no way in the world of earning money except by work”.  Republicans associated themselves with business and Americans accepted this pro-capitalist model and Republican won elections (Greenberg ’04:14).  In 1896 an era of reform began.  Before 1896 both parties favored industrialization, and both parties sought to appeal to urban populations.  Civil War allegiances shifted in the election of 1896.  The realignment signaled the “end of the era of no decision” (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 47-48). 

 

Stage Four: Republican Populism 1900-1928

 

When Theodore Roosevelt became president in 1901 on the assassination of William McKinley, he moved sharply in the direction of the progressive wing of the Republican Party that dominated the House 185 to 163 with 9 Independents and Senate 53 to 26 with 8 Independents and ushered in a fourth party system of Republican Populism.  The Republicans would hold the White House for sixteen consecutive years and for 28 of the next 36 years.  With the realignment of the electorate after 1896, Republicans dominated the North and Midwest while Democrats maintained a stronghold in the “Southern states and border states.  The decline in competition between the two major parties would take its toll on party organization, no longer were the tightly run, vote mobilizing institutions of the Gilded Age needed to win.  The mandated primary, which most states instituted from 1905 to 1910, stripped the parties of a critical source of power, control over nominations.  Candidates no longer needed the party nod to get on the ballot.  In addition many cities introduced nonpartisan elections, in which party names do not even appear on the ballots, further reducing the stronghold of parties at the local level.  The Progressive era empowered the populace with such procedures as the initiative, the referendum and the recall.  The Seventeenth Amendment, adopted in 1913, further reined in the parties, by mandating the direct election of U.S. senators (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 49).  Although Democrat Woodrow Wilson won the presidency in 1912 and 1916, the electoral coalitions did not change and the Republicans remained the majority party.  Wilson won the 1912 election because Teddy Roosevelt split the Republican vote, running on his own third-party ticket, that of the Progressive Bull Moose party.  Wilson barely won again in 1916, as many old Progressives marched back to the Republicans.  By 1920 the Republican coalition had regained prominence.  (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 47-48).

Popular and Electoral Votes in Presidential Election 1900-1928

 

Year

# States

Candidate

Party Affiliation

Electoral

Popular Votes

Congress

Split

Turnout

1928

48

Herbert C. Hoover

Republican

444

21,391,993

72nd House

220 D, 214 R, 1 I

 

 

Alfred E. Smith

Democratic

87

15,016,169

72nd Senate

47 D, 48 R, 1 I

 

 

 

Norma Thomas

Socialist

 

267,835

71st House

167 D, 267, 1 I

56.9%

 

 

Verne L. Reynolds

Socialist Labor

 

21,603

71st Senate

39 D, 56 R, 1 I

(1928)

 

 

William Z. Foster

Workers

 

21,181

 

 

 

 

 

William F. Varney

Prohibition

 

20,106

 

 

 

1924

48

Calvin Coolidge

Republican

382

15,718,711

70th House

195 D, 237 R, 3 I

 

 

John W. Davis

Democratic

136

8,385,283

70th Senate

46 D, 49 R, 1 I

 

 

 

Robert M. LaFollette

Progressive

13

4,831,289

69th House

183 D, 247 R, 4 I

48.9%

 

 

Herman P. Faris

Prohibition

 

57,520

69th Senate

39 D, 56 R

 

 

 

Frank T. Johns

Socialist Labor

 

36,428

 

 

 

 

 

William Z. Foster

Workers

 

36,386

 

 

 

 

 

Gilbert O. Nations

American

 

23,967

 

 

 

1920

48

Warren G. Harding

Republican

404

16,143,407

68th House

205 D, 225 R, 5 I

 

 

James M. Cox

Democratic

127

9,130,328

68th Senate

43 D, 51 R, 1 I

 

 

 

Eugene V. Debs

Socialist

 

919,799

67th House

131 D, 301 R, 1 I

49.2%

 

 

P.P. Christensen

Farmer-Labor

 

265,411

67th Senate

37 D, 59 R, 2 I

 

 

 

Aaron S. Watkins

Prohibition

 

189,408

 

 

 

 

 

James E. Ferguson

American

 

48,000

 

 

 

 

 

W.W. Cox

Socialist Labor

 

31,715

 

 

 

1916

48

Woodrow Wilson

Democratic

277

9,127,695

66th House

190 D, 240 R, 3 I

 

 

 

Charles E. Hughes

Republican

254

8,533,507

66th Senate

47 D, 49 R

 

 

A.L. Benson

Socialist

 

585,113

65th House

216 D, 210 R, 6 I

61.6%

 

 

J. Frank Hanley

Prohibition

 

220,506

65th Senate

53 D, 42 R

 

 

 

Arthur E. Reimer

Socialist Labor

 

13,403

 

 

 

1912

48

Woodrow Wilson

Democratic

438

6,296,547

64th House

230 D, 196 R, 9 I

 

 

 

Theodore Roosevelt

Progressive

88

4,118,571

64th Senate

56 D, 40 R

 

 

William H. Taft

Republican

8

3,486,720

63rd House

291 D, 127 R, 17 I

58.8%

 

 

Eugene V. Debs

Socialist

 

900,672

63rd Senate

51 D, 44 R, 1 I

 

 

 

Eugene W. Chafin

Prohibition

 

206,275

 

 

 

 

 

Arthur E. Reimer

Socialist Labor

 

28,750

 

 

 

1908

46

William H. Taft

Republican

321

7,675,320

62nd House

228 D, 161 R, 1 I

 

 

William J. Bryan

Democratic

162

6,412,294

62nd Senate

41 D, 51 R

 

 

 

Eugene V. Debs

Socialist

 

420,793

61st House

172 D, 219 R

65.4%

 

 

Eugene W. Chafin

Prohibition

 

253,840

61st Senate

32 D, 61 R

 

 

 

Thomas L. Hisgen

Independence

 

82,872

 

 

 

 

 

Thomas E. Watson

People’s

 

29,100

 

 

 

 

 

August Gillhaus

Socialist Labor

 

14,021

 

 

 

1904

45

Theodore Roosevelt

Republican

336

7,628,461

60th House

164 D, 222 R

 

 

Alton B. Parker

Democratic

140

5,084,223

60th Senate

31 D, 61 R

 

 

 

Eugene V. Debs

Socialist

 

87,814

59th House

136 D, 250 R

65.2%

 

 

Silas C. Swallow

Prohibition

 

258,536

59th Senate

33 D, 57 R

 

 

 

Thomas E. Watson

People’s

 

117,183

 

 

 

 

 

Charles H. Corregan

Socialist Labor

 

31,249

 

 

 

1900

45

William McKinley

Republican

292

7,218,491

58th House

178 D, 208 R

 

 

William J. Bryan

Democratic

155

6,356,734

58th Senate

33 D, 57 R

 

 

 

John C. Wooley

Prohibition

 

208,914

57th House

151 D, 197 R, 9 I

73.2%

 

 

Eugene V. Debs

Socialist

 

87,814

57th Senate

33 D, 57 R

 

 

 

Wharton Barker

People’s

 

50,373

 

 

 

 

 

Jos. F. Mailoney

Socialist Labor

 

39,739

 

 

 

 

Source: Series Y 79 – 83. Morton, Rogers C.B. Secretary of Commerce; Barabba, Vincent P. Director of the Bureau of the Census. Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970. Bicentennial Edition pg. 1073-1074, Table 1.5 & 1.6 pgs. 18-22 Maisel, L. Sandy; Buckley, Kara Z. Parties and Elections in America: The Electoral Process. Fourth Edition. Lanham Maryland.  Roman & Littlefield Publishers. 2005

 

In 1906 Roosevelt advocated a tax on inheritances.  Taft, a far more conservative man than Roosevelt, revered the Supreme Court.  Indeed he would serve as chief justice, an office far more congenial to his nature than the presidency, for most of the 1920s.  He was horrified at the idea of defying the Supreme Court so he proposed the idea of a constitutional amendment that would permit an income tax and proposed a corporate income tax on profits.  In 1911 the Supreme Court agreed unanimously.  The Sixteenth amendment meanwhile passed the Senate 77-0 and the House 318-14.  The amendment was ratified by the required number of state legislatures and was declared effective on February 3, 1913.   By that time the Republican Party had split between the conservative Taft Republicans and the progressive Roosevelt Republicans, who stormed out of the 1912 convention to form their own party under the symbol of the bull-moose.  As a result, the Democrat Woodrow Wilson was elected president with less than 42 percent of the popular vote but with almost 82 percent of the electoral votes (Gordon 04: 271).  Among the first acts of the new Wilson administration was the passage of a personal income tax law.  Although only fourteen pages long, it contained the seeds of the vast complexity that was to come.  Incomes more than $3,000 was to be taxed, on a progressive scale from 1 to 7 percent on incomes more than $500,000.  But there were many exemptions, such as interest on state and local bonds and corporate dividends up to $20,000.  Interest on all debts, depreciation of property, and many other things were deductible from taxable income.  The corporate income tax remained a completely separate tax.  The financial exigencies of the twentieth century’s great wars would send income tax rates soaring to heights undreamed of by even its most passionate advocates (Gordon 04: 277). Justice Oliver Holmes said, “Taxes are the price we pay for civilization.”

 

After the Democrats took control of the House of Representatives in 1910, Congress finally passed a bill creating a Cabinet level department to “promote and develop the welfare of the wage earners of the United States, to improve their working conditions, and to advance their opportunities for profitable employment”.  William Howard Taft grudgingly signed the bill into law on March 4, 1913, the final day of his presidency (Cohen 09: 195). American manufacturing increased rapidly as the result of the World War in Europe.  Markets in Latin American and Asia, which had been served by European companies, were now open to be taken over by American firms.  Far more important was the avalanche of order that began to roll in to American firms form Great Britain and its allies, for steel, vehicles, railroad rolling stock and rails, and a new invention barbed wire. Munitions were of course n the greatest demand.  Du Pont had been only a midsized manufacturer of gunpowder before the war, but would come to supply the Allies with fully 40 percent of their munitions.  In the four years of war Du Pont’s military business increased by a factor of 276 and it became one of the world’s largest chemical companies as well.  By the end of the war Du Pont had revenues twenty-six times as large as they had been in 1913 (Gordon 04: 292).  Overall the gross national product of the United States increased by 21 percent in the four years of the war, while manufacturing increased by 25 percent (Gordon 04: 289). 

 

Between 1910 and 1920 only about 21 large firms a year started pension plans, in the 1920s the number rose to about 45.  By 1925 over 200 firms, led by the railroads, which dominated the expansion of private pensions, offered them.  By the late 1920s retirement funds for policemen, teachers and firemen had become nearly universal.  In 1921 the national government gave employers tax exemptions for contributions to trust funds designed to accumulate and distribute capital for fringe benefits.  Treasury rulings in 1914 and 1921 allowed businesses to deduct pension expenses from the recently enacted income tax.  The 1926 Revenue Act wrote these administrative rulings into law.  Calvin Coolidge at the end of this period of Republican dominance was president for the 1920s, when incomes grew by 20 percent between 1921 and 1929 and the number of automobiles rose from 9.3 million to 23.1 million, by the end of the decade there was almost one care for every family.  But this was also a decade for speculative booms, with rising inequality.  Coolidge, with Andrew Mellon, likely the wealthiest man in the country, as his secretary of the treasury, proceeded with an economic policy of aggressive tax slashing for the wealthy.  They cut the inheritance tax in half, abolished the gift tax, and reduced the income tax to 5 percent.  Like their predecessors in 1896, Coolidge and Mellon attacked those who “seek to perpetuate prejudice and class hatred and pit one class of taxpayers against another”.  The Republican bargain, Mellon declared, was straightforward, “In no other nation and at no other time in the history of the world have so many people enjoyed such a high degree of prosperity” (Greenberg ’04: 14-15).

 

To be sure 659 banks failed in 1929, but that was slightly below the annual average for the decade and no major banks had collapsed as a result of the crash (Gordon 04: 318).  President Herbert Hoover called a conference of businessmen in November 1929 and urged them to invest in construction, he telegraphed state governors, who funded 80 percent of government construction, to do the same and in the spring he promised to increase spending by $140 million.  No small sum in a federal budget that amounted to only $3.3 billion or about 3 percent of GNP.  At the time twenty-five percent of the federal budget went to debt service, and most of the rest to fund the 139,000 man army and the 95,000 man navy.  The winter and early spring of 1930 the stock market rebound regaining about 45 percent of what had been lost.  By the Spring of 1930 it didn’t look as if more would be needed and President Hoover told a religious group, “You have come sixty days too late.  The depression is over.” (Gordon 04: 320).  Unfortunately Hoover then signed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act.  This was economic folly.  Tariffs are taxes and taxes inescapably are always a drag on the economy.  But far worse, high tariffs breed retaliation from other countries.  Professional economists knew this and a thousand of them signed a petition asking Hoover to veto the tariff bill.  The economist’s arguments proved all too true and world trade began to collapse.  The Federal government that Hoover presided over was small and limited in scope to conventional wisdom.  Herbert Hoover said on 25 March 1932, “the absolute necessity of a balanced budget is the most essential factor to economic recovery (5 May) the imperative and immediate step (13 May) indispensable (21 May) the first necessity of the Nation (11 August) the foundation of all public and private financial stability (11 August).  The government collected little revenue and therefore it had little money to dispense.  The federal income tax had been in effect a mere twenty years, and only about 5 percent of Americans paid it.  The total federal budget was just $3.3 billion (Gordon 04: 328).  

 

Stage Five: New Deal Democrats 1932-1968

 

The stock market crash in 1929 and the Great Depression shattered the allegiances of the fourth party system.  The American public blamed the Great Depression on the Republican president Herbert Hoover and his party.  In 1932, Franklin Delano Roosevelt swept into office with 57 percent of the popular vote, with the electoral college 472 to 59 and stayed in office for five successive terms only two 1936 and 1940 above 60% turnout.  For the next thirty years it would be the Democrats who were dominant.  The voting patterns forged in the 1850s and 1880s were radically disrupted.  The Republicans had identified themselves with the concept of business led prosperity that turned to ash.  The New Deal coalition solidified union support for the Democratic Party, African-Americans began to identify with the Democratic party and poverty was defined at an annual income of less than $3,000 a year.  Roosevelt made the Democratic Party the indispensable party for an America that would recover economically and honor the mass of laboring and working people.  Even though Republicans won Congress in 1946, and despite President Eisenhower’s defeat of Democrat Adlai Stevenson in both 1952 and 1956, these elections, quite popular, were seen as deviations, Eisenhower’s success was more a result of a war hero’s popularity than it was an electoral shift to the GOP.  The majority of Americans still owed allegiance to the Democratic Party, and the issues dividing the electorate were still the New Deal issues.  Kennedy and Johnson recaptured the 1960s for Democrats and sustained voter turnout in the 60% range. For more than three decades the political agenda would be defined by the same question, does the federal government have a responsibility to serve as the employer of last resort, intervene actively in the economy and help those unable to help themselves (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 52). 

 

Popular and Electoral Votes in Presidential Election 1932-1968

 

Year

# States

Candidate

Party Affiliation

Electoral

Popular Votes

Congress

Split

Turnout

1968

50

Richard M. Nixon

Republican

301

31,785,480

92nd House

254 D, 180 R

46.6%

 

 

Hubert H. Humphrey

Democratic

191

31,275,166

92nd Senate

54 D, 44 R, 2 I

(1970)

 

 

George C. Wallace

American Independent

46

9,906,473

91st House

243 D, 192 R, 1 I

60.6%

(1968)

 

 

Henning A. Blomen

Socialist Labor

 

52,588

91st Senate

57 D, 43 R

 

 

 

Dick Gregory

 

 

47,133

 

 

 

 

 

Fred Halstead

Socialist Workers

 

41,388

 

 

 

 

 

Eldridge Cleaver

Peace and Freedom

 

36,563

 

 

 

 

 

Eugene J. McCarthy

 

 

25,552

 

 

 

 

 

E. Harold Munn

Prohibition

 

15,123

 

 

 

1964

50

Lyndon B. Johnson

Democratic

486

43,129,566

90th House

247 D, 197 R

48.4%

 

 

Barry M. Goldwater

Republican

52

27,178,188

90th Senate

64 D, 36 R

(1966)

 

 

Eric Hass

Socialist Labor

 

45,219

89th House

295 D, 140 R

61.7%

 

 

Clifton DeBerry

Socialist Workers

 

32,720

89th Senate

68 D, 32 R

(1964)

 

 

E. Harold Munn

Prohibition

 

23,267

 

 

 

1960

50

John F. Kennedy

Democratic

303

34,226,731

88th House

258 D, 177 R

47.3%

 

 

Richard M. Nixon

Republican

219

34,108,157

88th Senate

67 D, 33 R

(1962)

 

 

Eric Hass

Socialist Labor

 

44,450

87th House

263 D, 174 R

64.0%

 

 

Rutherford L. Decker

Prohibition

 

46,203

87th Senate

65 D, 35 R

(1960)

 

 

Orval E. Faubus

National States Rights

 

44,977

 

 

 

 

 

Farrell Dobbs

Socialist Workers

 

40,165

 

 

 

 

 

Charles L. Sullivan

Constitution

 

18,162

 

 

 

1956

48

Dwight D. Eisenhower

Republican

457

35,590,472

86th House

283 D, 153 R

 

 

Adlai E. Stevenson

Democratic

73

26,022,752

86th Senate

64 D, 34 R

 

 

 

T. Coleman Andrews

States’ Rights

 

111,178

85th House

233 D, 200 R

60.6%

 

 

Eric Hass

Socialist Labor

 

44,450

85th Senate

49 D, 47 R

(1956)

 

 

Enoch A. Holtwick

Prohibition

 

41,987

 

 

 

1952

48

Dwight D. Eisenhower

Republican

442

33,936,234

84th House

232, D, 203 R

 

 

Adlai E. Stevenson

Democratic

89

27,314,992

84th Senate

48 D, 47 R

 

 

 

Vincent Hallinan

Progressive

 

140,023

83rd House

211 D, 221 R. 1 I

63.3%

 

 

Stuart Hamblen

Prohibition

 

72,949

83rd Senate

47 D, 48 R, 1 I

(1952)

 

 

Eric Hass

Socialist Labor

 

30,267

 

 

 

 

 

Darlington Hoops

Socialist

 

20,208

 

 

 

 

 

Douglas A. MacArthur

Constitution

 

17,205

 

 

 

 

 

Farrell Dobbs

Socialist Workers

 

10,312

 

 

 

1948

48

Harry S. Truman

Democratic

303

24,179,345

82nd House

234 D, 199 R, 1 I

 

 

Thomas E. Dewey

Republican

189

21,991,291

82nd Senate

49 D, 47 r, 1 I

 

 

 

Strom Thurmond

States’ Rights

39

1,176,125

81st House

263 D, 171 R, 1 I

53.0%

 

 

Henry Wallace

Progressive

 

1,157,326

81st Senate

54 D, 42 R

(1948)

 

 

Norman Thomas

Socialist

 

139,572

 

 

 

 

 

Claude A. Watson

Prohibition

 

103,900

 

 

 

 

 

Edward A. Teichert

Socialist Labor

 

29,241

 

 

 

 

 

Farrell Dobbs

Socialist Workers

 

13,614

 

 

 

1944

48

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Democratic

432

25,606,585

80th House

188 D, 245 R, 1 I

 

 

Thomas E. Dewey

Republican

99

22,014,745

80th Senate

45 D, 15 R

 

 

 

Norman Thomas

Socialist

 

80,518

79th House

242 D, 190 R, 2 I

55.9%

 

 

Claude A. Watson

Prohibition

 

74,758

79th Senate

56 D, 38 R

(1944)

 

 

Edward A. Teichert

Socialist Labor

 

45,336

 

 

 

1940

48

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Democratic

449

27,307,819

78th House

218 D, 208 R, 4 I

 

 

Wendell L. Willkie

Republican

82

22,321,018

78th Senate

58 D, 37 R, 1 I

 

 

 

Norman Thomas

Socialist

 

80,518

77th House

268 D, 162 R, 5 I

62.5%

 

 

Roger Q. Babson

Prohibition

 

57,812

77th Senate

66 D, 28 R, 1 I

(1940)

 

 

Earl Browder

Communist

 

46,251

 

 

 

 

 

John W. Aiken

Socialist Labor

 

14,892

 

 

 

1936

48

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Democratic

523

27,752,869

76th House

261 D, 164 R, 4 I

 

 

Alfred M. Landon

Republican

8

16,674,665

76th Senate

69 D, 23 R, 2 I

 

 

 

William Lemke

Union

 

882,479

75th House

331 D, 89 R, 13 I

61.0%

 

 

Norman Thomas

Socialist

 

187,720

75th Senate

76 D, 16 R, 4 I

(1936)

 

 

Earl Browder

Communist

 

80,159

 

 

 

 

 

D. Leigh Colven

Prohibition

 

37,847

 

 

 

 

 

John W. Aiken

Socialist Labor

 

12,777

 

 

 

1932

48

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Democratic

472

22,809,638

74th House

319 D, 103 R, 10 I

 

 

Herbert C. Hoover

Republican

59

15,758,901

74th Senate

69 D, 25 R, 4 I

 

 

 

Norman Thomas

Socialist

 

881,951

73rd House

310 D, 117 R, 5 I

56.9%

 

 

William Z. Foster

Communist

 

102,785

73rd Senate

60 D, 35 R, 2 I

(1932)

 

 

William D. Upshaw

Prohibition

 

81,869

 

 

 

 

 

Verne L. Reynolds

Socialist Labor

 

33,276

 

 

 

 

 

William H. Harvey

Liberty

 

53,425

 

 

 

 

Source: Series Y 79 – 83. Morton, Rogers C.B. Secretary of Commerce; Barabba, Vincent P. Director of the Bureau of the Census. Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970. Bicentennial Edition pg. 1073-1074; Presidential Elections, 1789–2008 — Infoplease.com, Pearson Education Inc. 2007, : Table 1.5 & 1.6 pgs. 18-22 Maisel, L. Sandy; Buckley, Kara Z. Parties and Elections in America: The Electoral Process. Fourth Edition. Lanham Maryland.  Roman & Littlefield Publishers. 2005

 

Under FDR government accepted a bottom-line responsibility for employment and by that formal change altered the electoral equation for the parties.  During the 1930s, most federal government expenditures were devoted to stimulating employment and providing jobs directly.  “Provide work and economic security to the mass of the people” Roosevelt advised, “in order that they may be free to live and develop their individual lives and seek happiness and recognition”.  With the war, America employed its entire people and sealed the contract that Roosevelt had offered.  Roosevelt won in a landslide, and later Truman would use those themes, that philosophy of government and the issue of employment to turn back the postwar Republican challenge. But with the war and the Depression behind America, people were moving on with their lives (Greenberg ;04: 15-16).  State Rights Party nominee Strom Thurmond garnered 39 electoral votes but New Deal politics had one last burst of electoral success in 1948 when Harry Truman saved the Democrats from defeat by fanning resentment against a Republican Party still tainted by the Great Depression and its opposition to the New Deal.  Standing before the Democratic Convention, Truman described the Democrats as “the people’s party” and the Republicans as a party pursuing a “rich man’s” agenda of low prices for farmers, cheap wages for labor, and high profits for big corporations.  Truman won against predictions and polls and the Democrats reclaimed the Congress with big majorities (Greenberg ’04: 34).

 

In 1950 North Korean troops caused a storm when they crossed the thirty-eighth parallel, and in 1951 Truman fired Douglas MacArthur, creating his own firestorm.  Senator Joe McCarthy waved his list of State Department Communists in 1950, but by 1954 McCarthyism fell suddenly into disrepute and the Senate censured him.  The United States decided to contain communism and after some debate to build the hydrogen bomb.  The presidential ticket of Eisenhower was quintessentially internationalist.  Dwight Eisenhower, a commanding wartime figure, was vigorously courted by both parties to become their presidential nominee and accepted the Republican nomination.  Eisenhower was not elected for his partisanship he was elected to bring down the curtain on the Korean War and usher in a new play, where Americans got on with their lives and families were freed from the Depression and War.  Republicans put on their buttons, “I like Ike”.  Eisenhower got some help from Adlai Stevenson, the Democratic nominee for president in both national elections of the fifties who said, “we Democrats, win or lose, can campaign not as a crusade to exterminate the opposing party, but as a great opportunity to educate and elevate a people whose destiny is leadership” (Greenberg ’04: 35). The Montgomery, Alabama bus boycotts brought Martin Luther King to national attention, and Governor Orval Faubus’s resistance to court-ordered desegregation of the Arkansas schools forced President Eisenhower to send the 101st Airborne to Little Rock.  In Eisenhower’s first term the Republican Congress expanded eligibility for Social Security and later, working with two Texas Democratic leaders, Sam Rayburn and Lyndon Johnson, Congress added disability insurance and regularly raised benefits.  Leaving out the South, which was in its own world, the two parties divided the country fairly evenly and the public decided to trust its leaders.  They were busy raising their baby-boom children.  They watched the Brooklyn dodgers through four consecutive seasons, only to lose the National League pennant twice in the last inning of the last game and the World Series twice to the New York Yankees (Greenberg ’04: 37)

 

The retirement of the war time president brought the first real national election of this new era.  John F. Kennedy won enough Electoral College votes, 303 to 219, to settle the election, by this popular margin was a scant 118,574 votes, must less than All Gore’s margin in 2000.  There were recounts in Illinois and New Jersey.  Then the dust settled, 1960 had brought a historic high turnout of 64.5% (Greenberg ’04: 37).  Kennedy ran under the banner of change.  The core principles of John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson were abundance and inclusiveness, to make sure all can “share in the benefits of our abundance and natural resources”.  All the world they hoped would look to America, not just because of its military superiority.  In his first term Kennedy managed the nuclear crisis and achieved an agreement to end nuclear testing setting the stage for détente.  The most enduring principle was the theme that America’s prosperity should be inclusive and not leave anyone behind.  In his final speech of the campaign Kennedy asked the citizenry to vote for “someone who cares deeply about the people he represents”.  At his inauguration he said, “For man holds in his hands the power to abolish all forms of human poverty and all forms of human life” but his call was to man’s better nature, “to struggle against the common enemies of man: tyranny, poverty, disease and war itself”.  Kennedy believed in the right of the black Americans to enjoy equal rights with white Americans and in 1963, shortly before he was assassinated he said the right to vote must not be denied to any citizen on the grounds of his race or color, for this nation will not be fully free until all its citizens are free.  The Democrats won a landslide majority in 1964 against conservative Republican nominee Barry Goldwater (Greenberg ’04: 47).

 

Johnson had by 1965 pushed through legislation on civil rights, Medicare, aid to education and the Great Society.  When battling to win passage of the Voting Rights Act Johnson went on camera and said “We shall overcome” identifying his Presidency with the struggle for civil rights.  For America, Johnson declared, the goal of opportunity must become a commitment to racial equality, with almost no tolerance for falling short, “we seek not just legal equity, but human equality” and most of his social programs focused on the poor, particularly poor blacks.  Many people felt de-segregation went too far.  The Republicans made major gains just two years in the 1966 congressional elections.  Governor of Alabama George Wallace ran on the American Independent ticket and won 46 Electoral College votes, more than 9 million votes.  While Democratic nominee Hubert Humphrey nearly passed Nixon on Election Day, Humphrey took less than 43% of the vote.  The majority of Americans voted for candidates who opposed the Great Society: 43% for Nixon and 14% for Wallace.  Wallace obviously ran strong in the South, carrying five Deep South states and took his campaign to the working class, carrying 13 percent of those without college degrees and 15 percent of manual workers.  Among white union households, Nixon took 42 percent of the vote and Wallace won 15 percent.  African Americans new the polarization was about them and 90% voted Democratic (Greenberg ’04: 17 & 50). 

 

Stage Six: Split Ticket Voting 1968-present

 

A sixth party system arose after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 protected the voting rights of blacks by outlawing literacy tests and other methods of keeping blacks from voting.  These events accelerated a redefinition of voting allegiances among Southern voters.  Black voters registered and turned out to vote in numbers never before seen.  White voters began to look for conservative Republican alternatives. The Democratic Party was further split by the war in Vietnam in general the upper class and academics opposed the war while the working class supported it.  By 1996 the Republican party was flourishing in the South, after the 1996 election eight of the eleven Southern governors were Republican, eight of the ten senators up for reelection from the South in that year were also Republicans, and all were reelected, and of the 125 Southerners elected to the House in that election, 71 were Republicans.  Republican strength in state legislatures throughout the South reached new highs.  The sixth party system is different from the new Deal in the rise of candidate centered and candidate run elections.  Since the mid-1960s members of congress began winning their reelection races by larger margins from 1 to 2 percent before 1964, to 5 percent after 1964 and by the mid-1970s by 8 to 9 percent.  Today, incumbents maintain an electoral advantage as much as 96 to 98 percent over their challengers (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 53,54 & 55).  Over the last 50 years no party has succeeded in dominating at the polls or commanding the realm of ideas.  This parity and lack of a dominant party has invited a series of bold efforts by the Democrats and Republicans to become the leading party of the era, but each fell short (Greenberg ’04: 16-17).

 

A primary characteristic of the modern electoral era is split ticket voting and divided government, as opposed to unified party control of the government, when one party dominates the Senate, the House and the White House.  Since the 1950s more and more voters split their tickets voting Democratic for Congress and Republican for president, or vice versa.  Although only four elections from the turn of the century to the election of Eisenhower resulted in the two major parties sharing control of government institutions, divided government has dominated the second half of the twentieth century, its normalcy ushering in a new paradigm for understanding American government.  From 1900-1952 only four elections resulted in split party control of the government, but since 1952 sixteen elections have brought divided government to power, and only nine have resulted in unified control.  In the 50 years between 1952 and 2003, the same party has controlled the presidency and both houses of Congress for only eighteen years (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 426 & 429).  One explanation for divided government is that it is not a random pattern but a willful one in which citizens choose not to have all branches of the government under the control of just one party preferring a system where the parties check and balance each other (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 57).  The weakening of the party has led to the rise of a divided system since 1964 with the majority party in Congress being a different party than the President.  The Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association prescribed stronger parties in its influential report “Toward a More Responsible Two Party System” that complained American parties were too weak to form a link between the electorate and the elected.  Parties did not stand firmly on issues and candidates did not feel bound to implement party programs once in office.  Essentially the norm espoused in the report was a parliamentary system (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 423). 

 

Electoral and Popular Vote Cast for President by Party 1972 – 2008

 

Year

# States

Presidential Candidate

Political Party

Electoral

Popular Vote

Congress

Split

 

Voting Age Population Turnout

2008

50

Barack Obama

Democratic

365

66,882,230

 

 

 

 

 

John McCain

Republican

173

58,343,671

 

 

 

 

 

Ralph Nader

Independent

 

739,000

111th House

258 D, 178 R

56.8%

 

 

Bob Barr

Libertarian

 

515,000

111th Senate

58 D, 40 R, 2 I

(2008)

2004

50

George W. Bush

Republican

286

62,028,285

110th House

234 D, 201 R

37.1%

 

 

John F. Kerry

Democratic

251

59,028,109

110th Senate

49 D, 49 R, 2 I

(2006)

 

 

Ralph Nader

Independent

 

156,000

109th House

202 D, 232 R, 1 I

55.3%

 

 

Michael Badnarik

Libertarian

 

369,000

109th Senate

44 D, 55 R, 1 I

(2004)

2000

50

George W. Bush

Republican

271

50,456,002

108th House

205 D, 229 R, 1 I

37.0%

 

 

Al Gore

Democratic

266

50,999,897

108th Senate

48 D, 51 R, 1 I

(2002)

 

 

Ralph Nader

Green

 

2,882,955

107th House

212 D, 221 R, 2 1

51.3%

 

 

Pat Buchanan

Reform

 

324,000

107th Senate

50 D, 50 R

(2000)

1996

50

William J. Clinton

Democratic

379

47,402,357

106th House

211 D, 223 R, 1 S

38.8%

 

 

Robert J. Dole

Republican

159

39,198,755

106th Senate

45 D, 55 R

(1998)

 

 

H. Ross Perot

Reform

 

7,137,000

105th House

207 D, 221 R, 1 S

49.1%

 

 

Ralph Nader

Green

 

527,000

105th Senate

45 D, 55 R

(1996)

1992

50

William J. Clinton

Democratic

370

44,909,889

104th House

204 D, 230 R, 1 I

38.8%

 

 

George H. Bush

Republican

168

39,104,545

104th Senate

47 D, 53 R

(1994)

 

 

H. Ross Perot

Independent

 

19,742,267

103rd House

258 D, 176 R, 1 I

55.1%

 

 

Andre Marrou

Libertarian

 

281,000

103rd Senate

57 D, 43 R

(1992)

1988

50

George H. Bush

Republican

426

48,886,097

102nd House

267 D, 167 R, 1 I

36.5%

 

 

Michael Dukakis

Democratic

111

41,809,074

102nd Senate

56 D, 44 R

(1990)

 

 

Ron Paul

Libertarian

 

410,000

101st House

259 D, 174 R

50.1%

 

 

Lenora B. Fulani

New Alliance

 

129,000

101st Senate

55 D, 45 R

(1988)

1984

50

Ronald Reagan

Republican

525

54,455,075

100th House

258 D, 157 R

36.4%

 

 

Walter F. Mondale

Democratic

13

37,577,185

100th Senate

55 D, 45 R

(1986)

 

 

David Bergland

Libertarian

 

227,000

99th House

252 D, 182 R

53.1%

 

 

Lyndon H. LaRouche

Independent

 

79,000

99th Senate

47 D, 53 R

(1984)

1980

50

Ronald Reagan

Republican

489

43,899,248

98th House

267 D, 168 R

39.8%

 

 

Jimmy Carter

Democratic

49

36,481,435

98th Senate

45 D, 55 R

(1982)

 

 

John B. Anderson

Independent

 

5,719,437

97th House

243 D, 192 R

52.6%

 

 

Ed Clark

Libertarian

 

920,000

97th Senate

46 D, 53 R, 1 I

(1980)

1976

50

Jimmy Carter

Democratic

297

40,830,763

96th House

273 D, 159 R

37.2%

 

 

Gerald R. Ford

Republican

240

39,147,973

96th Senate

58 D, 41 R, 1 I

(1978)

 

 

Eugene J. McCarthy

Independent

 

756,631

95th House

292 D, 143 R

53.6%

 

 

Roger McBride

Libertarian

 

172,000

95th Senate

61 D, 38 R, 1 I

(1976)

1972

50

Richard M. Nixon

Republican

520

47,169,911

94th House

291 D, 144 R

38.2%

 

 

George McGovern

Democratic

17

290,170,383

94th Senate

60 D, 37 R, 2 I

(1974)

 

 

John G. Schmitz

American

 

1,099,482

93rd House

239 D, 192 R

55.2%

 

 

Benjamin Spock

People’s

 

9,000

93rd Senate

56 D, 42 R, 2 I

(1972)

Source: Series Y 79 – 83. Morton, Rogers C.B. Secretary of Commerce; Barabba, Vincent P. Director of the Bureau of the Census. Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970. Bicentennial Edition pg. 1073-1074; Presidential Elections, 1789–2008 — Infoplease.com, Pearson Education Inc. 2007, Table 1.5 and 1.6 pgs. 18-21 Maisel, L. Sandy; Buckley, Kara Z. Parties and Elections in America: The Electoral Process. Fourth Edition. Lanham Maryland.  Roman & Littlefield Publishers. 2005; 109-111th Congresses by Damerow, Darold. Senior Professor of Government and History. Congress. Cranford, New Jersey. Union County College. August 2009, U.S. House of Representatives, Office of the Clerk. Statistics of the Presidential and Congressional Election 10 July 2009

 

With a lot of help from the Democratic Congress, Nixon presided over perhaps the greatest era of regulation since the early New Deal, clean air and water, consumer and workplace safety, and women’s rights.  Based on his frank comments to his inner circle of advisers and supporters, Nixon was surely a racist and an anti-Semite, but those hardly qualify him as a conservative.  It was Ronald Reagan who led the conservative revolution giving Republicans the vision to aspire to something grander this era.  Voters were worried Reagan would lead to War; nonetheless Reagan won with 50.7% of the popular vote.  In 1982 his popularity headed down with the recession and along with it Republican congressional fortunes, as 26 seats swung from Republican to Democratic in the House.  Drawing upon conservative thinking Reagan’s starting point was to honor the individual and the entrepreneur to advance the nation and well-being of the citizens with tax cuts and faith that supply side economics would “trickle down” while massively building up the military-industrial complex.  The spectacular economic recovery of 1983 to 1985 gave reality to Reagan’s economic vision, 12.3% economic growth, a decline in unemployment from 10% in 1983 to below 7% in 1986.  The platform of 1980 staked out cultural ground for the Republicans and Southern Baptist ministers who had supported the Democrats over the Republicans by 41 to 29 percent in 1980 shifted loyalties four years later, choosing Republicans by 66 to 26 percent.  Reagan took 59% of the vote and won all but the District of Columbia and Mondale’s home state of Minnesota, except for Roosevelt in 1936, the biggest Electoral College landslide ever, but with the lowest turnout since 1924 (Greenberg ’04: 49-53, 55 & 60).     

 

Elections in the 1990s repudiated Reaganomics.  To be sure, median income rose between 1983 and 1988, but the decade brought unprecedented rises in inequality followed by anger producing recession, the wealthiest incomes increased 69% but the middle class stagnated up just 2.8% between 1980 and 1989.  Bush pledged to continue the Reagan revolution saying, “Read my lips, no new taxes”.  As Chairman of the Democratic Leadership Council in 1990 Clinton articulated, “our burden is to give people a new choice, rooted in old values, a new choice that is simple, offers opportunity, demands responsibility, gives citizens more say, provides them with responsive government, all because we recognize that we are a community.  Republican governance is misguided to glorify the pursuit of greed and self-interest (Greenberg ’04:69).    The crash of 1992 swept away Republican standing with the working and middle classes.  In 1992, almost a fifth of voters wished to have no party of the established political parties.  Ross Perot’s third party performance garnered 19% of the popular vote, many from disgruntled Republicans, and Clinton won with only 49% of the popular vote.  The Democrats made a serious effort to dominate this era.  While the Democrats did not elect a majority president, Clinton won with 53% of the vote in 1996, the least popular election since 1924.  Clinton sustained economic growth over the decade, higher incomes and less poverty by making balancing the federal budget his priority.  Support for Democrats rose amongst the educated but decreased amongst the uneducated and there was a Republican majority in Congress every term after his first 103rd Congress. The Democrats were denied an outright majority 2000 by Nader’s challenge.  Had there been no third-party candidates, Clinton would have likely won with 52% of the vote in 1992 rising to 53.4% in 1996.  Al Gore would have moved into the White House with 50.1% of the vote and carried both New Hampshire and Florida in 2000 (Greenberg ’04:62-69, 75).   

 

The presidential election of 2000 is one of the most unusual political battles in American history.  The nation was beginning a new century with the realization that it would also be getting a new president.  Clinton’s legacy was unusual; the nation was at peace, the budget was balanced and its economy was strong, yet many voters were apprehensive about Clinton and happy that his tenure was coming to an end.  People believed that the policies of the Clinton administration had been good for the nation and were thankful to Clinton for them, but they did not like Clinton personally, as the result of a series of sex scandals.  Gore wanted to embrace Clinton’s politics but not Clinton himself.  With Clinton, who had led the Democratic Party for eight years, resting, the opposition Republicans believed they had an excellent chance to return to the White House they had last occupied when George Bush was president.  Their hope rested with Bush’s son, George W. Bush, who was governor of Texas.  The nation underwent an intense campaign that did not produce a clear leader even as Election Day approached.  Gore was ahead in some of the final polls, Bush in others, but neither led by more than two percentage points and the margin of error was four percent (Dover ’03: & 11).  The general election campaign began in mid-August with the conclusion of the national conventions.  Each now had a running mate.  The Federal Election Campaign Act granted the nominees of the major parties $67.5 million each.   Since Reform Party nominee Ross Perot had garnered 7.8 percent of the vote in 1996, this party’s 2000 candidate Pat Buchanan, received $12.4 million.  Ralph Nader received no federal funding but made it clear that his major goal in this election was to attain 5 percent of the vote so his Green Party would qualify for federal funding in 2004.  Many voters thought Nader drew votes from Gore’s camp while Buchanan’s appeal was limited (Dover ’03: 10).  

 

Presidential Vote by State, 2000 Election

 

State

Popular Vote

% Popular Vote Bush

% Popular Vote Gore

Electoral Vote Bush

Electoral Vote Gore

Alabama

1,666,272

56.5

41.6

9

 

Alaska

285,560

58.6

27.7

3

 

Arizona

1,532,016

51.0

44.7

8

 

Arkansas

921,781

51.3

45.9

6

 

California

10,965,856

41.7

53.4

 

54

Colorado

1,741,368

50.8

42.4

8

 

Connecticut

1,459,525

38.4

55.9

 

8

Delaware

327,622

41.9

55.0

 

3

District of Columbia

201,894

9.0

85.2

 

2

Florida

5,963,110

48.8

48.8

25

 

Georgia

2,596,645

54.7

43.0

13

 

Hawaii

367,951

37.5

55.8

 

4

Idaho

501,621

67.2

27.6

4

 

Illinois

4,742,123

42.6

54.6

 

22

Indiana

2,199,302

56.6

41.0

12

 

Iowa

1,315,563

48.2

48.5

 

7

Kansas

1,072,218

58.0

37.2

6

 

Kentucky

1,544,187

56.5

41.4

8

 

Louisiana

1,765,656

52.6

44.9

9

 

Maine

651,817

44.0

49.1

 

4

Maryland

2,020,480

40.3

56.5

 

10

Massachusetts

2,702,984

32.5

59.8

 

12

Michigan

4,232,711

46.1

51.3

 

18

Minnesota

2,438,685

45.5

47.9

 

10

Missouri

2,359,892

50.4

47.1

11

 

Montana

410,997

58.4

33.4

3

 

Nebraska

697,019

62.2

33.3

5

 

Nevada

608,970

49.5

46.0

4

 

New Hampshire

569,081

48.1

46.8

4

 

New Jersey

3,187,226

40.3

56.1

 

15

New Mexico

598,605

47.8

47.9

 

5

New York

6,821,999

35.2

60.2

 

33

North Carolina

2,911,262

56.0

43.2

14

 

North Dakota

288,256

60.7

33.1

3

 

Ohio

4,701,998

50.0

46.4

21

 

Oklahoma

1,234,229

60.3

38.4

8

 

Oregon

1,533,968

46.5

47.0

 

7

Pennsylvania

4,913,119

46.4

50.6

 

23

Rhode Island

409,047

31.9

61.0

 

4

South Carolina

1,382,717

56.8

40.9

8

 

South Dakota

316,269

60.3

37.6

3

 

Tennessee

2,076,181

51.1

47.3

11

 

Texas

6,407,637

59.3

38.0

32

 

Utah

770,754

66.8

26.3

5

 

Vermont

294,308

40.7

50.6

 

3

Virginia

2,739,447

52.5

44.4

13

 

Washington

2,487,433

44.6

50.2

 

11

West Virginia

648,124

51.9

45.6

5

 

Wisconsin

2,598,607

47.6

47.8

 

11

Wyoming

218,351

67.8

27.7

3

 

United States

105,396,627

47.9

48.4

271

266

Source: Table G-1 Dover, Edwin. The Disputed Presidential Election of 2000. Greenwood Press. West Port Connecticut. 2003 pg. 150; Scammon, Richard M.; McGillivrey, Alice V.; Cook, Rhodes.  America Votes 24: A Handbook of Contemporary American Election Statistics 2000. Washington D.C. Congressional Quarterly Press. 2001

 

The campaign began January 3, 1999 and ended December 18, 2000 when the Supreme Court ruled certain procedures to recount ballots and unreliable machines violated the equal protection clause.  The Electoral College vote was 271 for Bush and 266 for Gore.  A candidate must win a majority of the nation’s 538 electoral votes, 270, to be President.  The election was unusually close in both popular and electoral votes.  Gore won the popular vote by a narrow margin of 48.4 to 47.9 percent, thus making this the fourth closest presidential election in American history.  Gore received 50,992,335 votes, while Bush garnered 50,455,156.  Nader finished in third place with 2,882,738 (2.7 percent), while Buchanan trailed with 449,077 (0.4 percent).  The electoral vote was even close and unusual in that the second place finisher in the popular vote ran strongest.  Bush finished first with 271 votes (including 25 from Florida), while Gore came in second with 267.  The last time the winner of the electoral vote lost the popular vote was in 1888 (Dover ’03: 10 & 14). 57 percent of voters with annual incomes below $15,000 supported Gore, while 59 percent of those with incomes above $100,000 backed Bush.  In addition, 71 percent of voters who resided in cities with populations above 500,000 voted for Gore, while 59 percent of those in rural areas supported Bush.  Religion also influenced choices, 79 percent of Jewish people backed Gore, while 63 percent of Protestants were for Bush.  Gore won the votes of 90 percent of blacks, while Bush garnered the votes of 54 percent of whites.  58 percent of married men voted for Bush, 63 percent of unmarried women voted for Gore, while married women and unmarried men were evenly divided (Dover ’03: 2& 15).

 

Florida was one of the first states to conclude its voting on Election Day because it closed most of its polling places at 7 pm.  Voter News Service moved Florida from Gore to Bush and then as Gore reduced Bush’s lead to less than 2,000 votes there were reports of voting irregularities that would lead to a mandatory recount of the entire statewide vote.  The network removed Florida from Bush’s victory column, thus reducing the Texas governor’s electoral count to only 246, while Gore stood at 267.  Neither candidate had enough votes to win but either candidate would win with a victory in Florida (Dover ’03: 17-18).  The Count whittled down Bush’s lead from the initial count of 1,764 votes of a total of more than 6 million votes cast.  After the certification of Republican Secretary of State Kathleen Harris, Bush’s lead dropped to 300.  Absentee ballots from military installations located outside the nation brought Bush’s lead to 930 votes.  The deadline for recounts was November 26, only one of three counties submitted its recount, one had abandoned its recount and simply submitted the vote count as of Election Day and the third county still had a recount in progress.  Harris certified the results as official and proclaimed Bush the winner of Florida’s twenty-five electoral votes, ahead by only 537 votes.  The Gore team filed a lawsuit contesting Harris’ count in the district court of Judge N. Sander Sauls on December 2.  The trial lasted for only two days, with Sauls ruling against Gore on December 4.  Gore appealed to the Florida Supreme Court immediately.  The Florida Supreme Court added 383 votes to Gore’s total to reflect manually counted ballots from the completed recounts in Miami-Date and Palm Beach Counties that Harris had rejected.  Bush’s lead was reduced to only 154 votes.   The Bush campaign appealed this ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court in what soon became the case of Bush v. Gore (Dover ’03: 46). The first case to reach the high court was Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board that was overruled to accede to Bush’s request to stop the statewide recounts on December 9.  The final decision was rendered on December 12, 2000.  The 5 to 4 decision led to the immediate conclusion of the recounts and of the election itself, giving Bush a victory by 537 votes in Florida and a national total of 271 electoral votes.  The final electoral vote was Bush, 271 and Gore, 266, with one abstention (Dover ’03: 20).

 

Presidential Vote by Florida Counties, 2000 Elections

 

County

Popular Vote

% Popular Vote Bush

% Popular Vote Gore

Alachua

85,729

39.8

55.2

Baker

8,154

68.8

29.3

Bay

58,805

65.7

32.1

Bradford

8,673

62.4

35.5

Brevard

218,395

52.7

44.6

Broward

575,143

30.9

67.4

Calhoun

5,174

55.5

41.7

Charlotte

66,896

53.0

44.3

Citrus

57,204

52.0

44.6

Clay

57,353

72.8

25.5

Collier

92,163

65.6

32.5

Columbia

18,508

59.2

38.1

Dade

625,449

46.3

52.6

Desoto

7,811

54.5

42.5

Dixie

4,666

57.8

39.1

Duval

264,636

57.5

40.8

Escambia

116,648

62.6

35.1

Flagler

27,111

46.5

51.3

Franklin

4,644

52.8

44.1

Gadsden

14,727

32.4

66.1

Gilchrist

5,395

61.2

35.4

Glades

3,365

54.7

42.9

Gulf

6,144

57.8

39.0

Hamilton

3,964

54.1

43.4

Hardee

6,233

60.4

37.5

Hendry

8,139

58.3

39.8

Hernando

65,219

47.0

50.1

Highlands

35,149

57.5

40.3

Hillsborough

360,395

50.2

47.1

Holmes

7,395

67.8

29.4

Indian River

49,622

57.7

39.8

Jackson

16,300

56.1

42.1

Jefferson

5,643

43.9

53.9

Lafayette

2,505

66.7

31.5

Lake

88,611

56.4

41.3

Lee

184,377

57.6

39.9

Leon

103,124

37.9

59.6

Levy

12,724

53.9

42.4

Liberty

2,410

54.6

42.2

Madison

6,162

49.3

48.9

Manatee

110,221

52.6

44.6

Marion

102,956

53.6

43.4

Martin

62,013

54.8

42.9

Monroe

33,887

47.4

48.6

Nassau

23,780

69.0

29.2

Okalossa

70,680

73.7

24.0

Okeechobee

9,853

51.3

46.6

Orange

280,125

48.0

50.1

Osceola

55,658

47.1

50.6

Palm Beach

433,186

35.3

62.3

Pasco

142,731

48.0

48.7

Pinellas

398,472

46.4

50.3

Polk

168,607

53.6

44.6

Putnam

26,222

51.3

46.2

St. Johns

60,746

65.1

32.1

St. Lucia

77,989

44.5

53.3

Santa Rosa

50,319

72.1

25.4

Sarasota

160,942

51.6

45.3

Seminole

137,634

55.0

43.0

Sumter

22,261

54.5

43.3

Suwannee

12,457

64.3

32.7

Taylor

6,808

59.6

38.9

Union

3,826

61.0

36.8

Volusia

183,653

44.8

53.0

Wakulla

8,587

52.5

44.7

Walton

18,318

66.5

30.8

Washington

8,025

62.2

33.6

Federal Absentees

2,490

63.3

33.6

State Total

5,963,110

48.8

48.8

Source: Table G-2 Dover, Edwin. The Disputed Presidential Election of 2000. Greenwood Press. West Port Connecticut. 2003 pg. 151; Scammon, Richard M.; McGillivrey, Alice V.; Cook, Rhodes.  America Votes 24: A Handbook of Contemporary American Election Statistics 2000. Washington D.C. Congressional Quarterly Press. 2001

 

Voters were blinded by talk of ballots with chads only partially removed.  Chads might be hanging on to the ballot by one, two, or even four corners.  A “hanging” chad was attached to the ballot by two or fewer corners, and a “pregnant” or “dimpled” chad was attached by all four corners but had indications that it had been punched in some way with a stylus (Dover ’03: 20).  In Seminole County the Republican county clerk allowed officials of his party to correct mistakes on applications for absentee ballots and thereby helped Bush attain several thousand votes that might have been lost otherwise.  One voter might be required to cast a ballot in her county on  a punch car and then face a 2.6 percent chance of casting an unreadable ballot while another person in a different county would cast a vote through an optical scan approach and face only a 0.2 percent chance of not being counted (Dover ’03: 72).  The refusal to review approximately 9,000 additional Miami-Dade Ballots, which the counting machine registered as non-vote and which have never been manually reviewed, stands out as being critical for the election.  On November 9, 2000 the Miami-Dade County Democratic Party made a timely request under section 102.166 for a manual recount.  After first deciding against a manual recount, they began and on November 26, 2000 the Court ordered them to stop and voted to use the election returns previously compiled.  Earlier that day, the panel had decided to limit its recount to the 10,750 “under-votes” that is, ballots on which no vote was registered by counting machines.  At the time that the Board suspended the recount, approximately 9,000 of the 10,750 had not yet been reviewed.  In the two days that the Board had counted the ballots, the Board identified 436 additional legal votes, from 20 percent of the precincts; representing 15 percent of the votes cast, which the machine failed to register, resulting in a net vote of 168 votes for Gore.  Nonetheless, in addition to suspending further recounting, the Board also determined that it would not include the additional 436 votes that had already been tabulated in its partially completed recount (Dover ’03: 133-134).

 

With a Republican majority in the House of Representatives, Gore conceded defeat to Bush.  The decision was popular amongst Republicans but not with Democrats.  Justice Steven’s dissent assured, “Time will one day heal the wounds to that confidence that will be inflicted by today’s decision.  One thing, however, is certain.  Although we may never know with complete certainty the identity of the winner of this year’s President Election, the identity of the lost is perfectly clear.  It is the Nation’s confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law” (Dover ’03: 49).  America lost to Jeb Bush, only the third Republican governor in Florida since the end of Reconstruction in the 1870s (Dover ’03: 71), the intervention by the Supreme Court that executed more Bush prisoners than any other governors, and the ascension to the presidency of a candidate who lost the popular vote.  The election of 2000 was unusually close, it had the fifth-closest popular vote and third closest electoral vote margins in American history.  Unless the nation has several more disputed elections in the immediate future the Electoral College will probably remain in existence (Dover ’03: 77).  The Supreme Court may not fare so well, the criticism of Bush v. Gore has been particularly strong from two groups of people who have been among the Court’s most important supporters: Democrats and other political liberals on the one hand and constitutional law scholars on the other.  These two groups believe that the five member court majority voted as Republicans rather than as jurists in deciding the issues (Dover ’03: 77).  Vice President Al Gore claims that the trial court erred in the following three ways: (1) the trial court held that an election contest proceeding was essentially an appellate proceeding whereas the County Canvassing Board’s decision must be reviewed with an “abuse of discretion” rather than “de novo” standard of review; (2) the court held that in a contest proceeding in a statewide election a court must review all the ballots cast throughout the state, not just the contested ballots; and (3) the court failed to apply the legal standard for relief expressly set forth in section 102.168(3), that states,  “Receipt of a number of illegal votes or rejection of a number of legal votes sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of the election” (Dover ’03: 128-129).  A legal vote is one in which there is a “clear indication of the intent of the voter” (Dover ’03: 132- 133).

 

After losing in 2004 the Democrats moved cautiously, they took a majority in the House in 2006, but the economy began to suffer.  The Democrats couldn’t assume they could coast to victory over the Republican nominee simply because millions of Americans were disgusted with the domestic policies of Bush and the disaster of the Iraq War.  That wasn’t enough to ensure victory for Barack Obama.  The issues of race, his inexperience, and widespread doubts about his foreign policy fitness were tormenting problems that had to be overcome.  Obama however had a first rate organization, record amounts of cash and a slew of grassroots organizations like Move On that could mobilize millions of young voters.  He had black and Latino voting blocs locked up and Bush’s policies to poke fun at.   Obama had one more thing that proved decisive, he had a burning desire to be the first black man to win the White House (Hutchinson ’08: 90).  Obama won by a landslide, 365 Electoral College votes to 173 for McCain and a wide margin in the popular vote.  Obama’s victory was however strangely troubled by the Democratic majority in Congress and his poor choice in running mates.  In this modern age of split ticket voting it is desirable for the presidential party affiliation to be different than the majority party whereas a system of checks and balances is needed between the Executive and Legislative branches in the absence of multi-party parliamentary democracy.  The tyranny of the Democratic-Republican bipartisan system is evident in the extraordinarily high budget deficits and the people have learned to stay away in fear for their health.  Everyone seems to agree it would be nice for a Republican majority to sweep Nancy Pelosi from power so the Congressional majority could freely oppose the tyranny of the executive and vice versa.  This split ticket voting is the fundamental principle of the pre-multi-party modern era.  It is good to know this method of electing a President from a different party than the majority to keep the party machinery functioning at its optimum.   

 

Part Four: Evolution of the Federal Corrupt Practices Campaign Act

 

Circa 2010 a billion dollars of campaign finance is raised for congressional elections and another billion in presidential elections.  The costs of all elections have grown thirtyfold since 1952 while the number of votes cast has only risen 25 percent.  In 1974, the mean expenditure for all candidates for the House of Representatives was over $53,000, in 1990 it was close to $325,000, in 2000 it reached approximately $595,000.  The gap between incumbents and challengers widened as well.  The mean expenditure for incumbents rose from approximately $57,0000 to $422,000 to $774,000, for the same years, and for challengers from $40,000 to $134,000 to $295,000.  For open seats, the mean expenditure rose from about $90,000 to $543,000 to $1.1 million.  In the Senate, the mean expenditure for all candidates went from approximately $437,000, in 1974, to $2.6 million, in 1990, to $5.3 million in 2000.  For incumbents the mean expenditure was $4.3 million, for challengers a daunting $2.5 million, and open seat races $16.5 million. John Corzine campaign in New Jersey cost $60 million.   (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 155 & 171).  It is estimated that $265 million was spent on state elections and $200 million on local elections in 1980, by 1996 that amount had risen to $650 million on state elections and $425 million on local elections.  Between 1982 and 1992 spending on elections grew by 66 percent in the Kansas House, 225 percent in the Oregon House, and in the Maine Senate by 292 percent (Maisel & Buckley ’05:174).  Since 1976 public financing has been an important part of presidential campaigns.  During the pre-nomination phase of the presidential election, after reaching a qualifying plateau, candidates for the two parties’ nominations receive matching funds for all contributions of $250 or less received from individuals.  The total cost to the public of the running the 2000 presidential election exceeded $230 million (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 191 &192).  The American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees is the number 1 independent spender in the 2010 election. AFSCME is spending $87.5 million. The union's money comes from dues paid by its 1.6 million members. More than 90 percent of the chamber's campaign spending is going to help Republicans (Lawrence ’10).  In 2010 the educated appear to be voting for a Republican majority to split the ticket with the Democrat in the White House, or vice versa, until a multi-party parliament would want to again align itself with the Commander in Chief.

 

Federal Election Campaign Finance 2008 and 2010

 

 

 

Congressional Receipts

2010

Congressional Disbursements

2010

Congressional

Receipts

2008

Congressional

Disbursements

2008

Presidential Contributors 2008

Contributions

$ Amount

2008Description:

Size of Donations

2008

$ Amount by Size

2008

House

All

$978,875,156

$849,913,358

$988,561,070

$947,750,192

Individual

$1,335,581,364

$200 and Under

$428,170,699

 

Republican

$518,231,097

$435,130,006

$542,161,508

$500,444,188

PAC

$5,286,507

$200.01 - $499

$140,770,423

 

Democrat

$457,955,332

$412,529,593

$442,329,292

$443,552,045

Party

-$124,151

$500 - $999

$134,683,637

 

Other

$2,688,727

$2,253,759

$4,070,270

$3,753,959

Candidate

$56,788,136

$1000 - $1999

$206,611,622

Senate

All

$699,917,292

$626,361,219

$434,162,271

$442,608,494

Federal Funds

$103,934,663

$2000 and Over

$419,369,983

 

Republican

$389,200,689

$325,772,586

$237,358,019

$229,904,183

Transfers-In

$155,359,661

 

 

 

Democrat

$296,349,026

$286,981,376

$196,118,086

$212,048,519

Disbursements

$1,627,355,619

 

 

 

Other

$14,367,577

$13,607,257

$686,166

$655,792

Cash On Hand

$29,125,097

 

 

Source: Federal Election Commission

 

The financing of federal elections was governed by a series of outmoded and largely ignored laws, the 1907 Tillman Act, which prohibited corporate contributions, the 1925 Corrupt Practices Campaign Act, which set limits on expenditures in the House ($2,500 to $5,000) and Senate ($10,000 to $25,000) but not on presidential campaigns, the 1939 Hatch Acts, which put limits on contributions and involvement of federal employees, and the 1944 Smith-Connally and 1947 Taft-Hartley Acts, which prohibited labor unions from contributing directly to campaigns (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 140).  In 1907 Roosevelt signed the Tillman Act, banning campaign contributions from corporations and banks to those running in federal elections.  The law was intended to cut the ties between special interest and politics by curbing the influence of corporate money on the outcome of federal elections, but was ineffective.  The first actual restrictions on spending were imposed under the aptly named Federal Corrupt Practices Campaign Act of 1925 that remained the principal means for regulating campaign financing for almost fifty years.  The 1925 Act called for the disclosure of receipts and expenditures by candidates for the House and Senate but was silent in regards to the presidential campaign.   The Hatch Act of 1940 was the first to limit the amount an individual could donate to a candidate and prohibited political activities by certain federal employees.  No one was prosecuted under the Federal Corrupt Practices Campaign Act until the 1960s, with the rise of candidate centered elections and costly media-dependent campaigns, when President Kennedy appointed a bipartisan Commission on Campaign Costs to examine ways to reduce campaign costs (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 157 & 158).

 

Candidates set up multiple committees to avoid the campaign spending limits.  Corporations were notorious for giving election year bonuses, which were then passed on by obedient executives to deserving candidates.  Labor unions set up committees on political education that were used to solicit voluntary contributions from union members.  The reality of campaign financing indicated significantly increasing expenditures, corporate influence, and union activity.  The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971 marked the first step in reforming these practices.  The major provisions of this act put a limit on media expenditures, called for disclosing the source of campaign contributions, identifying them by occupation and business as well as by name and address and limiting the amount a candidate could spend on themselves.  The 1972 election was the first to be regulated under the new FECA provisions.  The 1974 amendments to the FECA, passed over President Nixon’s veto, have led to tremendous change in the role played by organized interest groups.  The 1974 amendments limited individual contributions to $1,000 per campaign but permitted the establishment of political action committees, which could contribute up to $5,000 in each campaign.  In a 1975 case involving Sun Oil Company the Federal Election Commission ruled that corporations could use general Treasury funds to establish political action committees.  Organized labor unions formed PACs shortly after they were legalized, peaking at 394 in 1984 (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 140-141).

 

In Buckley v. Valeo 424 U.S. 1 (1976) the Supreme Court agreed with petitioners that that the limitation on expenditures was an abridgement of the freedom of speech.  Limits on independent campaign expenditures restrained the interchange of ideas needed to catalyze social change and were therefore unconstitutional.  The spending limits were unconstitutional unless the presidential candidates accepted public funding.  In 1976 FEC was amended to reconstitute the Federal Election Commission, put caps on contributions, require the public disclosure of all donations above $200, partially finance the presidential primaries and complete public financing for presidential elections for candidates who voluntarily accepted campaign spending limits. Non-connected PACs were first registered with FEC in 1978, today there are more than fourteen hundred.  PACs have no members.  Individuals are contributors; they can fail to contribute again.  But talented fund-raisers will tell you that there is no dearth of small contributors.  A salient goal of campaign reform has always been to increase the number of small contributors.  In 1979 Congress amended the act to permit state and local parties to solicit unlimited contributions for party building activities.  In addition, state and local party committees were allowed to contribute volunteer time to individual campaigns so that the traditional role of local party organizations in federal elections was not lost. Soft money grew exponentially in the 1980s (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 143, 161 & 162).

 

The McCain-Feingold Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act (BCFRA) of 2002 took seven years to pass.  Under the old system, in place since the post-Watergate reform era, two types of money have funded campaigns in the United States.  The first, hard money is money raised by candidates and spent on their own campaigns.  Regulated by the Federal election committee, hard money contributions are capped and all candidates must disclose their donor lists.  The second type of money, soft money, is money not regulated by the FEC.  It is collected by the parties from corporations, labor unions, and wealthy individuals who write checks of $100,000 or more for party building activities such as public education and vote mobilization.  The leaders of the campaign finance reform movement in the Senate focused their attack on soft money.  Between 1994 and 2000 the amount of soft money raised by the two major parties had risen fivefold from $102 million to $495 million.  The Court took particular umbrage at the “attack ads”.  The Supreme Court ruling provided that as long as the magic words “elect, defeat, vote for, or vote against” did not appear in the commercial, the ad was not within the reach of FEC. 155  The BCFRA banned soft money in national parties, set a $10,000 per year cap on soft money for state parties.  The hard money limit contribution to a candidate was raised from $1,000 to $2,000, to a national party from $20,000 to $25,000 and an individual aggregate limit is $95,000.  The PAC limits were $5,000 a candidate, $15,000 the party, and no limit on total PAC giving.  Advertisements can only be paid for by hard money from PACs (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 169).

 

Growth of Political Action Committees 1974-2002

 

Year

Corporate

Labor

Trade/

Health

Non

connected

Coop

erative

Corpor

Ation w/o stock

Total

Contri

Bution to Congress

Millions of $

1974

89

201

318

 

 

 

608

12.5

1976

433

224

489

 

 

 

1,146

22.6

1978

785

217

453

162

12

24

1,653

34.1

1980

1,206

297

576

374

42

56

2,551

60.2

1982

1,469

380

649

723

47

103

3,371

87.6

1984

1,682

394

698

1,053

52

130

4,009

113.0

1986

1,744

384

745

1,077

56

151

4,157

139.8

1988

1,816

354

786

1,115

59

138

4,268

159.2

1990

1,795

346

774

1,062

59

136

4,172

159.1

1992

1,735

347

770

1,145

56

142

4,195

188.9

1994

1,660

333

792

980

53

136

3,954

189.6

1996

1,642

332

838

1,103

41

123

4,079

217.8

1998

1,567

321

821

935

39

115

3,798

219.9

2000

1,545

317

860

1,026

41

118

3,907

259.8

2002

1,528

320

975

1,055

39

110

4,027

282.0

Source: Table 4.2 pg. 130 Maisel & Buckley ‘05; Federal Election Commission

 

A striking feature of American politics is the extent to which political parties are supplemented by private associations formed to influence public policy.  These organizations, commonly called pressure groups or interest groups, promote their interests by attempting to influence government rather than by nominating candidates and seeking responsibility for the management of government.  Such groups, while they may call themselves non-political, are engaged in the politics of policy. If these groups decide to lobby Congress for legislation, they must register as a lobbying organization.  If they decide to support candidates for office, they must form a separate political action committee.  This is not an easy decision for a number of reasons, for instance, organizations that have been granted tax-exempt status by the Internal Revenue Service may well lost that status.  Over 12,500 individuals were listed in a recent directory of Washington lobbyists.  Over sixteen hundred political action committees contributed to candidates in the 1978 congressional elections, more than 4,000 had registered with the Federal Election Commission by the end of 1988 (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 135 & 129).  A preponderance of interest groups active today exist in order to defend their members economic interest, ie. Unions and trade associations.  The number of economic interest groups increases in response to the intrusion of federal regulation in economic affairs.  Noneconomic groups, sometimes called public interest groups, pursue goals that their members view as good for the entire society.  The individual most closely associated with the formation of public interest groups is Ralph Nader.  He first made his reputation by crusading against General Motors for producing unsafe automobiles.  He was instrumental in forming a cadre of public interest groups concerned with consumer issues, government reform, health care, and other issues (Buckley & Maisel ’05: 131). Most interest groups attempt to maintain some degree of bipartisanship because they do not want to alienate public officials who favor their policy preferences.  Interest groups have taken to rating every representative and senator with their basic information and voting record.  Interest groups use these ratings to determine whom to help financially in upcoming campaigns (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 134 & 139). 

 

To get voter turnout to increase the patronage system needs to be reinstated.  While it might be acceptable to spend money on a Republican majority in the 112th Congress PACs should donate at least half of their funds to independent candidates and parties and continue to donate more.  This is so important that it should be required by law.  The Democratic and Republican (DR) Parties also need to donate up to 25% to third parties.  The bipartisan is a public health hazard.  No citizen can tolerate such monopolization of the political process, or such an extortionate health care system and expect to survive physically, let alone as a bill of law.  The voters are staying away from the polls in droves.  It is unlikely anyone will forget the double dose of poison they voted for in the 2008 General Elections and U.S. citizens are going to continue not to participate in the political process to avoid being exposed to corrupt campaign financing until elections are sufficiently peaceful and interesting.  To tempt voters in 2010, third parties have sidled up to the ballot using a Fusion Voting System that allows candidates to declare multiple party affiliations and there is an explosion of viable Congressional and Senatorial third party candidates but no soft spoken Governors.  The Democratic-Republican (DR) Party has overstayed its welcome, noone is more painfully aware of this than the apologetic Democratic and Republican incumbents themselves.  Campaign financing needs to be redistributed from the major parties to the minor parties.  In the 2010 parliamentary election only $2.7 million of campaign financing, 0.3% of $979 million went to minor party candidates, Democrats took in $458 million and Republicans a whopping $518 million.  Democrats and Republicans alike need to be members and patrons of the third parties.  A law needs to be passed to redistribute 10-25% of Democratic and Republican revenues to third parties.  Third party candidates need equal advertising time with their major party competitors.  Candidates also need money to pay promising scholars, diplomats and poor people.  Challengers need to redirect attention from the incumbent to the people who benefit from the social welfare campaign of the third party candidate.  In sum the Federal Election Commission needs to take command of not more than 25% of the assets of the Democratic and Republican (DR) Parties and redistribute them fairly to third party candidates.  Third party political organizations should also enjoy a tax exempt status that the Democratic and Republican parties do not under 26USCI(F)(VI)§527. 

 

Part Five: Vote for Me: An Aspiring Young Multi-Party Democracy at 222

 

What is the role of “third parties” in our 222 year old Democratic-Republican (DR) Party System?  In 2005 ninety-nine of the one hundred U.S. senators are either republicans or Democrats, 434 of the 435 representatives in the House of Representatives are affiliated with one of the two major parties, all fifty of the state governors and more than 7,350 of the approximately 7,400 state legislators elected in partisan elections ran under major party labels (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 267).  Surprisingly more than twenty different parties ran at least one candidate for federal office in the 2002 general election. Third party candidates have the potential to force the major party candidates to take a stand on issues that are most important to their followers.  But they also have the potential to divide the vote in such a way that the candidate they least favor wins.  To date, they have rarely had the opportunity to win an election (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 270).  In 2010, many States, disillusioned with the Democratic-Republican (DR) Party have enacted laws such as Oregon Fusion Voting to allow candidates multi-party recognition to foster multi-party democracy.  Without the base of political party support a non-major party candidate has a difficult task demonstrating viability.  To be viable, the candidate must remain visible throughout the campaign.  The candidate must not fall too far behind in the polls.  Television must keep the candidates name before the public, on a footing as nearly equal to those of the major-party candidates.  The financial burden is a heavy one.  Perot’s 1992 campaign stands as the most successful challenge to major-party dominance of presidential politics since former president Theodore Roosevelt ran on the Bull Moose Party ticket in 1912. Perot gained access to the ballot in every state (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 379).  It is hoped a large number of minor party candidates will win the 2010 midterm election and incumbents will defect from the major parties in droves.  A third party majority is needed for an independent candidate to win the Presidency in a parliamentary Democracy.  Citizens are deathly sick of the Democratic-Republican (DR) Party, wherefore Congress must tolerate minor parties or the people just won’t vote.   

 

Third Parties on the 2002 Congressional Election Ballot

 

Alaskan Independence

Independence

One Earth

America First

Independent

Politicians are Crooks

American Constitution

Independent American

Pro Life Conservative

American Independent

Independent Citizens Movement

Progressive

Concerned Citizens

Liberal

Reform

Concerns of People

Libertarian

Republican Moderate

Conservative

Liberty Union

Restore Justice Freedom

Constitution

Lower Tax Independent

Right to Life

Free Energy

Make Marijuana Legal

Socialist

Grassroots

Marijuana Reform

Socialist Workers

Green

Nebraska

United Citizens

Honesty, Humanity, Duty

New Jersey Conservative

U.S. Taxpayers

Homeland Protection

Natural Law

Vermont Grassroots

Human Rights

No New Taxes

Working Families

Independence

Non-Partisan

Wisconsin Greens

 


Source: Table 7.1 pg. 266 Maisel an Buckley ‘05

 

Before 2006 Bernie Sanders (S-Vt) was the only independent in the House of Representatives 1990-2006 when he was elected to the Senate where he was joined by Joe Lieberman won as an Independent although he was not nominated by the Democratic Party, in the 111th Congress there are none.  Congressman Sanders, the former mayor of Burlington, has had a long and colorful career in Vermont politics.  At one point he was the only avowed socialist mayor of any American city, his loyal band of followers was locally known as the Sandersistas, after the Nicaraguan socialist revolutionaries.  When he ran for Congress, he drew support mostly from liberal Democrats, in the House he has caucused with Democratic members, who don’t run against him and treat him as one of their own in awarding committee assignments.  In fact, the Democrats have not run a candidate against Sanders, who has been reelected with relative ease since first winning his seat in 1990 (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 267).  The 1980 campaign of John Anderson provide examples of third party efforts.  In 1980, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) had to rule on whether John Anderson’s “party” in the 1980 presidential election constituted a party.  The FEC ruled that it did, thus making Anderson eligible for federal campaign financing in 1984.  Anderson had done well among a certain segment of Republicans in the primaries, but he could never capture the heart of the Republican Party because he was viewed as too liberal on social issues.  The FEC ruled similarly on Ross Perot’s “party” in the 1992 presidential election, even though the party under whose label he ran in 1996, the Reform party, did not exist in 1992 (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 15).  August King, who served two terms as the Independent governor of Maine (1995-2003) entered politics as a Democrat, serving on the staff of Wiliam Hathaway, who represented Maine in the House from 1965 until 1973 and in the Senate from 1973 until 1979.  Leaving politics and government service, King followed two careers simultaneously, as a very successful owner of a small business and as the host of a statewide television program examining Maine politics on the state’s public television network.  In 1994 he decided to run for governor.  Jesse “The Body” Ventura surprised everyone by winning Minnesota’s gubernatorial election as the Reform Party candidate in 1998 (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 267-268)

 

H. Ross Perot was the ultimate outsider, stressing the change theme as no one had before.  Perot wanted to get under the hood and fix things.  He wanted a whole different approach to government, his practical down home approach that had been so successful in business.  There was nothing about Ross Perot, as a man, as a candidate, as a catalyst for new ideas that did not say “change”.  He clearly struck a responsive chord with the American people.  Before he dropped out of the campaign on the eve of the Democratic convention in 1996, his high poll showings suggested the extent to which his appeal was being heard.  When he withdrew, those who had listened to his message turned toward Bill Clinton (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 363).  Perot wanted to get the nation out of debt.  Perot planned to balance the budget although Bush had increased spending without reneging on his “no new taxes” pledge and the deficit was at record highs.  Money didn’t trickle down, the rich were getting richer and it would take the poor 12 generation instead of 1.6 generations in 1947-73 to double their standard of living.  Close the loopholes and tax the rich.  Before we can hope to eliminate our deficit, we have to overhaul the political system that created it.  It’s not just a matter of bringing in new people.  It’s not just a matter of replacing a Republican President with a Democrat, or a Democratic Congress with a Republican one.  The British aristocracy we drove out in our Revolution has been replaced with our own version, political nobility that is immune to the people’s will.  Being an elected, appointed or career public servant is a noble calling.  Only the people, the owners of this democracy, can make America strong again.  The Founders believed in the people.  Only the people can remake our country (Perot ’92).

 

A century ago citizens did not know much about candidates for office.  But they did know about political parties.  And candidates were candidates of political parties.  Today, campaigns are candidate centered.  Sixty years ago, newspapers dominated the mass media that affected American politics.  Citizens learned the new of the day through their daily papers, in major cities, often more than one newspaper competed for the public’s attention.  Newspapers lost their primacy with the emergence of television.  By the late 1950s television sets had saturated the American landscape.  Over 90 percent of American homes had televisions, many had more than one.  Twenty years ago, three major networks, ABC, CBS, and NBC, dominated television broadcasting.  According to Nielsen Media Research ratings, nearly three out of every five homes watched one of the major networks during prime viewing hours in 1979.  In 1998 the three major networks captured only about one quarter of the market.  Even if the newer networks such as Fox are added in, the number does not reach a third.  It’s not that the total amount of television viewing has decreased but rather that citizens are turning to cable or satellite outlets (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 391).  The media context for politics as we enter the twenty-first century is an extremely complex one.  Politicians try to structure the way in which they appear on free media outlets, they continue to use paid media in ways to present their message as they define it in a way most likely to impact the intended audience.  In the early days of the republic, free media referred to pamphlets and early newspapers, the so-called penny press, that printed news for all to read (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 393).  Howard Dean’s unsuccessful bid for the Democratic presidential nomination was the first to demonstrate the power of fundraising on the Internet.  Dean was able to raise most of his funds through contributions to his web page at little cost to his campaign (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 467).  Television watching has declined dramatically with the draconian enforcement of HDTV in 2009, fewer people are watching regular broadcasts as most have switched to myriad of cable companies.

 

The role that the media should play in our political system is to permit those who choose our elected officials to do so in an informed way.  The press plays an important role in narrowing multicandidate fields.  This role, also known as field winnower, has long been recognized in presidential primaries and is just as apparent in statewide and other highly visible primaries.  When the media stops mentioning a candidate, when the image associated with a candidate is an unflattering one, when a candidate does not meet expectations, or when the agenda discussed in the media excludes issues raised by a candidate or his or her role in a campaign, a signal goes out that that candidacy has lost viability. The media has assume the role of critic, judging the performance of those seeking office, and documenter of elections for the public (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 395, 401 & 403).  Polling and media advertising are however expensive.  Therefore candidates must raise money in advance in order to start effective campaigning.  It also dissuades the competition.  One important technique for raising money is direct mail, to raise money from small donors.  Before a candidate arrives at a political event, someone has to be sure that the event will run efficiently.  The key role is the press secretary.  In any campaign the campaign manager and the candidate will determine what effective role political party organization will play.  However, even in those areas in which political party organization is not strong, someone in a campaign must have the responsibility of coordinating campaign efforts with those of the party leadership (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 250-252).  Virtually every politician in Washington has a press secretary whose job is to guarantee that the politician is seen frequently in the media, particularly in the media that serves the elected official’s constituents.  Every campaign has a press secretary who is charged with the care and feeding of journalists covering the campaign.  Candidates treat the press well so that journalists are inclined to treat them favorably.  Mass media, free and paid, are the only effective means of communicating large numbers of citizens.  Candidates, if they want to win, have an obligation to work with professional media consultants who can produce effective ads. There is nothing evil in any of this (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 416).

 

Call on the local precinct.  Say, “I would like to be active in party affairs” and see what happens.  Precinct work involves knocking on doors, stuffing envelopes, attending gatherings and conventions and even giving talks to groups.  Real power may attend acceptance of a precinct post, for in case a candidate falls ill or dies the county precinct people may legally meet and nominate or select a replacement, without having to ask the electorate at all.  State party platforms do not emerge out of thin air, they are likely to be written and or revised by delegates from county committees.  Avoid extremes of partisanship during your lifetime of party activity.  There is no excuse for one’s friends having to be members of your party as the price of friendship.  Nor is it essential for children to join the parties of parents, for the decision is a personal demonstration of citizenship, not of family loyalty.  The channels of communication have to open between relatives and friends alike, disregarding party ties.  Party membership gives the right to vote one’s choice among party candidates in the primaries.  It is an opportunity through work in precincts, cities, counties, and States to change the way life is lived in one’s locality (Bornet ’04: 12-13). Tip O’Neill (D-Mass., 1953-1987, Speaker of the House 1977-1987) has been quoted as saying, “In the final analysis, all politics is local”.  Politicians still believe Tip, decades after his retirement, years after his death.  Many started out as local politicians, and they know the effectiveness of one-on-one campaigns.  Their goal, accordingly, is to make national or statewide politics local.  They do so by defining smaller groups into which voters fall and by then seeking to appeal to these groups.  Many techniques are available for these appeals, mass media directed at certain audiences, targeted mailings, the Internet, speeches to certain groups.  But in the end, the political strategy is the same, make an appeal, in any way possible, to the largest number of people so that it will seem personal to each voter (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 120). 

 

The role that political parties have traditionally played has been to structure the contest for office so that elections can perform their role most effectively.  It is important to distinguish among the party in the electorate, party organization and party in government.  There is a sociological distinction between cadre parties and mass membership parties.   A cadre party’s primary goal is to obtain electoral success and who are subordinated to leaders in government and are inactive between elections.  Mass membership societies are ideological and educational organizations.  Their goal is to convince the working class and change the system radically (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 11 & 13). The rise of parties affects elections by eliminating the idea of electors making free choices from among a variety of presidential candidates.  Parties started by using congressional caucuses, meetings where all congressional members of the party would convene, to designate their nominees. The party platforms are statements of the direction in which the two parties want our country to go.  The significance  of party platforms in frequently disputed.  The Democrats use the platform writing process as a means to reach out to grassroots activists around the country.  The Republican platform committee, on the other hand, normally only meets in the convention city on the weekend before the convention itself.  Platforms serve different purposes for different individuals.  For activists and ideologues they are often a means to gain a foothold into party dogma.  For interest groups, they represent one way to gain support for particular views.  For candidates, the platform process has served as a way to weed out those in the party who do not support them (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 323 & 324).  A politician needs to know what voters to appeal to, what is the partisan distribution of voters within the district, what is the normal voting strength for candidates of the party, conversely what the strengths of the opposition, what kind of techniques will work to appeal to the voters whose support is needed?  Based on analysis of the district candidates decide if they think they can win the election.  The first job is to identify likely supporters.  The second is to ascertain what other voters are possible converts.  Having identified these two groups the candidate must set a strategy reaching out to both of these groups in a way to solidify their support and increase the chance they will turn out to vote.  The most important resource that any candidate has is personal time.  Some voters will vote for a candidate because of party affiliation.  But political party is not a resource that is equally available to all candidates.  Is the organization efficient? (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 237 & 239). 

 

The incumbent has a distinct advantage.  In only six elections since World War II have fewer than 90 percent of those seeking reelection been reelected.  Over 90 percent of House incumbents seeking to return are successful in election after election.  The average reelection rate for incumbents seeking reelection in the last three elections was over 97 percent.  Senators too are rarely defeated (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 471). 

State legislators seeking reelection also win virtually all of the time (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 258).  Incumbent presidents do not have to prove that they are capable of handling the office or that they have the requisite background and experience, they have held the job for four years.  What is better experience for being president than having been president?  Incumbent presidents have a political organization in place (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 369).  Nearly 90 percent of respondents report having had some contact with their congressional leaders, almost a quarter had personally met their representatives, and almost three quarters had received mail from their representative in Washington.  Challengers are not known at all, voters do not choose between two candidates on equal footing but between one who is well known and positively viewed and another who has to fight to be viewed at all (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 80 & 89).  Incumbents are winning because challengers are poor campaigners.  When challengers run good campaigns, incumbents can lost.  But good challengers appear too infrequently for too many important offices.  The lack of good challengers and good campaigns insulate incumbents in congressional races, the same factors insulate those incumbents seeking reelection to less visible and less attractive offices as well (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 260).  

 

The most prevalent rules call for candidates to run in their party’s primary if they meet certain fairly simple criteria.  First, the prospective candidate must be a registered member of the political party whose nomination he or she seeks.  Second, candidates must meet some sort of test to gain access to the ballot.  Often this test involves gathering a certain number of signatures on a petition.  The number of signatures necessary and who is eligible to sign are important factors.  In Tennessee, only 25 signatures are required for most offices.  In Maine a percentage of those voting in the last election are needed, only registered party members may sign petitions, and they must sign a petition that contains only the names of party members from their home town (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 208).  Despite the lip service given to the basic principle of majority rule, majority rule is an exception in American politics.  Most elections in America, and certainly most primaries are determined by plurality rule.  That is, the person with the most votes, not necessarily 50 percent plus at least one, in the primary wins the nomination (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 217).  Politicians generally like to avoid hotly contested primaries.  However, under certain circumstances, such as when a candidate is not well known and/or a candidates organization has not tested, a little primary can be a good thing (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 230). Credential disputes are the most easily understood.  In party rules and in the call to the convention, each party establishes the procedures through which delegates are to be chose.  In most cases no one challenges the delegates presenting themselves as representing a certain state.  Each party appoints a Credentials Committee that hears challenges to proposed delegations and rules on the disputes.  The report of the Credentials Committee is the first order of official business before the nominating convention.  Credentials, and rules disputes which can determine who wins and who loses, are seen as critical matters. The whips inform the delegates and the delegates fall into line (Maisel & Buckley ’05: 321 &324).

 

Short of enfranchising felons and children the most likely way for the federal government to improve their voting age population turnout is to overthrow the Democratic-Republican (DR) aristocracy that has been making everyone sick since 1800 and create a multi-party democracy whose peaceful social welfare campaigns foster party loyalty and universal prosperity amongst all citizens.  The election of racial minority Barack Obama in 2008 sent home the message that minority parties are the way of the future.  Fifty-eight percent of Americans believe a third major political party is needed because the Republican and Democratic Parties do a poor job of representing the American people.  It is however nearly impossible for an unknown third party candidate to unseat an incumbent in the modern age of paid television ads, even major party challengers fail to defeat an incumbent 97% of the time for the past three elections.  Dissatisfaction with Congress is however so high most pollsters predict the Republicans shall take back the House and Senate and there are an unusually high number of viable third party candidates for both the House and Senate.  Usually the votes of Americans who have not totally forsaken politics are usually stolen from third party candidates because third party candidates don’t generally win and the voters want to vote for a winning candidate.  While a vote for a Republican congressman might be marginally better than a vote for a Democratic congressman in the 2010 interim election, a vote for either the Democratic or Republican (DR) party is not a vote for change, it is even more wasted than not voting at all.  A least non-voters do not legitimize the tyranny.  The United States, has not garnered a 66% quorum for democracy since 1900, and really needs to improve their political party system.  The most logical thing to do is to dissolve the monolithic Democratic-Republican Party into a multi-party Democracy.  To achieve this common interest public and private laws need to be made to redistribute campaign financing from major to minor parties.     

 

Bibliography

 

Blackwell, Kenneth J.; Klukowski, Kenneth A. The Other Voting Right: Protecting Every Citizen’s Right to Vote by Safeguarding the Integrity of the Ballot Box. 28 Yale Law and Policy Review 107 (2009).  Pg. 107-123

 

Bornet, Vaughn Davis. Republican, Democrat, or Independent: Which Choice for Me?. Emeritus Professor of History and Social Science. Southern Oregon University. Talent, Oregon. Bornet Books. 2004

 

Chomsky, Noam. Media Control: The Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda. 2nd Ed. Seven Stories Press. New York. 2002

 

Crissy, Sarah R. Voting Behavior of Naturalized Citizens 1996-2000. U.S. Census Bureau. Housing and Household Economic Statistics Division. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Population Association of America. New Orleans, LA. April 16-19, 2008

 

Damerow, Darold. Senior Professor of Government and History. 109-111th Congresses. Cranford, New Jersey. Union County College. August 2009

 

DeToqueville, Alexis. Democracy in America. 1835. Alfred A. Knopf 1945. Introduced by Daniel J. Boorstin. Toronto, Canada. Vintage Books. 1990

 

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Gordon, John Steele. An Empire of Wealth: The Epic History of American Economic Power. Harper Collins Publisher. New York. 2004

 

Greenberg, Stanley B. The Two Americas: Out Current Political Deadlock and How to Break It. St. Martin’s Press. New York. 2004

 

Human Rights Watch Sentencing Project: Losing the Rights to Vote: The Impact of Felony Disenfranchisement in the United States 1998

 

Huntley, James Robert. Pax Democratica: A Strategy for the 21st Century. Fwrd. by Lawrence S. Eagleburger. St. Martin's Press, Inc. New York. 1998

 

Hutchinson, Earl Ofari. How Obama Won. Middle Passage Press. Los Angeles, California. 2008

 

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Jones, Jeffrey M. Trust in Government Remains Low: Only 26% are satisfied with way nation is being governed. Gallup. September 18, 2008

 

Kant, Immanuel. Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch. 1795

 

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Maisel, L. Sandy; Buckley, Kara Z. Parties and Elections in America: The Electoral Process. Fourth Edition. Lanham Maryland.  Roman & Littlefield Publishers. 2005

 

Milyo, Jeffrey; Schosberg, Samantha. Gender Bias and Selection Bias in House Elections. Department of Economics. Tufts University. Medford, Massachusetts. 2000

 

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Perot, Ross. United We Stand. How We Can Take Back Our Country: A Plan for the 21st Century.  Ross Perot. Hyperion. New York. 1992

 

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Case Law

 

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)

 

Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U. S. 87, 91 (1982)

 

Buckley v. Valeo 424 U.S. 1 (1976)

 

Bush v. Gore No.  00-949

 (2000)

 

Citizens United v. F.E.C No. 08-205 (2010)

 

Doe et al v. Reed, Washington Secretary of State No. 09-559 argued April 28, 2010 and decided June 24, 2010

 

Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915)

 

Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)
 
 

Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 193 (1986)

 

Oregon v. Mitchell 400 U.S. 112 (1970)

 

Richardson v. Ramirez 418 U.S. 24, 41-55 (1974)

 

Smith v. Allright 321 U.S. 649 (1944)

 

Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964)

 

Statute

 

Corrupt Practices Campaign Act of 1925

 

Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971

 

Hatch Act of 1939

 

Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301-15545 (2006)

 

McCain-Feingold Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act (BCFRA) of 2002

 

National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg (2006)

 

Political Organizations 26USCI(F)(VI)§527

 

Smith-Connally Act of 1947

 

Taft-Hartley Act of 1947

 

Tillman Act of 1907

 

Voting Rights Act of 1970