

Hospitals & Asylums

USDA Consolidated Balance Sheet Settlement Requirements HA-16-10-19

Dear USDA Budget Office:

The Historical Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) budget table has been switched with a patently defective monthly and Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) is unavailable by regular email. Due to undeclared use of undistributed offsetting receipts by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to, for instance, subsidize agriculture with commodity insurance for trade war losses, with unspent food stamp agricultural subsidy estimates, there is not much cause for alarm regarding theft, this is a declaration of anorexia by the FNS incidental to failing to sustain SNAP benefit growth. Having Bachelored the exclusion of revenues in federal outlay estimates, the USDA Budget Office must take full responsibility accounting for FNS, especially the largest UDSA program SNAP, and cannot rest until the Historical SNAP table is updated right. FNS has made many verifiable mathematical errors since they started to cut SNAP benefits. Cutting SNAP benefits is also the reason that morale is low in the USDA. It is an unrelated issue that the Forest Service (FS) needs to be transferred to the Interior Department, who cannot currently afford to adopt the FS budget, in every case, and by Congress, to prevent agricultural fire risk, 65 times greater in National Forests than National Parks. The USDA budget does not fit on a page, and should not be squeezed by a gambler's standard of beauty. *Digestion* takes so long there does not seem to be time to edit *Drug Regulation* this October, but this section will be edited to also negotiate with the shrinking FDA budget, and provided the email goes smoothly, the book on water, nutrition, gastroenterology, urology and agriculture will be delivered to the USDA budget office email. To master their job the burden of proof is on the USDA budget office to upgrade their balance sheet(s) at the end of their congressional budget justification, to account for undistributed offsetting receipts, federal outlays and program level, in one consolidated balance sheet, that is internally consistent with sub-agency descriptions in the same document, that requires further investigation, regarding the Department's largest program, from most recent Historical SNAP spending data, as directed below.

USDA Consolidated Balance Sheet FY 17 – FY 20
(millions)

	2017 Review	2018 Estimate	2019 Budget	2020
Total Federal Outlays	129,786	137,848	133,299	141,299
Budget Request	145,939	143,606	139,429	157,161
Undistributed Offsetting Receipts	[16,153]	[5,758]	[6,130]	[15,862]
Total Budget Authority	214,622	218,848	210,264	228,558
Farm Production and Conservation FPAC				
Farm Service Agency, Federal	1,458	1,328	1,012	1,593

Outlays				
Transfer from Program	[310]	[308]	[267]	[339]
Farm Loan Programs	[8,003]	[7,996]	[7,618]	[8,328]
Commodity Credit Corporation Fund	[7,065]	[8,450]	[10,318]	[7,027]
Commodity Credit Corporation Outlays	[9,969]	[11,277]	[7,655]	[11,481]
Subtotal, Farm Service Agency	[26,805]	[29,359]	[26,870]	[28,768]
Risk Management Agency, Federal Outlays	5,254	8,962	8,818	6,003
Crop Insurance Premiums	[3,677]	[3,786]	[3,639]	[3,730]
Subtotal, Risk Management Agency	[8,847]	[12,764]	[12,390]	[9,642]
Natural Resources Conservation Service	4,520	4,306	4,336	4,934
Subtotal Federal Outlays FPAC	11,232	14,596	14,166	12,530
Subtotal Budget Authority, FPAC	[40,256]	[46,413]	[43,663]	[43,435]
Trade and Foreign Agricultural Affairs				
Foreign Agricultural Service				
Salaries and Expenses, Federal outlays	197	195	193	215
Market Development Programs	278	398	230	304
Foreign Food Assistance	1,802	1,789	0	1,969

Subtotal Federal Outlays, TFAA	2,277	2,382	423	2,488
Expense Transfer from CCC Export Credit	[6]	[6]	[6]	[7]
Export Credit Guarantees	[1,582]	[5,500]	[5,500]	[2,000]
Subtotal, Budget Authority TFAA	[4,032]	[7,957]	[6,098]	[4,679]
Rural Development				
Rural Utilities Service	[8,886]	[8,884]	[7,402]	[8,967]
Loans	[8,190]	[8,195]	[7,408]	[8,230]
Federal Outlays	696	689	-6	737
Rural Housing Service	[30,059]	[30,033]	[29,503]	[30,435]
Loans	[27,991]	[27,978]	[27,760]	[28,200]
Federal Outlays	2,068	2,055	1,743	2,235
Rural Business-Cooperative Service	[1,420]	[1,580]	0	[1,544]
Loans	[1,243]	[1,415]	0	[1,358]
Federal Outlays	177	165	0	186
Subtotal, Federal Outlays Rural Development	2,941	2,909	1,737	3,158
Subtotal, Budget Authority Rural Development	[40,376]	[40,497]	[36,905]	[40,946]
Food Nutrition and Consumer Services				
Food and Nutrition Service				
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program	70,507	70,500	70,500	72,827
Child Nutrition Programs	22,794	24,444	23,147	25,126

Woman, Infants and Children (WIC)	6,350	6,313	6,465	7,000
All Other	698	702	717	759
Total, FNCS	100,349	104,872	105,709	110,319
Food Safety				
Federal Outlays	1,032	1,021	1,031	1,116
Revenue Funded	[247]	[236]	[240]	[270]
Food Safety and Inspection Service	[1,279]	[1,257]	[1,271]	[1,386]
Natural Resources and Environment				
Forest Service	6,077	6,006	5,172	5,305
Marketing and Regulatory Programs				
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service	1,305	1,289	1,035	1,402
Agricultural Marketing Service, Federal Outlays	1,079	1,096	996	1,176
Subtotal Federal Outlays MRP	2,384	2,385	2,031	2,578
AMS User Fee Funded	[222]	[226]	[255]	[243]
AMS Budget Authority	[1,301]	[1,322]	[1,251]	[1,419]
Subtotal, Budget Authority MRP	[2,606]	[2,611]	[2,286]	[2,821]
Research, Education and Economics, Subtotal	3,068	3,049	2,650	3,355
Agricultural Research Service	1,277	1,267	1,070	1,396
National Institute of Food and Agriculture	1,533	1,526	1,370	1,677
Economic	87	86	45	95

Research Service				
National Agricultural Statistics Service	171	170	165	187
Departmental Activities, Subtotal	426	428	380	450
Office of the Secretary	52	54	54	57
Office of Civil Rights	24	24	22	26
Office of Inspector General	98	98	87	106
All Other Staff Offices	253	253	218	262
Total Federal Outlays	129,786	134,935	128,419	141,299
Budget Request	145,939	143,606	139,429	157,161
Undistributed Offsetting Receipts	[16,153]	[8,671]	[11,010]	[15,862]
Total Budget Authority	214,622	215,935	205,384	223,951

Source: USDA Budget Summary FY 19 [non-add in re: outlays]; USDA FNS 2017

The whitening out of FNS SNAP historical tables is perplexing because 3.3% spending growth from the previous year is the welfare program settlement, but they don't produce previous year statistics anymore. Because they have broken the SNAP promise made in the Farm Bill of 2008 to not cut benefits, and marked immigrants for death by starvation, a crime of genocide, consumer confidence in the program is ill-advised and it was planned to increase benefits with 2.7% average annual inflation and population growth of only 0.6%, costing 3.3% more than previous year. Booms precedes bust, arrears from FY 16 are therefore ill-advised at the macroeconomic level for welfare programs and large agencies, enjoyed by smaller agencies, but 1% population growth would be considered normal. Since FY 17, the last year for which SNAP statistics were done, it can be guesstimated that there are slightly fewer beneficiaries, and slightly lower spending, but the decline is not as much as FY 16- FY 17 when immigrants were initially targeted for death by starvation. Therefore the settlement is 3.3% SNAP spending growth from FY 17 program levels, to provide for a benefit that is perpetually 2.7% greater than the previous year, and 1% population growth FY 20 and 0.6% population growth every year thereafter. The White House OMB will appreciate that the Hebrew word for "leek" is the same as "cut" and while weapons of war are to be turned into plough-shares by the \$2.1 billion FY 20 Food for Peace program, the consolidated balance sheet will turn his agricultural budget cuts into leeks, and obese people will be tempted to make famine with "pork" barrel politics, no more, and "grow SNAP benefits". SNAP spending is re-estimated at zero growth FY 18 – FY 19 and 3.3% growth from FY 17 in FY 20. The burden of proof is upon the USDA budget office to re-produce the following consolidated balance sheet so that it is internally consistent with sub-agency descriptions in the congressional budget justification. It is good that the USDA produce the first FY 21 budget, because

their issues regarding internal consistency and the declaration of undistributed offsetting receipts are the same as OMBs.

The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) provides leadership on issues related to food, agriculture, food safety, rural development, and natural resources. The USDA was founded by President Abraham Lincoln's signature of the Act to Establish a Department of Agriculture on May 15, 1862. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) is made up of 30 agencies and offices with nearly 100,000 employees who serve the American people at more than 4,500 locations across the country and abroad. The U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census conducted the census of agriculture for 156 years (1840-1996). The 1997 Appropriations Act contained a provision that transferred the responsibility for the census of agriculture to National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS). Since 2017 the USDA was reorganized several times, without authorization of Congress, to negotiate with torturous Presidential budget cut and negative subsidy demands. Farm and Foreign Agricultural Services was divided into Farm Production and Conservation (FPAC) governed by a worthless Business Center and Trade and Foreign Agricultural Affairs with responsibility for the Codex Alimentarius. P.L. 480 International Food Assistance transfer to USAID must be sustained at 3% annual growth from FY 17 to redress an increase in global hunger since 2016. Estimates of outlays for the Commodity Credit Corporation, Risk Management and Rural Business Cooperative Services have moderated after revenues ceased to be accounted for by more carefully differentiating program level and outlays pursuant to right interpretation of the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 under 2USC§661c. Because of the comfortable (silo) profit margin of undistributed offsetting receipts, by the agriculture department, the budget request should increase 2.5% annually from FY 17. OMB should not attempt to cut agricultural spending, OMB should account for Agriculture Department undistributed offsetting receipts to reduce the deficit and pay for the beginning of next year's agriculture budget. The USDA Budget Office balance must produce a consolidated balanced sheet to add exact sub-agency budget requests. This is the same problem that OMB is having with adding a list of exact Cabinet agency congressional budget request entries. The USDA budget office must double check SNAP spending against the FNS historic record. SNAP consumer spending and producer morale could grow 3.3% annually for the same agricultural subsidy price as accounting errors and commodity insurance.

The USDA governs and subsidizes the agricultural sector with loans, insurance, food stamps and international assistance to sustain consumer economic growth with a minimum of consumer price inflation, in a free market. Outlays for government are expected to grow 2.5% government, 3% services and 3.3% SNAP to afford 2.7% average annual consumer price inflation and 0.6% population growth. Because of the comfortable margin of undisclosed undistributed offsetting receipts the official budget request is estimated to grow 2.5% while most USDA sub-agencies grow 3%. USDA would sustain 1% net new employees and 1.5% raise FY 19 and FY 20. The Forest Service who needs to be transferred to the Interior Department to prevent agricultural fire risk. The Interior cannot however afford the Forest Service without the continuing support of USDA until it is integrated into the Interior Department congressional budget request by Act of Congress. SNAP benefits need 3.3% annual growth in total spending, to help a growing population of consumers afford 2.7% average annual rate of consumer price index inflation more than the bare bones diet of the previous year, rather than less to re-interpret the totalitarian famine ordered by the Thrifty Food Plan to pay for the bare bones diet of the previous year. The USDA anticipates it will exhaust savings from hyperinflation in their previous total budget requests by FY20, but their overestimates of sub-agency outlays in the USDA total outlay table continues to be a \$10 billion a year rescission business. The bulk of the continuing agriculture department budget errors involves overestimates of SNAP spending in the FNS sub-agency budget that must checked against the historic SNAP table to begin to sustain 3.3% annual total consumer

agricultural subsidy growth. The entire USDA Budget table however must be internally consistent with all subagency budgets. The USDA Budget Office needs to produce a consolidated balance sheet to accurately express the USDA budget authority, budget request, federal outlays and undistributed offsetting receipts.

The programs and funding of Food, Nutrition, and Consumer Services (FNCS) provide access to safe, nutritious, and wholesome meals, while promoting a healthy diet. Within FNCS, the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) administers USDA’s domestic nutrition assistance programs. Working in partnership with State agencies and other cooperating organizations, FNS helps ensure children and low-income Americans have sufficient food to support nutritious diets. Over the course of a year, one in four Americans will be served by one of USDA’s 15 nutrition assistance programs. The Budget includes funding to support estimated participation levels under current law, including \$73.2 billion for the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), \$23.1 billion for Child Nutrition Programs, and \$5.8 billion for the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC). In 2019, participation levels are estimated: 40.8 million per month for SNAP, 30.7 million per day for the Child Nutrition Program (CNP), and 6.9 million per month for WIC. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Food and Nutrition Services (FNS) Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP) serves as the first line of defense against hunger. It enables low-income families to buy nutritious food with Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) cards. Food stamp recipients spend their benefits to buy eligible food in authorized retail food stores. The USDA is not accountable for the larger FNS programs SNAP and WIC but the microprograms appear well-estimated. The FNS must ensure the USDA uses accurate SNAP and WIC statistics when calculating the FNS budget and USDA totals. It is advised provide for 2.7% average annual inflation and 0.6% population growth, 3.3% annual growth for SNAP, CNP and WIC program spending, 3% for other nutrition services. Due to the moral hazards of accounting errors and commodity insurance, it does not cost more to subsidize consumers with agricultural subsidies.

Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) Outlays FY 17 – FY 20
(millions)

	FY 2017	FY 17 Review	FY 2018	FY 2019	FY 2020
Discretionary					
Special Supplemental Nutrition Program (WIC)	6,350	6,350	6,313	6,465	7,000
Commodity Assistance Program					
Commodity Supplemental Food Program	236	236	238	244	258
The Emergency Food	59	59	59	61	65

Assistance Program, Soup Kitchens, Food Banks					
Farmers' Market Nutrition Program	19	19	19	19	19
Pacific Island Assistance and Disaster Assistance	1	1	1	1	1
Nutrition Services Incentive Program	3	3	3	3	3
Total Commodity Assistance Program	318	318	320	328	346
Nutrition Programs Administration	171	171	170	174	187
Total, Discretionary Programs	6,839	6,839	6,803	6,967	7,533
Mandatory					
WIC Universal Product Database	1	1	1	1	1
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)	78,481	70,507	70,500	70,500	72,827
Child Nutrition Programs (CNP)	22,794	22,794	24,244	23,147	25,126
Permanent Appropriation	187	187	190	193	204

s					
Farm Bill: Seniors Farmers' Market Nutrition Program	21	21	21	21	21
Total Mandatory Programs	101,484	93,510	98,069	98,742	98,178
Total, Discretionary Programs	6,839	6,839	6,803	6,967	7,533
Total Current Law	108,323	100,349	104,872	105,709	105,711

Source: USDA FY 19 pg. 42; FNS 1969-2017

After re-estimating the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) on pg. 42 of USDA FY 19, using much lower estimates from FNS 1969-2017, 3.3% growth in SNAP spending FY 19 – FY 20 can be calculated for less FY 17 – FY 18 and nearly exactly the same FY 19 – FY 20 as requested in the total FNS request on pg. 80 of USDA FY 19. SNAP benefit amount determined by the Thrifty Food Plan could begin to grow at exactly the 2.7% (2018) annual average rate of consumer price index inflation more than the year before, rather than less, and the beneficiary population could grow 0.6% annually, for 3.3% annual growth in federal outlays. The Budget includes a bold new approach to nutrition assistance that combines the use of traditional SNAP Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) cards with a USDA Foods Box that contains 100 percent American grown products. Specifically, the USDA Foods Box proposal has self-incriminated regarding potential to reduce waste, fraud, and abuse by limiting opportunities for benefits to be misused or trafficked. The USDA has deprived SNAP beneficiaries of the tenure promised by Food, Conservation and Energy Act of 2008 H.R. 2419. Taking into consideration the extremely high 22%-33% rates of child poverty, it is necessary to rule that CNP, SNAP and WIC benefits grow at an annual rate of 2.7% to compete with 2.7% average annual consumer price inflation, to feed 0.6% more people annually, with 3.3% annual spending growth.

The Food Stamp Act of 1977 codified at 7USC§2011 set forth a program of food stamps to guarantee low income people and families an adequate nutritious diet to eliminate hunger and malnutrition. Participation in the food stamp program is limited to those households whose incomes and other financial resources, held singly or in joint ownership, are determined to be a substantial limiting factor in permitting them to obtain a more nutritious diet, upper limit of household income is 130% of the poverty line. SSI beneficiaries are automatically eligible under 7USC§2014. Under SNAP rules, the maximum benefit levels for each fiscal year — which are the benefit amounts that go to households with no disposable income after deductions for certain necessities — are set at 100 percent of the cost of the Thrifty Food Plan, USDA's estimate of the minimum amount that a family needs to afford a bare-bones, nutritionally adequate diet, for the preceding June. Thrifty Food Plan needs to be reformulated to provide for 2.7% average consumer price inflation more than the bare bones diet of the previous year, to avoid being charged with totalitarian famine.

Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Statistics 2007-2020

Fiscal Year	Average Participation	Average Benefit	Total Benefits		Total Costs
	-- Thousands--	--Dollars--	-----Millions of Dollars-----		
1969	2,878	6.63	228.80	21.70	250.50
1970	4,340	10.55	549.70	27.20	576.90
1971	9,368	13.55	1,522.70	53.20	1,575.90
1972	11,109	13.48	1,797.30	69.40	1,866.70
1973	12,166	14.60	2,131.40	76.00	2,207.40
1974	12,862	17.61	2,718.30	119.20	2,837.50
1975	17,064	21.40	4,385.50	233.20	4,618.70
1976	18,549	23.93	5,326.50	359.00	5,685.50
1977	17,077	24.71	5,067.00	394.00	5,461.00
1978	16,001	26.77	5,139.20	380.50	5,519.70
1979	17,653	30.59	6,480.20	459.60	6,939.80
1980	21,082	34.47	8,720.90	485.60	9,206.50
1981	22,430	39.49	10,629.90	595.40	11,225.20
1982	21,717	39.17	10,208.30	628.40	10,836.70
1983	21,625	42.98	11,152.30	694.80	11,847.10
1984	20,854	42.74	10,696.10	882.60	11,578.80
1985	19,899	44.99	10,743.60	959.60	11,703.20
1986	19,429	45.49	10,605.20	1,033.20	11,638.40
1987	19,113	45.78	10,500.30	1,103.90	11,604.20
1988	18,645	49.83	11,149.10	1,167.70	12,316.80
1989	18,806	51.71	11,669.78	1,231.81	12,901.59
1990	20,049	58.78	14,142.79	1,304.47	15,447.26
1991	22,625	63.78	17,315.77	1,431.50	18,747.27
1992	25,407	68.57	20,905.68	1,556.66	22,462.34
1993	26,987	67.95	22,006.03	1,646.94	23,652.97
1994	27,474	69.00	22,748.58	1,744.87	24,493.45
1995	26,619	71.27	22,764.07	1,856.30	24,620.37
1996	25,543	73.21	22,440.11	1,890.88	24,330.99
1997	22,858	71.27	19,548.86	1,958.68	21,507.55
1998	19,791	71.12	16,890.49	2,097.84	18,988.32
1999	18,183	72.27	15,769.40	2,051.52	17,820.92
2000	17,194	72.62	14,983.32	2,070.70	17,054.02
2001	17,318	74.81	15,547.39	2,242.00	17,789.39
2002	19,096	79.67	18,256.20	2,380.82	20,637.02
2003	21,250	83.94	21,404.28	2,412.01	23,816.28
2004	23,811	86.16	24,618.89	2,480.14	27,099.03
2005	25,628	92.89	28,567.88	2,504.24	31,072.11
2006	26,549	94.75	30,187.35	2,715.72	32,903.06
2007	26,316	96.18	30,373.27	2,800.25	33,173.52

2008	28,223	102.19	34,608.40	3,031.25	37,639.64
2009	33,490	125.31	50,359.92	3,260.09	53,620.01
2010	40,302	133.79	64,702.16	3,581.78	68,283.94
2011	44,709	133.85	71,810.92	3,875.62	75,686.54
2012	46,609	133.41	74,619.34	3,791.27	78,410.61
2013	47,636	133.07	76,066.32	3,866.98	79,933.30
2014	46,536	125.35	69,999.81	4,130.17	74,129.98
2015	45,800	126.83	69,705.77	4,233.42	73,939.19
2016	44,300	125.52	66,672.64	4,339.27	71,011.91
2017	43,857	125.52	66,059.17	4,447.75	70,506.92
2020	44,120	128.90	68,244.82	4,581.18	72,826.00

Source: USDA Food and Nutrition Service 2017, projection 2020 HA

Using accurate statistics from 2017 SNAP benefits remained the same as the previous year at \$125.52, total food stamp spending declined from \$71 billion (2016) to \$70 billion (2017), while administrative spending increased from \$4.3 billion (2016) to \$4.5 billion (2017). Because food stamps has been subjected to so many cuts, growth the estimates for 2018, 2019 and 2020 are more than the market can bear. Trump Administration anti-immigrant policy regarding SNAP constitutes genocide. The immigration applications of people who apply for food stamps have been denied so that they are both deprived of food and deported so that it is as if they had been exterminated and no longer exist and this constitutes a grave breach of Sec. 2, Arts. 23, 55 and 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to Civilians in Times of War (1949) and genocide under 18USC§1091. The genocide convention is applicable if a particular class of people has been marked for extermination by the authorities- even if by starvation rather than outright execution. Punitive rationing occurred in the Chinese famine of 1958-62 village families who descended from landlords were not fed at all or were fed a lower ration than the poorer class of peasants. Research on the Ukrainian famine in the early 1930's proved that Stalin's objective was to liquidate the kulak class of farmers (Natsios '01: 49-54). Trump Administration growth at the expense of benefit reductions, in both its forms, racial discrimination against ethnic Hispanics, other immigrants and work requirements, are prohibited as incitement to ethnic violence by means anti-immigrant worker propaganda under Art. 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Food Stamps are unpopular because the USDA has broken the promise not to cut SNAP benefits made by the Farm Bill of 2008 so many times, few people qualify under the asset test and fewer want to be cut again. Anti-immigrant policies and work requirement must be overruled to sustain SNAP growth under the Farm Bill of 2008 and stop burdening the budget with the USDAs several failed attempts to account for a depressed SNAP balance. SNAP grows 3.3% - 2.7% benefit inflation and 0.6% population. Because the SNAP agricultural subsidy is expensive, the FNS has one of two settlement options, a program level that is 3.3% greater than the previous year, estimated to be the same as 2017 or a program level that is 3.3% annually more than 2017, and is expected to buy the cheaper option – 3.3% greater than previous years (+/- = 2017) – to administrate \$72.8 billion for 44,120,000 \$128.90 benefits in 2020.

Food stamp statistics date to 1969 when \$250.5 million fed 2.8 million people. The Food Stamp Act of 1977 wrongly reduced benefits from \$5.7 billion for 18.6 million beneficiaries in 1976 to \$5.5 billion for 17 million beneficiaries in 1977. Beneficiaries rose to 21 million in 1981 but fluctuated downward until Public Law 100-435, the Hunger Prevention Act of 1988 was signed into law September 19, 1988. Following this initiative, Public Law 101-624, the Mickey Leland Memorial Domestic Hunger Relief Act of November 28, 1990 established EBT as an issuance alternative and permitted the Department to continue to conduct EBT demonstration projects. Following the Personal Responsibility and Work

Opportunities Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) that removed the entitlement of recipients to AFDC and replaced that with a new block grant to states called Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) food stamp benefits languished.

The Farm Bill of 2008 changed the name of the Food Stamp Program to Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). Promising not to cut benefits the average benefit amount increased rapidly from \$96.18 in 2007 to \$102.19 in 2008, to \$125.31 in 2009 to \$133.79 in 2010. Participation increased 53% from 26.3 million in 2007 to 40.3 million in 2010 reaching a high of 47.6 million in 2013. SNAP promised not to cut benefits and between 2008 and 2013 had the longest uninterrupted spurt of food stamp benefit growth the nation has ever enjoyed. The USDA then intentionally, abruptly, and with significant terrorism, cut aggregate SNAP benefits on Halloween 2013 and Thanksgiving 2016, but couldn't do the math right, although they tried twice on October 7 and November 10, 2016. Average benefits payments went down from \$133.07 in 2013, to \$125.01 in 2014, up to \$126.83 in 2015 and down again to \$125.52 in 2016 this counts as two counts of intentional deprivation of relief benefits under 18USC§246. A strange section pertaining to publicly operated community health centers (from 1985?) needs to be repealed under 7USC§212a.

After the Farm Bill of 2002 food stamp participation increased from about 17.2 million in fiscal year 2000 to 26 million people in July 2006. The rate of payment accuracy in the FSP improved 34 percent between FY2000 and FY2004 and the 94.12% overall payment accuracy rate was the highest achieved since the inception of the program. USDA awarded \$48 million to 24 States for their exemplary administration of the program in fiscal year (FY) 2005. By August 2008, participation had reached an all-time (non-disaster) high of 29 million people per month. The 2008 farm bill (H.R. 2419, the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008) was enacted May 22, 2008 through an override of the President's veto. The new law increased the commitment to Federal food assistance programs by more than \$10 billion over the next 10 years. In efforts to fight stigma, the law changed the name of the Federal program to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program or SNAP as of Oct. 1, 2008, and changed the name of the Food Stamp Act of 1977 to the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008. Additional Recovery Act funds were terminated as of October 31, 2013 in accordance with an illegitimate Republican interpretation of section 442 of the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-296). The cuts were deep and totalitarian, as has happened so many times before under the Food Stamp Act of 1977. SNAP beneficiaries did not get the tenure promised by Food, Conservation and Energy Act of 2008 H.R. 2419 and the longest uninterrupted growth in good stamp from the Farm Bill of 2002 was brought to end. Food Stamp had their best run with the renaming of the program to Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) between 2009 to Halloween 2013. Since then, with more cuts on Thanksgiving 2016, benefits have gotten smaller and beneficiaries are poorer. For poor Americans receive a full ration of SNAP benefit spending increases 3.3% annual SNAP growth = 0.6% growth in beneficiaries + 2.7% consumer price index (CPI) inflation. The irony is that the cost of SNAP growth is well-within the FNS spending over-estimates and it would not cost more to keep the promise to not cut SNAP benefits. The accounting errors in the consumer food subsidy are paid out in the form of commodity insurance for large export companies damaged by the trade war with China in conflict with the Swiss Formula for Unilateral Tariff Reductions (2007) upgrade from algebra to calculus, 0.99 developing, 0.97 industrialized.

Under SNAP rules, the maximum benefit levels for each fiscal year — which are the benefit amounts that go to households with no disposable income after deductions for certain necessities — are set at 100 percent of the cost of the Thrifty Food Plan, USDA's estimate of the minimum amount that a family needs to afford a bare-bones, nutritionally adequate diet, for the (unconstitutionally vague) preceding June. 3.3% spending growth is estimated because FNS must make a conscious effort to

increase benefit amount with 2.7% average consumer price inflation, population growth is expected to be low, only 0.6%, because the USDA has broken the promise not to cut “SNAP” benefits made in the Farm Bill of 2008. To prevent anorexic policy from breaking bones, the Thrifty Food Plan needs to set a new standard of beauty, 2.7% average consumer price inflation, more than the basic ration of the previous year. Food stamps cost more, and spending grows faster, than services 3%, or government 2.5%. Every tax-dollar spent on agricultural subsidies is estimated to contribute 16 dollars to the local economy. Food stamps are the most effective and sustainable consumer driven agricultural subsidy. Otherwise producers will sue for commodity insurance and other agricultural subsidies, that do not feed the poor for no extra cost. The beauty of growing federal SNAP benefit spending 3.3% annually is that by eliminating the moral hazards of breaking the SNAP promise not to cut benefits and targeting immigrants for death by starvation, in-between the commodity insurance due to Chinese agricultural tariffs and accounting errors, it costs taxpayers nearly exactly the same amount to pay for SNAP growth and use the federal agricultural subsidy to feed Americans, as it does to have low morale and engage in undeclared undistributed offsetting receipts with OMB. Government cheese costs extra, but is needed to enforce the expiration date on dairy products at the food bank.

International Agricultural Assistance Supplement

The US international agricultural assistance program has been effectively terminated since FY 2018 by (continuing resolution) CR 18. Congress failed to defend international assistance programs, against budget cuts, with the defective zero growth policy that protects other federal programs, and international agricultural assistance was especially targeted for total discrimination, by President Donald J. Trump. Funding spiked from \$1.9 billion FY 16 to \$2.1 billion FY 17 before reaching zero in FY 18 – FY 19. \$2.1 billion FY 20 is needed to refinance both International Agricultural Assistance programs, on the condition that it grows 3% to \$2.2 billion FY 21 and increases 3% annually thereafter. Congress may be perplexed by the xenophobic role reversal of the Mayor to sue the US Congress for discriminating against the Buy American Act under 24USC§225h in regards to the international treaty obligation to sustain US financing for international agricultural assistance programs under 7USC§1691. Termination of US international agricultural assistance constitutes a grave breach of Arts. 23, 55 and 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Times of War (1949). The number of undernourished people is reported to have increased to 821 million in 2017 from 800 million in 2016– around one out of every nine people in the world, by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in 2018. *The Report of the Secretary General on SDG Progress 2019* estimated 821 million people – approximately 1 in 9 people in the world – were undernourished in 2017, up from 784 million in 2015. This represents a worrying rise in world hunger for a third consecutive year after a prolonged decline. Government spending on agriculture compared to agriculture’s contribution to the total economy has declined by 37 per cent; the ratio fell from 0.42 in 2001 to 0.26 worldwide in 2017. In addition, aid to agriculture in developing countries fell from nearly 25 per cent of all donors’ sector-allocable aid in the mid-1980s to only 5 per cent in 2017, representing a decrease of \$12.6 billion (Guterres '19: 7, 8). WHO once estimated every dollar invested agricultural subsidies means \$16 to the local economy. Termination of US international agricultural assistance 2018-2019 has obviously compromised achievement of Sustainable Development Goals 2.1 By 2030, end hunger and ensure access by all people, in particular the poor and people in vulnerable situations, including infants, to safe, nutritious and sufficient food all year round. The genocide convention is applicable if a particular class of people has been marked for extermination by the authorities - even if by starvation rather than outright execution (Natsios '01: 50). North Korea and US immigrants can be described as being targeted for death by starvation because of the termination of US international agricultural assistance and anti-immigrant food stamp rules, respectively.

International Agricultural Assistance Spending FY 16 – FY 20
(millions)

	FY 16	FY 17	FY 18	FY 19	FY 20
P.L. 480, Title II	1,716	1,900	0	0	1,927
McGovern- Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition	202	202	0	0	227
Total	1,918	2,102	0	0	2,154

Source: State Department, Foreign Operations and Related Organizations FY 17 and FY 19

The termination of US agricultural assistance could lead to widespread famine and must be prioritized as the absolutely most affected program by the Trump budget cuts, second are international assistance programs undefended by CR 18, third are civilian Cabinet agencies suffering from abuse of congressional zero spending growth policy. 2 - 3 million people died in the North Korean famine of 1996 when the Soviet food assistance program was terminated, before news had even crossed the DMZ to their families in southern Korea that they were starving (Natsios '01). Because too much food can be a wasteful problem for the 672 million people who are obese worldwide, like Presidents Trump and Un sometimes, the international assistance program and other food programs that were cut are not tempted with arrears in the first instance, they are offered 3% annual program level growth from \$1.9 billion FY 16 to \$2.1 billion FY 20. Costing less and making more over the long-term, a 3% agricultural inflation allowance is a better deal than arrears from FY 16 or high FY 17 levels. To feed a growing population, spending for food service programs needs to grow faster than spending for paper-pushing governments, that grow 2.5% annually, due to 2.7% average annual consumer price inflation in foodstuff, in the United States, but food perishes. Total State Department budget program levels must be recalculated from FY 16 total levels of \$56.0 billion, at annual 2.5% government and 3% International Agricultural Assistance P.L. 480 spending growth, to \$60.1 billion FY 20. This FY 20 estimate includes \$1 billion arrears for United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organizations (UNESCO) and United Nations Relief and Works Administration for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).

It is the policy of the United States to use its abundant agricultural productivity enhance the food security of the developing world through the use of agricultural commodities and local currencies to –

1. Combat world hunger and malnutrition and their causes;
2. Promote broad-based, equitable, and sustainable development, including agricultural development;
3. Expand international trade;
4. Develop and expand export markets for United States agricultural commodities;
5. Foster and encourage the development of private enterprise and democratic participation in developing countries under 7USC§1691.

Countries are eligible for emergency food assistance if a country has a famine and is recognized as a least developed country with an agricultural deficit evidenced by,

1. That the daily per capita calorie consumption of the country is less than 2300 calories.
2. Food security requirements are that the country cannot meet its food security requirements through domestic production or imports due to a shortage of foreign exchange earnings.
3. Child mortality rate of children under 5 years of age in the country is in excess of 100 per 1000 births under 7USC§1727a.

The number of undernourished people is estimated to have increased to 821 million in 2017 from 800 million in 2016— around one out of every nine people in the world. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World: Building Climate Resilience for Food Security and Nutrition 2018 monitors progress towards the targets of ending both hunger (SDG Target 2.1) and all forms of malnutrition (SDG Target 2.2). New evidence continues to signal a rise in world hunger and a reversal of trends after a prolonged decline. While some progress continues to be made in reducing child stunting, levels still remain unacceptably high. Nearly 151 million children under five – or over 22% – are affected by stunting in 2017. Wasting continues to affect over 50 million children under five in the world and these children are at increased risk of morbidity and mortality. Furthermore, over 38 million children under five are overweight. Adult obesity is worsening and more than one in eight adults in the world – or more than 672 million – is obese. The absolute number of people in the world affected by undernourishment, or chronic food deprivation, is now estimated to have increased from around 804 million in 2016 to nearly 821 million in 2017. The situation is worsening in South America and most regions of Africa; likewise, the decreasing trend in undernourishment that characterized Asia until recently seems to be slowing down significantly.

A total of 5 nations suffered totalitarian famines in the 20th century – Soviet Ukraine (1930-1933), the People's Republic of China (1958-62), Ethiopia (1984-85), Cambodia (1974-79) and North Korea (1994-98). The dekulakization and forced collectivization in the Soviet Union killed 14.5 million people nationwide with particular focus on the Soviet Ukraine between 1929 and 1933 Stalin is particularly noted for attempting to cover up evidence of this debacle. Mao Zedong launched the Great Leap Forward in 1958 after having begun forced collectivization of agriculture in 1956 Great Leap Forward borrowed from Stalin's agriculture minister. The ensuing Chinese famine from 1958 to 1962 resulted in an estimated 30 million deaths. Another hidden famine killed several hundred thousand people in Ethiopia between 1972 and 1973 precipitating a coup by military officers in 1974 that unseated Emperor Haile Selassie. The subsequent famine of 1984-85 which killed one million people, was reportedly a consequence of drought induced crop failure. Robert Kaplan reported in his book on the famine however that attempts to resettle hundreds of thousands of people from the Amharic and Tigrayan highlands to resettlement camps in the fertile lowlands where they were served miniscule portions of food for 11 hours of work; hundreds of thousands of people died. Starvation was one of the means used by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia 1974-1979 to water the killing the fields and it is estimated that perhaps a third of the casualties of resulted from deliberately planned starvation that included preventing people from scavenging for wild foods. The North Korean famine of 1994 to 1998 after the severance of Eastern Bloc aid after the dissolution of the Soviet Union resulted as the result of the massive corruption, secrecy and greed that led to the collapse of the public distribution system (PDS) during the social transition to a market distribution system led to an estimated 2 to 3 million deaths (Natsios '01: 49-54).

The World Food Program was established in 1963, WFP is the United Nations frontline agency in the fight against global hunger. In 2003, WFP fed 104 million people in 81 countries, including most of the world's refugees and internally displaced people. Since it was set-up in 1963, the Rome-based organization has invested US\$27.8 billion and more than 43 million metric tonnes of food to combat hunger, promote economic and social development and provide relief assistance in emergencies throughout the world. In USAID the Office of Food for Peace administers food relief to famished regions of the world under 7USC§1691. The World Food Program (WFP) and Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) alleviated famine in Yemen and are deeply concerned that North Korea had a bad harvest, in the total absence of any US international agricultural assistance whatsoever. Congress may be perplexed by the role reversal of the Mayor to sue the US President for discriminating against Buy

American provisions under 24USC§225h in regards to sustaining federal financial support for international agricultural assistance under 7USC§1691. If the United States is unable to continue to coordinate the delivery of agricultural assistance commodities, and restart P.L. 480 and the McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition, the equivalent of the international agricultural assistance budget may be contributed directly to the WFP, but this is unsolicited. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) FAO/WFP Joint Rapid Food Security Assessment was issued May 2019. Prolonged dry spells, abnormally high temperatures and floods, coupled with limited supplies of agricultural inputs, had a severe impact on yields of the 2018 main crops harvested last September/October. Production prospects for the 2018/19 early season crops – to be harvested in June – are unfavorable due to widespread low rainfall and lack of snow cover, which left crops exposed to freezing temperatures during winter. Post-harvest losses from harvesting to storage are expected to be higher than usual as shortages of fuel and electricity hampered the timely transport and processing of crops as well as the ventilation of stocks. The 2018 aggregate food crop production is estimated to be below-average at 4.9 million mt, 12 percent below the previous year's near-average level and the lowest level since the 2008/09 season. Cereal import requirements in the 2018/19 marketing year (November/October) are estimated at 1.59 million mt. With commercial imports officially planned at 200,000 mt and food assistance (already received or pledged) set at about 21,200 mt, the uncovered deficit for the full marketing year is estimated at an elevated level of about 1.36 million mt.

Food consumption levels are low and dietary diversity is very poor. Diets mainly consist of rice, maize or potatoes complimented by kimchi (cabbage) or vegetables and greens, when available. Protein intake is very low. Poor food consumption is widespread in the surveyed population in both November (37 percent) and April (46 percent) assessments and only a few households have an acceptable diet. Food-related coping strategies are widely adopted, including reducing consumption by adults for children to eat and reducing meal sizes. Urban households who typically rely on relatives in rural areas to access food and diversify their consumption are no longer able to do so to the same extent, as also rural households increasingly face food shortages. Since January 2019, rations of the Public Distribution System (PDS) have been reduced to 300 grams per person per day (g/pp/day), which compares to 380 grams during the same period in 2018. Rations may decline further during the July to September period, when PDS rations are typically lower compared to other months of the year. Overall, it is estimated that 10.1 million people (40 percent of the population) are food insecure and in urgent need of food assistance. The situation could further deteriorate during the lean season from May to September, if no proper and urgent humanitarian actions are taken.

DPRK does not officially release economic data and widely varying estimations of macroeconomic numbers exist. Estimations of the Bank of the Republic of Korea suggest that in 2016 the local economy grew at its fastest pace in 17 years, when for the first time, GDP per capita surpassed the US \$1,000 mark. More recent analyses by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) suggest that the country experienced an economic downturn in 2017 and 2018, amid reduced trade activities as a consequence of sanctions targeting top-earning export sectors, such as coal, minerals and textiles. The primary economic activities in the DPRK are mining, some heavy industry, agriculture and fisheries. The agricultural sector is estimated to contribute to roughly one quarter of the country's GDP, with significant fluctuations over the years due to frequent climatic shocks impacting agricultural production. The geography of the country is largely mountainous, with only 15 percent of the land (or 1.9 million ha) suitable for agriculture. Of this, about 30 percent is irrigated, mostly paddy fields and winter/spring crops. The most productive agricultural land is located in the western plains of the country, and narrow strips along the east coast. Rice, maize and potatoes constitute the major food crops, with the first two commodities contributing 45 and 34 percent of overall grain production respectively. However, the proportion of each crop produced and consumed in local diets varies greatly

in different parts of the country. Soybean, barley and wheat are also widely cultivated as well as minor grains such as millet, sorghum, oats and rye. The organization of the rural economy is mostly characterized by the operation of cooperative farms, with a smaller number of state farms. According to the CBS, the farming population involves 2,513 cooperative farms with 2.54 million farmers and 707 state farms, employing 802,000 farmers. State farms tend to be specialized in large -scale production of livestock, fruits, vegetables and other cash crops. By contrast, cooperative farms are responsible for producing most of the grains and staple foods. They also produce vegetables, fruits and livestock, which are sold into the government marketing system and distributed to cooperative farm members.

Cultivated lands with slopes below 15 degrees are managed by cooperative farms, while lands above 15 degrees of slope are officially administered by the Ministry of Land and Environmental Protection (MoLEP). Sloping lands are also used by households, both from cooperative farms and from urban areas, to grow maize, soybean, vegetables and other crops for their own consumption. This practice dates back to the late 1990's when, due to the general shortages of food, land use regulations were relaxed and households expanded cultivation onto sloping lands. In 2014, however, the government initiated a reforestation program that is resulting in a gradual decline in production from sloping lands. The main agricultural season starts in April, with the arrival of the spring rains, and the harvest normally takes place between September and October. One important element for achieving food security involves expanding the area under double cropping as broadly as possible through practices such as using greenhouses to produce seedlings for transplanting to open fields, using tunnel houses and plastic mulch to preserve soil moisture, and the introduction of short-season and cold-tolerant varieties that can extend the growing season. The availability of vegetables in the winter months is very limited. Traditionally in October/November both urban and rural households use cabbage to make kimchi as their main source of vegetables until the following March/April. Assuming average productivity of 15 mt/hectare from an area of 30,000 hectare on cooperatives and state farms, vegetable production could be estimated at about 0.45 million mt. This compares to a requirement of 2.7 million mt based on a recommended minimum consumption of 300 g/pp/day, suggesting a gap of vegetables as high as 2 million mt. the overall number of livestock between 2015 and 2017, with the exception of pigs, which increased by about 8 percent from 2.41 million head in 2015 to 2.6 million head by 2017. The country has no traditional rangelands, but some forest lands has been converted to grazing lands totaling up to about 200,000 ha.

The sanctions imposed on the country by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in December 2017 were the strictest yet. The text of the resolution states that sanctions “are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK”. Nevertheless, the unintended negative impact sanctions can have on agricultural production, through both direct and indirect impacts, cannot be ignored. The most obvious are restrictions on the importation of certain items that are necessary for agricultural production, in particular fuel, machinery and spare parts for equipment. In 1991, the country's oil consumption amounted to 3.8 million mt/year, subsequently falling to 750,000 mt by 2017. According to data received from CBS, the national allocation of fuel for agriculture in 2018 was 44,502 mt, including 40,502 mt of diesel and 4,000 mt of petrol. Given an average annual amount of 1.4 million hectares cultivated between 2012 and 2018, this amounts to 31 kg of diesel fuel per hectare. Shortages of fuel, electricity and pumping equipment limit the ability to irrigate, reducing yields and making crops susceptible to extreme weather shocks, such as drought and heatwaves. Lack of energy can result in grain with high moisture content going into storage, making it susceptible to spoilage or the occurrence of mould, fungus and mycotoxins. Storage of crops in facilities lacking proper ventilation, temperature and humidity control can further add to post-harvest losses. Potatoes are particularly sensitive to humidity and temperature, and post-harvest losses of potatoes in storage areas are reportedly as high as 20 percent. In the potato growing region such as

Ryanggang Province, families may receive two mt of potatoes or more at distribution and be responsible for storing them until the food distribution in the following year. Storage at a household level in rudimentary facilities undoubtedly results in a high degree of household waste.

The 2018 harvested area of soybeans has decreased for the second consecutive year and it is estimated at 107,000 hectares, about 40 percent below the area harvested in 2016. Overall, the area planted with the soybeans has been steadily increasing between 2013 and 2016, reflecting government efforts to enhance nutrition security and diet diversity. The average yield of rice paddy in 2018 is set at 4.4 mt/hectare, about 12 percent lower than the 2017 level of 5 mt/hectare. All provinces registered severe paddy yield reductions, while crops in Ryangang and North Hamgyong provinces were less affected by the dry weather conditions and official estimates show an increase in yields compared with 2017. Rice production in 2018 is officially estimated at 2.1 million mt (in paddy terms), 12 percent below previous year below -average level. The average maize yield in 2018 is estimated at 3.7 mt/hectare, showing a decline of 14 percent compared with the previous year level. Yields of soybean are set at 1.3 mt/hectare, about 15 percent below the previous year's above-average level. The only exception were yields of crops which are more resistant to dry weather, such as sorghum, millet, and buckwheat and potatoes. The average yields other cereals, including sorghum, millet, and buckwheat, is officially estimated to have increased by 13 percent compared with the previous year's level and were also well above average. The yields of the main season potatoes is officially estimated at 5.6 mt/hectare, 14 percent above the 2017 level of 4.9 mt/hectare. The aggregate 2018/19 cereal production is estimated at about 4.9 million mt (in cereal equivalent and paddy terms), 12 percent below the 2017 near-average output.

In broad terms, in DPRK households access food through multiple and diverse avenues. According to the government, most of the population gets its greatest share of food staples from PDS rations (if the household is headed by workers, governmental officials or pensioners) while the rest receive staples directly through post-harvest allocations (if the household is headed by a cooperative or state farmer). In 2017, 17.5 million people (71.5 percent of population) were reported to be PDS-dependent⁶, while 7 million people were either working in cooperative farms (6.1 million) or state farms (800,000) and therefore not PDS -dependent. Across the country, farmers work in 3,220 farms (2,513 cooperative farms and 707 state farms) distributed in almost every county. In addition to staple food, food is also accessed at household level through kitchen gardens, state shops, farmers markets and through relatives. Cash plays an important role in accessing food purchased at farmers' markets as well as in collecting food from state shops and at PDS distribution centers where in both cases commodities need to be paid for, though at highly subsidized prices, as reported to the FAO/WFP team in different counties. Eating meals in institutions is also a common food access strategy. For example, children from six months of age, commonly attend nurseries where they receive three meals per day. The Food Procurement and Distribution Authority sets the average monthly ration for the coming month, one month ahead of time. Distributions take place twice per month, normally between 1st - 5th and 15th - 20th day of each month following a distribution schedule for registered households managed at the Public Distribution Centers (PDCs). The PDS rations, distributed through the PDCs, are acquired at fixed subsidized prices (44 KPW/kg for rice, 24 Korean KPW/kg for maize), relatively low if compared to fluctuating prices for other staple food items (such as soybeans and potatoes) in the farmers markets or state shops. The PDS rations vary in quantity and composition throughout the year and between years. The official national target ration for planning was 573 g/ pp/day for several years, but for 2019 it has been lowered by 5 percent to 550 g/pp/day. At time of writing, the reported effective PDS ration is 300 g/pp/day (January-April 2019), which represents a sharp reduction compared to the 2018 ration size (that started with 380 g/pp/day in January and ended with 360 g/pp/day in December), and the lowest registered for the initial months of any calendar year. On average, households (including

both PDS-dependent and cooperative farmers) surveyed in April 2019 received 1,393 kcal/pp/day in the form of PDS rations or post-harvest allocations (with 394 g/pp/day on average⁸) whereas those surveyed in November 2018 got higher rations on average (1,529 kcal/pp/day from 447 g/pp/day⁹). This decline in average food rations received by PDS-dependent and cooperative farmers alike reflects the impact of the declining harvest and the growing food gap that has been announced at the national level. Based on rations reportedly received by the interviewed households, in April 2019, PDS-dependent households could access 1,080 kcal/pp/day (average PDS ration of 306 g/pp/day), while cooperative farmer households could access 2,285 kcal/pp/day (in form of post-harvest allocations of 647 g/pp/day of staples). When analyzed from the caloric point of view, PDS-dependent households in the April 2019 dataset are provided with 1,369 kcal/pp/day, which falls short of the recommended daily calorie intake of 2,100 kcal/pp/day by 35 percent and of the minimum basal requirements of 1,800 kcal/pp/day by 24 percent (Figure 9). In absolute terms, the PDS ration size is not enough to provide enough caloric intake. For cooperative farmers, the situation seems to appear less challenging as they receive 2,285 kcal/pp/day on average and need at least 2,500 kcal – 5,000 kcal to perform hard manual agricultural labor.

Different types of state shops exist in DPRK and serve as one of the food sources selling daily food items such as salt, oil, bean paste, eggs, other processed foods, as well as vegetables and fruits in specific seasons. Food items at state shops are sold at a fixed, subsidized price, which does not change through the year or by season. People visit the shop, show their coupons and pay in cash. Coupons work as entitlements to buy certain kinds of food items (the amounts per household are indicated on the coupon and those amounts vary by households depending on the household member occupation, hard or light labour, and number of dependents). Coupons are a means to distribute the relatively small supply of certain items as compared to the total population in the area being serviced. In addition to state shops, markets play an important role in food systems as a place to source foods, receive cash or barter items. The relevance and importance of this mechanism has been growing relentlessly since the severe food shortages in the 1990s but remains poorly understood. One form of market is the farmers markets, where people from farming families gather on the 11th, 21st and 31/1st of each month and sell or exchange food products (vegetables and animals), largely coming from their kitchen gardens. A farmers' market can be as sizable as 600-700 sellers, reflecting the widespread need among people to satisfy their food consumption needs through market exchanges, plus the need for cash to purchase other items. In April, all the surveyed households reported buying food, with 72 percent visiting farmers' markets regularly to purchase food, which is consistent with the November datasets. Prices of sea sh have almost tripled, and basic (and more affordable) sources of proteins such as eggs have double in price from 150 KPW/piece to 300 KPW/piece. It is worth mentioning that eggs in state shops (when available, which is often not the case) only cost 10-12 KPW. Around 90 percent of cooperative farmer households have a kitchen garden, while only 40 percent of PDS-dependent households do.

Among surveyed households in April 2019, only 7 percent had an acceptable diet with a more frequent intake of high-protein foods and fruits (see Table 19). The other 93 percent (poor and borderline food consumption) of the households reported a daily diet that is insufficient in diversity and nutrients. When compared to the November 2018 dataset, the food security situation is clearly worsening. According to the 2017 Multi Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) carried out by CBS with technical and financial support from UNICEF, higher stunting rates are registered in older children. According to the survey, the prevalence of stunting in DPRK can be as high as 32 percent in some provinces. It also showed that young children in rural areas are more likely to be stunted than those living in urban areas. Several nurseries reported percentages of undernourishment between 15-25 percent. Based on the analysis and converging findings of the November 2018 and April 2019 household assessments, the Mission estimated that 10.1 million people are food insecure and in urgent need of assistance, including

7.5 million PDS dependents and 2.6 million farmers. The food gap stands at 1.36 million mt for the whole marketing year 2018/2019. It would be discrimination for the US President to require the North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un to eliminate nuclear weapons and missile testing as a condition for the receipt of US agricultural and food assistance under 24USC§225h. It would however be uncharacteristic for the US to pass on such an opportunity to reason with Un. The ballistic missile tests have backfired and are even now still causing artificial warming of the Pacific. North Korea will be stricken with drought until the ocean completely cools. Un is advised to use this evidence of self-inflicted global warming to justify ceasing to deposit spent ballistic missiles from (nuclear?) tests, in the Pacific Ocean, and support efforts to neutralize any thermal pollution therefrom, pursuant to the Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992) under Art. 27 of the Declaration on Social Progress and Development (1969).

The US President is similarly charged with responding to evidence of the consequences of his unlawful actions, and must cease his unlawful economic interventions, whereas his current account budget and international trade balances are defective or unpublished, respectively, and must pay reparations so it would be as if the unlawful budget cuts had never occurred. There is no denying unlawful tariff increases have caused the US international trade deficit to increase and are struggling to declare customs revenue growth against the prevailing policy of tariff reduction (from 2016 where hyper-inflationary). Anti-immigrant policy has caused several years of zero income tax revenue growth that cannot be entirely concealed by the tax cut for the rich. Budget cuts have depressed civilian government who are due redress in the form of an inflation allowance of 2.5% for government and 3% for services since FY 16, before the illegal cuts. 3.3% growth is needed for food full food stamp benefit payments, 2.7% inflation and 0.6% cowed population increase, and 4% for disability, for a 3% COLA and 1% population growth, is from the previous year, whereas costs and benefits are significantly higher for public welfare than other professional government programs and brutal eligibility requirements and prior recertification torture treatment despite the SNAP promise that there would be no more cuts, furthermore inhibit enrollment, damage to these programs is done, it is evidence of robbery against the President and Congress, who are conspicuously unable to produce an accurately balanced federal budget or Food and Nutrition Service budget, respectively. The genocide convention is applicable if a particular class of people has been marked for extermination by the authorities- even if by starvation rather than outright execution. Punitive rationing occurred in the Chinese famine of 1958-62 village families who descended from landlords wither were not fed at all or were fed a lower ration than the poorer class of peasants. Research on the Ukrainian famine in the early 1930's proved that Stalin's objective was to liquidate the kulak class of farmers. Similarly, US government intelligence sources reported that as the public distribution system broke down, the North Korean authorities focused food supplies on three groups: members and immediate families of the military, of the party, and of workers in strategic industries such as mining (Natsios '01: 49-54, 211).

Trumps unlawful anti-immigrant starvation genocide and work for food stamps requirement incited workplace shootings are much more descriptive of totalitarian famine as an act of genocide. Contemporary theory directs that when confronted with famine to suspect the presence of a totalitarian regime that must be closely regulated for the domestic administration of relief to have any chance of succeeding in meeting the nation's agricultural needs because the totalitarian state makes the wealthy and politically connected overweight without so much as a grain of rice being given to the poor. There is deep concern that the DSM-V does not recognize overeating as a mental disorder, like anorexia and bulimia, due to non-self incrimination. Totalitarian famines caused by Trump, Un, and Astrue indicate that the obese obsess about eating the poor people's food. The legal standard of mental illness is that a person can be institutionalized if they are a harm to themselves, others, and/or extremely destructive to the environment under *Washington v. Harper* (1990). It is extremely harmful for Congress to

discriminate against the Buy American Act under 24USC§225h in regards to the international treaty obligation to sustain US financing for international agricultural assistance programs under 7USC§1691. Terminating US international agricultural assistance impoverishes US producers, dollar for dollar, and gravely compromises achievement of Sustainable Development Goal 2.1 By 2030, end hunger and ensure access by all people, in particular the poor and people in vulnerable situations, including infants, to safe, nutritious and sufficient food all year round. The genocide convention is applicable if a particular class of people has been marked for extermination by the authorities - even if by starvation rather than outright execution (Natsios '01: 50)

Because the charge against President Trump is **incitement to violence**, the remedy is prohibition of propaganda under Art. 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1978), to charge the United States with genocide in regards to the totalitarian famine in international agricultural assistance, it is necessary to charge Speaker of the House Pelosi, who did not defend agricultural assistance against totalitarian famine, or international assistance with their self-incriminating zero spending growth policy, with **torture**, intrinsic to her obsession with the Permanent Select Intelligence Committee, as a crime of genocide under 18USC§1091. It is the Speaker of the House and the ex-CIA Secretary of State who must be impeached before the 2020 Presidential elections. It is not enough for President Obama to say, “the United States does not torture” in 2009 when the torture statute got fuzzy to subsidize Pelosi as Speaker and Clinton as Secretary of State. The “balanced” budget has been proven to be a myth regarding the unsustainable Clinton robbery surplus. Revenues must grow faster than spending that must grow to compete with inflation 2.5% government, 3% services (since FY 16), 3.3% food stamp and 4% disability from previous year. The Swiss Formula for Unilateral Tariff Reduction needs to be upgraded from algebra to calculus – 0.99 for developing and 0.97 for industrialized nations (from 2016 where hyper-inflationary). The genocide convention obligates Congress to amend federal torture statute, since 2009, to comply with Arts. 2, 4 and 14 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1987) by repealing the phrase “outside the United States” from 18USC§2340A(a) and amending Exclusive Remedies at §2340B so: The legal system shall ensure that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation, including the means for as full rehabilitation as possible. In the event of the death of the victim as a result of an act of torture, their dependents shall be entitled to compensation under Art. 14 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1987).

Cuts to international agricultural assistance constitute discrimination against the Buy American Act under 24USC§225h in regards to the international treaty obligation to sustain US financing for international agricultural assistance programs under 7USC§1691. Terminating US international agricultural assistance impoverishes US producers, dollar for dollar, and gravely compromises achievement of Sustainable Development Goal 2.1 By 2030, end hunger and ensure access by all people, in particular the poor and people in vulnerable situations, including infants, to safe, nutritious and sufficient food all year round. This totalitarian famine of US international agricultural assistance constitutes a grave breach of Arts. 23, 55 and 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Times of War (1949). By reason of attitude not in accordance with the Geneva Conventions the government is under obligation to make good to consequence of injury. Thus every wrong creates a right for the court to rectify pursuant to the *Case Concerning the Factory of Chorzow* Permanent Court of Justice A. No. 9 (1927). Damages incurred to claimants regards their property, rights and interest and person. It was held that the essential principle contained in the actual trial of an illegal act is **non-repetition**, and that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed *Interpretations of Paragraph 4 of the Annex following*

Article 179 of the Treaty of Neuilly of 29 November 1919 (Greek Republic v. Kingdom Bulgaria) by the Permanent Court of Justice in No. 3 (12/9/1924) cited by Advisory Opinion regarding the Legal Consequences of Constructing a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory No. 131 on 9 July 2004.

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws under Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the US Constitution. When a person has by a final decision been convicted of a criminal offence and when subsequently his conviction has been reversed or he has been pardoned on the ground that a new or newly discovered fact shows conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice, the person who has suffered punishment as a result of such conviction shall be compensated according to law, unless it is proved that the non-disclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to him under Art. 14(6) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 23 March 1976. The State shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation, including the means for as full rehabilitation as possible. In the event of the death of the victim as a result of an act of torture, his dependents shall be entitled to compensation under Art. 14 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 26 June 1987.

Reiterated from Calcium Supplement [HA-7-10-19](#)

Work Cited

FAO and WFP. 2019. FAO/WFP Joint Rapid Food Security Assessment, Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Bangkok. 40 pp. License: CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO.

Guterres, António. Report of the Secretary-General on SDG Progress 2019. Special Edition. United Nations Publications. New York. 2019 (for integration)

Natsios, Andrew S. The Great North Korean Famine, Politics and Foreign Policy. Institute for Peace. 2001

The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World: Building Climate Resilience for Food Security and Nutrition. Food and Agriculture Organization. 2018